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Abstract: Among the many peculiarities of schizophrenics perhaps the most obvious is their tendency to say odd things. Indeed, for
most clinicians, the hallmark of schizophrenia is "thought disorder" (which is usually defined tautologically as incoherent speech).
Decades of clinical observations, experimental research, and linguistic analyses have produced many hypotheses about what,
precisely, is wrong with schizophrenic speech and language. These hypotheses range from assertions that schizophrenics have
peculiar word association hierarchies to the notion that schizophrenics are suffering from an intermittent form of aphasia. In this
article, several popular hypotheses (and the observations on which they are based) are critically assessed. Work in the area turns out
to be flawed by errors in experimental method, faulty observations, tautological reasoning, and theoretical models that ignore the
complexities of both speech and language. This does not mean that schizophrenics are indistinguishable from nonschizophrenics.
They are clearly deviant in many situations. Their problem, however, appears to be in processing information and in selective
attention, not in language itself.
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Consider the following excerpts taken from several pub-
lished conversations:
a. Then, I always liked geography. My last teacher in
the subject was Professor August A. He was a man
with black eyes. I also like black eyes. There are also
blue and gray eyes and other sorts, too. I have heard
it said that snakes have green eyes. All people have
eyes. There are some, too, who are blind. These
blind people are led by a boy. It must be terrible not
to be able to see. There are people who can't see,
and, in addition, can't hear. I know some who hear
too much. One can hear too much. There are many
sick people in Burgholzli; they are called patients.
(Bleuler 1950, p. 17)
b. Everybody needs sex. . . . I haven't had sex for five
years. The clock is in this room because they want
patients to learn how to tell time. I know Mary
Poppins, and she lives in Massachusetts. I didn't
like the movie "Mary Poppins." They messed up
the book, so they could try to win the Oscar. Movies
come from real life. This morning, when I was at
Hillside, I was making a movie. I was surrounded
by movie stars. The x-ray technician was Peter
Lawford. The security guard was Don Knotts. . . .
Is this room painted blue to get me upset? My
grandmother died four weeks after my eighteenth
birthday. (Sheehan 1981, p. 69)
c. Yes. Of course, the whole thing wasn't my idea. So,
I suppose I'd be perfectly happy if he came back and
decided to do it all on his own. If I could make two
trips myself, I don't see why he can't. (Laffal 1979,
p. 309)
d. Well, I wonder if that part of it can't be - 1 wonder if
that doesn't - let me put it frankly; I wonder if that
doesn't have to be continued? Let me put it this
way: let us suppose you get the million bucks, and
you get the proper way to handle it. You could hold
that side? (Gold 1974, p. 117)
I have asked several colleagues (three clinical psychol-
ogists) to read these passages and then to rate them on a
five-point scale ranging from "schizophrenic" to "nor-
mal." Invariably, excerpts a and b are judged "schizo-
phrenic." It is easy to see why. The speakers jump from
one subject to another, produce peculiar associations,
and sound quite bizarre. Excerpts a and b are excellent
examples of how clinicians and laymen expect schizo-
phrenics to talk.
Unlike the first two excerpts, the third (c) is usually
rated "normal." It is neither bizarre nor particularly
obscure. Excerpt c presents a problem for researchers
interested in schizophrenia because it, too, was produced
by a patient diagnosed schizophrenic (see Laffal 1979, for
diagnostic criteria). Schizophrenic speech, you see, may
not always be "schizophrenic."
Excerpt d was rated moderately schizophrenic. It is not
bizarre, but it is repetitive, loose, and difficult to follow.
It was produced by former U.S. President Richard Nixon
(diagnosis unknown). Many of his colleagues produced
similar speech (Gold 1974). This excerpt brings up an-
other problem for researchers. Difficult-to-follow speech
is not limited solely to schizophrenics. Schizophrenics
may say things that appear strange to listeners, but so do
normal people and nonschizophrenic patients. The fol-
lowing excerpt, for example, comes from a 47-year-old
hypomanic patient:
Women of America, it behooves you one and all to help
at this, the most interesting epoch of the World's
History, in every way possible, the march of civiliza-
tion, the march to victory! I will play you Beethoven's
Great Symphony with its four fateful opening notes -
sol, sol, sol mi. . . . - V, V, V, V, the Day of the
Century has dawned! (R. A. Cohen 1975, p. 1020)
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The researcher studying schizophrenia is clearly in a
difficult position. On the one hand, schizophrenic speech
is easy to recognize (as in extracts a and b), but, on the
other hand, it makes up only a small part of schizophrenic
discourse (see Andreasen & Grove 1979 and Rochester &
Martin 1979). Moreover, nonschizophrenics may also
produce similar bizarre speech. To get around these
difficulties, theorists and researchers have focused not
merely on what schizophrenics say but also on how they
say it. Many papers have been published, the literature
has been reviewed several times (Maher 1966; 1972; Pavy
1968; Schwartz 1978b), but just what is wrong with
schizophrenic speech remains a puzzle. The present
paper is not merely another literature review. Instead,
the focus here is on the assumptions underlying various
research approaches. It is the present thesis that research
in the area of schizophrenic speech and language is flawed
by errors in experimental method, faulty observations,
tautological reasoning, and theoretical assumptions that
do not capture the complexities of speech or language.
Although it may be true that schizophrenics have cogni-
tive problems, the evidence for "schizophrenic language"
is not at all compelling.
In order to answer the question, Is there schizophrenic
language?, it is necessary to make clear what is meant by
the terms "schizophrenia," "language," and "schizo-
phrenic language." This paper begins, therefore, with
some definitions.
What is schizophrenia?
It is impossible to write about schizophrenia without
mentioning the frequently lamented unreliability of the
"schizophrenic" diagnosis. Many authors have worried
about diagnostic unreliability, and some have even ar-
gued that diagnoses are "of little value," being simply a
means for "providing employment" (Browning & Stover
1971, p. 403). There is no doubt that unreliable diagnoses
can exert a pernicious effect on research. If the subject
population used in an experiment is heterogeneous,
meaningful results are difficult to obtain and conflicting
findings across studies are inevitable. Clearly, for re-
search purposes, perfect agreement among diagnosti-
cians would be ideal. Perfect agreement is unlikely,
however, because schizophrenia is not a homogeneous
diagnostic category. Bleuler (1950) referred to "the
schizophrenias," and there is a fair amount of evidence
suggesting that he was right (Wing 1978). Nevertheless,
interrater diagnostic agreement for the category "schizo-
phrenia" is relatively high.
Beck and his coworkers (Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock & Erbaugh 1962) found an average interrater relia-
bility of 70 percent among four experienced psychiatrists
for the major diagnostic categories of psychosis, neurosis,
and character disorder. Similar reliability levels (73 to 74
percent) have been reported by Kreitman, Sainsbury,
Morrissey, Towers, and Scrivner (1961) and Sandifer,
Petlos, and Quade (1964). Even higher agreement has
been reported by Yusin, Nihira, and Mortashed (1974).
All of these studies have been criticised on meth-
odological grounds (diagnostic judgments were not al-
ways independent) and statistical ones (the statistics used
were not corrected for chance agreement; Fenton,
Mosher & Matthews 1981; Spitzer & Fleiss 1974). Using
the statistic kappa (an intraclass correlation that corrects
for chance agreement), Spitzer and Fleiss (1974) found
the reliability of the schizophrenic diagnosis to range
from .32 to .77 (1.00 indicates perfect agreement) in six
studies. The mean kappa was .57. More recently,
Spitzer, Forman, and Nee (1979) reported a kappa of .82
for the schizophrenic diagnosis. These estimates of psy-
chiatric reliability compare quite favorably with those
achieved in other branches of medicine.
Using established laboratory "tests," experienced radi-
ologists disagree about 30 percent of the time when
evaluating chest films (Herman & Hessel 1975), and
pathologists frequently disagree about whether tissue is
malignant (MacMahon, Morrison & Ackerman 1973).
The fact is that many medical diagnoses are as difficult to
make as psychiatric ones (over 30 percent of appendec-
tomies are performed on normal appendices; Thomas &
Mueller 1969).
Pathologists may have difficulty deciding whether a
particular tissue sample is malignant, but no one has
argued that this means that cancer does not exist. It is
similarly illogical to conclude that schizophrenia cannot
be studied because it is heterogeneous and sometimes
difficult to diagnose (Mosher 1978). Schizophrenia's het-
erogeneity does make it necessary, however, for investi-
gators to specify carefully the relevant characteristics of
the schizophrenic studied in their particular experiment.
Just saying that a patient has been "repeatedly diagnosed
as schizophrenic" (Chaika 1974, p. 259) is not enough.
Instead, researchers should provide a detailed rationale
for their subjects' diagnoses, using rating scales (Overall
& Woodward 1975) and careful clinical descriptions.
The present argument is not meant to imply that there
is one true set of diagnostic criteria. The diagnostic
criteria promulgated in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM HI (American Psy-
chiatric Association 1980) are as arbitrary as the "Re-
search Diagnostic Criteria" (Spitzer, Endicott & Robins
1978) and the "Feighner Criteria" (Feighner, Robins,
Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & Munoz 1972) from which
they were derived (Fenton et al. 1981; Overall & Hollis-
ter 1979). Nevertheless, these diagnostic systems do
permit researchers and clinicians to decide with some
degree of reliability whether or not a patient meets the
criteria for being diagnosed schizophrenic. As previously
noted, Spitzer, Forman, and Nee (1979) found the relia-
bility of the DSM III criteria to be higher (kappa = .82)
than for many purely somatic conditions.
A possible problem for investigators studying schizo-
phrenic speech and language is that "incoherence,
marked loosening of associations, markedly illogical
thinking or marked poverty of content of speech" (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, p. 188) is one of the DSM III
criteria for schizophrenia (particularly when associated
with blunt affect, delusions, hallucinations, or grossly
disorganized or catatonic behavior). If disordered speech
is a criterion for the schizophrenic diagnosis, then it is no
surprise that diagnosed schizophrenics show incoher-
ence, loosening of associations, and so on. Although the
dependence of the diagnosis of schizophrenia on "in-
coherence" often makes it difficult to separate the two,
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research may still proceed if investigators are clear about
what they mean by language - the subject of the next
section.
What is language?
Although Bleuler (1950) noted the peculiar speech of
schizophrenics, he did not feel that their deficit was
linguistic. "The abnormality," he wrote, "does not lie in
the language itself, but rather in its content" (p. 147).
Some writers on schizophrenia have failed to make this
distinction. Lewis (1944), in his preface to Kasanin's well-
known Language and Thought in Schizophrenia, uses the
terms "thought," "language," and "speech" interchange-
ably. Cameron (1944), in the same volume, agrees, stat-
ing "it is quite impossible in human adults to separate
thinking from language behavior" (p. 51). As Rochester
and Martin (1979) argue, the failure to distinguish among
thought, language, and speech leads to tautological argu-
ments such as: "thought disorder is when talk is in-
coherent and talk is incoherent when the thought is
disordered" (p. 5).
Linguists have long noted the conceptual distinction
between thought, language, and speech. For example,
the Swiss linguist Saussure (1915) distinguished between
langue, an abstract set of linguistic rules, and parole,
individual speech performance. Langue is present in the
brain of everyone who speaks a language, whereas parole
is, at any given time, created using langue. The impor-
tance of this distinction is that parole (speech) is created
using a language's rules, but it is also influenced by other
factors. That is, what one says is determined not only by
language but also by needs, motives, intelligence, the
situation, and even one's state of health.
The distinction between langue and parole is a com-
mon one in linguistics (see Hormann 1971, for a review);
it also underlies Chomsky's (1972) distinction between
"competence" and "performance." According to
Chomsky, a person who has internalized linguistic (syn-
tactic, semantic, and phonological) rules has developed
"competence." The observed speech of such a person
("performance") does not simply reflect competence,
however. It is also determined by factors such as the
situational context, the speaker's motives, and the speak-
er's memory ability. According to Chomsky, "To study a
language, then, we must attempt to dissociate a variety of
factors that interact with underlying competence to de-
termine actual performance" (p. 16). [See also Chomsky:
"Rules and Representations" BBS 3(1) 1980.]
A dissociation among language, speech, and thought as
well as the distinction between competence and perfor-
mance can be seen clearly in studies of "abnormal"
populations. Furth (1961) studied deaf and normal chil-
dren in a concept formation task and found that concepts
may be formed without the child knowing a word for the
particular concept being learned. Similarly, commissuro-
timized patients are able to perform tasks requiring
abstract thinking with their right cerebral hemispheres -
the hemisphere that lacks the capacity to talk (Sperry
1968). [See also Bradshaw & Nettleton: "The Nature
of Hemispheric Specialization in Man" BBS 4(1)
1981.]
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To summarize, language is an abstract set of semantic,
syntactic, and phonological rules learned by every speak-
er. Speech (what someone actually says) reflects the
speaker's knowledge of these rules but is also affected by
many other factors, including (but not limited to) the
situational context, the speaker's motives, the speaker's
cognitive ability, and even the speaker's emotional state.
Thought is reflected in speech, but it is not the same
phenomenon. Thought can proceed without speech, and
it can be studied independent of verbal productions (see
Posner 1978).
What is meant by schizophrenic language?
Few writers and researchers believe that there is a
language called "Schizophrenic" with its own linguistic
rules like French or English (although see Forrest 1976).
Usually, all that is meant by the term "schizophrenic
language" is that schizophrenics sometimes say strange
things. But as indicated in the preceding section, linguis-
tic performance is determined by more than just language
competence. Schizophrenics may be perfectly competent
linguistically and still be incoherent if they have difficul-
ties in any of the other factors affecting linguistic perfor-
mance.
It is also important to note that not all schizophrenics
display peculiar speech. Estimates vary (Andreasen &
Grove 1979; Gerson, Benson & Frazier 1977; Rochester
& Martin 1979), but all agree that the majority of schizo-
phrenics speak coherently most of the time. Moreover,
peculiar speech is found in other patients (Andreason &
Grove 1979) about as frequently as among schizo-
phrenics. To be precise, then, the goal of this paper is to
examine the evidence that some schizophrenics have a
language (competence) deficit (semantic, syntactic, or
phonological), which is responsible for their strange
speech. Alternative explanations for their strange verbal-
izations (information-processing deficits, pragmatic defi-
cits) are also explored.
Associationism and schizophrenic language
By far the largest amount of research in schizophrenic
speech and language has been conducted within an asso-
ciationistic framework. Associationistic studies are of sev-
eral types, but they focus on stimulus-response models of
speech production and comprehension. Common in this
literature is a preoccupation with "conditioning."
Verbal conditioning. There have been many attempts to
get schizophrenics to alter their speech production by
"reinforcing" certain words or classes of words (Salzinger
& Pisoni 1958; 1961; Ullmann, Krasner & Edinger 1964).
Sometimes these procedures work; sometimes they do
not (Frankel & Buchwald 1969). It is possible that some
schizophrenic symptoms can be ameliorated by verbal
conditioning (Meichenbaum 1973; Salzinger, Portnoy,
Pisoni & Feldman 1970), but, as an explanation for why
schizophrenics produce incoherent speech in the first
place, the verbal conditioning literature produces a taut-
ology: Schizophrenics produce peculiar verbalizations
because such behavior is reinforced.
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Some investigators (Levitz & Ullmann 1969, for exam-
ple) have succeeded in getting nonschizophrenic subjects
to give rare responses on a word association task using
"social reinforcement." They argue that these results are
consistent with a "behavioral" theory of schizophrenia.
That is, schizophrenics give rare associations because
they are "reinforced" for doing so. Meiselman has (1978)
challenged this reasoning, arguing that such findings
merely reflect normal "flexibility," not schizophrenia. He
neglected to mention another problem with this line of
reasoning - there is little evidence that schizophrenics
give rare associations in the first place (see Schwartz
1978a; 1978b, and the next section).
Schizophrenic word associations. For over 70 years, re-
searchers have claimed that schizophrenics give rarer
word associations than nonschizophrenics. This "finding"
has, in turn, become an important tenet of some theories
of schizophrenia (see Mednick 1958, for example). Pecu-
liar word association hierarchies imply deviant semantic
structures - a language deficit in the current terminol-
ogy. Unfortunately, methodological shortcomings and
errors in data analysis render the support for the schizo-
phrenia-word association relationship largely illusory
(Schwartz 1978a; 1978b). Some studies used extremely
heterogeneous experimental groups (Kent & Rosanoff
1910). Others failed to control for age, sex, educational
level, or hospitalization (Johnson, Weiss & Zelhart 1964).
One study (Sommer, Dewar & Osmond 1960) was flawed
by inconsistencies in the number of subjects for whom
data were reported (see Schwartz 1978a).
Some studies have found that schizophrenics give mure
common associations than nonschizophrenics. For exam-
ple, a comparison of Horton, Marlowe, and Crowne's
(1963) reported commonality of college students' word
associations with those reported for schizophrenics shows
that the latter produce more common responses than the
former.
Contradictory findings have been reported by investi-
gators using similar techniques. For example, Frankel
and Buchwald (1969) were unable to condition schizo-
phrenics to make common word associations. Quite the
opposite result was reported by Deckner and Blanton
(1969), who found that schizophrenics took longer to learn
to choose a weak associate of a word than either patients
or normal subjects.
Several studies have reported no difference between
schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic word associations.
Fuller and Kates (1969) found no differences between
schizophrenics and normal individuals either in the fre-
quencies of their word associations or in their respective
tendencies to give idiosyncratic responses. Similarly,
Lisman and Cohen (1972) found that "the [schizophrenic]
patients sample from associative repertoires that are
essentially the same as [those of the] normals" (p. 187).
Although not directly concerned with word associa-
tions, studies by Larsen and Fromholt (1976), Russell and
Beekhuis (1976), and Traupmann, Berzofsky, and Kessel-
man (1976) have all found that memory organization
hierarchies are similar among schizophrenics and non-
schizophrenics. Similar hierarchies of organization imply
similar association strategies. (This point is returned to
later.)
Using another task, Chapman and Chapman (1973)
have reported that schizophrenics are biased toward
common rather than rare word meanings, just the op-
posite of the pattern expected if schizophrenics give rare
associations.
There are more studies in this area (Namyslowska 1975;
also see Ostwald & Zawarin 1980). Some find schizo-
phrenics give fewer common responses than normal indi-
viduals, some do not. Overall, there is little support for
the hypothesis that schizophrenics have deviant word
association hierarchies or that they give more rare word
associations than nonschizophrenics.
Further work in this area, no matter how careful, is
unlikely to lead to greater understanding of schizophrenia
because of the limitations of the word association tech-
nique. A major difficulty is deciding what constitutes a
"rare" response. Different sets of norms yield different
results (compare the Kent & Rosanoff 1910 norms with
those reported by Moran, Mefferd & Kimble in 1964).
Moreover, popular responses change over time (Jenkins
& Russell 1952).
There are also important individual differences in word
association responding. There are differences between
males and females (Palermo & Jenkins 1965) and among
different language speaking groups (Russell & Meseck
1959). Education also makes a big difference. Wreschner
(1907) found that university students and faculty were
much more likely than those with less education to
respond with words belonging to the same parts of speech
as the stimulus words. Rosenzweig (1964) found more
commonality of responding among students than "work-
ers." He went on to conclude that social class groups may
have different verbal habits. Thus, schizophrenics (who
tend to come more from the lower social classes; Hol-
lingshead & Redlich 1958) may be expected to give fewer
common responses for reasons other than their illness.
A final problem with word association tests is the
possible presence of idiosyncratic response "sets" (called
"idiodynamic sets" by Moran et al. 1964). For instance,
some individuals respond to the words "won" and "fore"
with numbers, whereas others respond with words relat-
ed to their nonnumeric meanings. Idiosyncratic sets have
been extensively studied (see Mefferd 1978 for a review),
and several appear to recur: those related to object-
referent, conceptual-referent, and speed. Contrary to the
language deviance hypothesis, schizophrenics show the
same sets as nonschizophrenics (Mefferd 1978; Moran et
al. 1964).
The set a subject adopts can be manipulated by care-
fully structuring the word association list. That is, if the
words "won" and "fore" are preceded by the unam-
biguous number "three," number associations are much
more likely than if they are preceded by the word "golf."
The importance of a word association list's organization is
emphasized by Mefferd (1978), who states that "almost
anyone can be made to appear 'schizophrenic'" (p. 206),
provided the proper sequence of words is used.
Methodological weaknesses, equivocal findings, and
the difficulties inherent in the word association technique
itself render the support for the hypothesis that schizo-
phrenics give rare word association responses highly
questionable. Theories that rely on a relationship be-
tween schizophrenia and rare word associations are built
on a shaky foundation. Even those studies that do find
schizophrenics performing differently from nonschizo-
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phrenics may be explained by the schizophrenics' lower
social class - a factor of performance, not competence.
The failure to demonstrate unusual word association
hierarchies or different response sets among schizo-
phrenics also argues against a language deficit.
Some experimenters who do not favor the hypothesis
underlying the word association studies have argued that
schizophrenics are "biased" toward a word's strongest
meaning. Work in this area is reviewed in the next
section.
Schizophrenic response biases. According to Chapman
and Chapman (1965), "a person has, to any one word, a
series of meaning responses" (p. 139). These responses
form hierarchies from strong to weak. In contrast to the
word association researchers, Chapman and Chapman
assume that schizophrenics' hierarchies are similar to
those of nonschizophrenics, but that the groups differ in
their "response biases." Schizophrenics tend to rely on a
word's strongest meaning to the relative exclusion of its
other, weaker meanings. Biases are measured by giving
subjects a choice of word meanings. The following is an
example of a typical item from a study by Chapman,
Chapman, and Miller (1964):
When the farmer bought a herd of cattle, he needed a
new pen.
This means: A. He needed a new writing implement.
B. He needed a new fenced enclosure.
C. He needed a new pick-up truck.
The word "pen" was previously scaled for meaning-
response strength: its strongest meaning was determined
to be "writing implement." Schizophrenics are expected
to choose response A more often than normal respon-
dents, who know that a weaker response, B, is correct.
The methodological weaknesses of this technique (the
difficulty in controlling for differences in word knowledge
and overall intellectual functioning) has been discussed in
detail by Schwartz (1978b) and will not be repeated here,
except to note the crucial importance of chance respond-
ing.
In multiple choice and similar tasks, a subject may
choose the correct alternative merely by chance. In
theory, it should be possible to correct for chance re-
sponding, but in practice, it is usually quite difficult
because subjects have partial information about the
words. For example, the irrelevant alternative (C in the
foregoing example) is rarely chosen by schizophrenic or
nonschizophrenic subjects. The schizophrenics may be
merely eliminating the irrelevant alternative and guess-
ing between the others. This appears to be what hap-
pened in a study by Boland and Chapman (1971), in which
schizophrenics chose an irrelevant meaning for a word 6
percent of the time, the correct meaning 42 percent of the
time and an associative-distractor (incorrect meaning) 52
percent of the time.
Schizophrenics, by the way, are not the only ones who
make errors in this kind of task. Prison immates (Rattan &
Chapman 1973) and nonschizophrenic patients (Naficy &
Willerman 1980; Neuringer, Fiske & Goldstein 1969;
Neuringer, Fiske, Schmidt & Goldstein 1972) behave
similarly. One study found schizophrenics to choose
more weak meanings than nonschizophrenic controls
(Neuringer, Kaplan & Goldstein 1974).
If schizophrenics have a bias toward strong meanings of
words, it is certainly not a very strong bias, nor is it
unique to schizophrenics. One hypothesis that seems
reasonable given the pattern of results is that the effect is
attributable to lowered intellectual functioning. The
small differences found between studies may merely be
the result of random fluctuations in the guessing rate of
schizophrenics.
Associationistic studies: evidence for a schizophrenic
language deficit. The literature on word associations and
response biases provides little convincing evidence that
schizophrenics produce rare word associations or that
they are insensitive to verbal context. They do seem to be
somewhat less knowledgeable about word meanings, but
this is a performance deficit also characteristic of non-
schizophrenic hospitalized patients, prison inmates, and
anyone else operating at a low intellectual level. Social
class membership may also play a role (Rosenzweig 1964).
Even if meaning biases or rare associations could be
reliably demonstrated, their value in helping us under-
stand schizophrenic language competence would be
doubtful. The problem is the focus on single words. In
natural speech, the pronunciation of a word, its meaning,
and its syntactic role can only be determined by an
analysis of the context in which it occurs. In addition, the
notion that each word presented to a subject elicits a
strong meaning response unless the context demands
some weaker meaning, is contradicted by the speed with
which language is comprehended. The time necessary to
transmit from ear to brain the number of signals required
by a theory such as Chapman's would make normal
conversation impossible (see Lashley 1951; Lenneberg
1967).
It should also be emphasized that sentences are more
complex than the sum of the meanings of their constituent
words. The order of words is as important in determining
a sentence's meaning as the rules of syntax. (Any novelist
can tell you that "John loves Mary" is not the same as
"Mary loves John.") Even when all the words in a sen-
tence elicit a strong meaning response, the meaing of the
sentence still depends on how the various words are
ordered. Theories based solely on the meanings of indi-
vidual words provide only an incomplete account of
either normal or disordered language.
Schizophrenics' knowledge of linguistic rules
A more direct approach to the study of schizophrenic
language competence has concentrated on schizo-
phrenics' ability to apply syntactic, semantic, phonologi-
cal, and pragmatic rules in their speech (see Maher 1972
for a review).
A problem for this approach is that schizophrenics are
not the only people who make semantic and syntactic
errors. Other patient groups and even normal speakers
make similar errors. This presents a problem for theories
such as Chaika's (1974). On the basis of errors made by
one schizophrenic patient, Chaika hypothesized that
schizophrenic speech results from an intermittent, cyclic
aphasia. As Fromkin (1975) has pointed out, however,
errors similar to those noted by Chaika are produced by
normal speakers.
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Chaika (1977) in a response to Fromkin and other
critics (Lecours & Vanier-Clement 1976) argued that
schizophrenic speech errors differ from qualitatively sim-
ilar errors produced by normal speakers because they
persist over longer periods and because normal slips are
understandable - they can be corrected with reference to
the context. Schizophrenic slips, she argues, are anoma-
lous, and schizophrenics do not correct their errors when
asked to. Similarities between the speech of aphasics
(particularly Wernicke's aphasics) and schizophrenics -
as well as differences - have been noted by several
writers (Andreasen & Grove 1979; DiSimoni, Darley &
Aronson 1977), but whether or not schizophrenic speech
is the result of aphasia remains problematic.
There is some doubt whether any amount of purely
descriptive argument will settle the issue. Authors use
similar data to make quite different points. In the absence
of some generally agreed-upon method for deciding
whether a speech error is "aphasic" or not, this argument
could go on indefinitely. Fortunately, there are other
relevant sources of data.
Gerver (1967), for instance, found that semantically
and syntactically correct sentences were easier for schizo-
phrenics to recall than random word strings. Moreover,
the increase in recall from random words to sentences was
as large for chronic schizophrenics as for normal indi-
viduals. Truscott (1970) also found schizophrenics to
make use of the regularities of English in recalling sen-
tences. Rochester, Harris, and Seeman (1973) found
schizophrenics to be aware of (and to use) syntactic units
in their recall. A similar conclusion was reached by
Carpenter (1976). These studies are not without faults
(see Rochester & Martin 1979); particularly troubling is
their tendency to reduce language to what may be studied
in the laboratory (see Schwartz 1978b for a related discus-
sion). Nevertheless, taken together, they seem to suggest
that schizophrenics do have the ability to use at least
syntactic if not semantic and pragmatic rules in experi-
ments of this sort (Andreasen & Grove 1979).
Schizophrenics may have the ability to use certain
linguistic rules, but, as excerpts a and b at the beginning
of this paper illustrated, their speech is sometimes quite
difficult to follow. Several theorists have suggested that
schizophrenic language lacks normal redundancy. This
idea is considered next.
The immediacy hypothesis
Salzinger and his colleagues have used the "cloze" pro-
cedure (a technique that requires judges to guess what
words have been omitted from a speech transcript) in a
research program with schizophrenics.
In a typical study (Salzinger, Portnoy & Feldman
1964), they found that normal judges were less able to
guess the words omitted from the first 100 words of a
schizophrenic's transcript than those omitted from the
transcripts of nonschizophrenic patients. The judges'
performances were even worse for the second 100 words
of the schizophrenic transcript, although for non-
schizophrenic transcripts the judges actually improved
during the second 100 words. Further experiments (re-
viewed in Salzinger, Portnoy & Feldman 1978) indicated
that judges were able to guess words omitted from schizo-
phrenic transcripts as well as those omitted from the
transcripts of nonschizophrenics when they were pro-
vided with only a few words of context (for example, the
four words surrounding the omitted word). When
lengthy context was provided (14 surrounding words), it
was easier to guess the words omitted from the non-
schizophrenic transcripts than those omitted from the
schizophrenic ones. These findings were interpreted to
support an "immediacy hypothesis" that schizophrenic
behavior, verbal or otherwise, is primarily controlled by
stimuli immediate in the environment. Thus, for schizo-
phrenics, small amounts of context afford high guess-
ability because they represent the immediate stimuli that
control responding. Large amounts of context do not
measurably improve the ability to guess words omitted
from schizophrenics' transcripts because schizophrenics
are not responding to stimuli remote in time.
Schwartz (1978b), in a review of this work, suggested
that at least some of these findings may be attributable to
the method of measurement. At low levels of context, it is
difficult to guess any of the omitted words correctly,
irrespective of whose protocol they come from. This
criticism does not apply to the data for what Salzinger et
al. (1978) call "function" words (conjunctions mostly, but
some prepositions) in which schizophrenic speech was
actually more predictable than nonschizophrenic speech
at low levels of context but less predictable when consid-
erable context was provided. In addition, the accuracy of
guesses for the second 100 words of schizophrenic dis-
course correlated —0.48 with the number of days the
patient was hospitalized. Another interesting finding was
that when schizophrenics serve as judges for such tran-
scripts (they themselves guess the missing words), their
performance also deteriorates with increasing context
(deSilva & Hemsley 1977).
Schizophrenics do indeed appear to attend to only a
few stimuli. Although Salzinger et al. (1978) are unclear
on this point, their "immediacy hypothesis" appears to
refer to stimuli close in time or space. In many ways, the
immediacy hypothesis makes predictions similar to "at-
tentional" hypotheses. Because conjunctions occur at
those points in a sentence that are most vulnerable to
distraction or shifts in attention, there is a strong pos-
sibility that Salzinger's findings are to a large extent a
reflection of the inability to sustain attention (see Maher
1972).
It should be noted that Rutter and his colleagues
(Rutter, Draffan & Davies 1977; Rutter, Wishner &
Callaghan 1975; Rutter, Wishner, Kopytynska & Button
1978) have been unable to obtain the results reported by
Salzinger and his colleagues. Salzinger, Portnoy, and
Feldman (1979) point out differences between Rutter et
al.'s studies and their own, the most important being that
Salzinger et al. s patients were not on medication whereas
Rutter et al.'s were. Another possibility is that outcomes
depend on how seriously disorganized schizophrenic pa-
tients are. In a study by Manschrek, Maher, Rucklos, and
White (1979), only the most "thought-disordered" schiz-
ophrenics produced unpredictable speech. Salzinger et
al.'s findings are in accord with many attentional theories
(these are addressed later in the paper). Their relevance
to the question of schizophrenic language is problematic.
According to Salzinger, Portnoy, and Feldman (1966),
the "speaker in emitting his words must react not only to
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the word that he has just uttered but to the last two words,
the last three words, usually to many words uttered
previously" (p. 172). As noted by Schwartz (1978b),
Salzinger et al. must choose words to be the basic units of
speech because smaller linguistic elements (morphemes,
for example) have very few associative relationships, and
the neuromuscular responses necessary to produce
speech (movements of the tongue and jaw, for instance)
have no associative relationships with one another. In-
deed, for muscular movements the next sounds in a
sequence may be more important determinants of how
the muscular apparatus will be arranged than preceding
sounds (Hormann 1971). Also, Salzinger et al.'s view of
language as a Markov process meets problems because a
sentence's meaning does not derive from summing the
meanings of its constituent words, and, therefore, any
model based on the stochastic relationship of single words
is inadequate.
Even if neurologically possible (see Lashley 1951), a
language model based on the associations between words
would require an enormous amount of learning and
would still never account for the infinite number of
possible sentences. This does not mean that Salzinger et
al.'s hypothesis is incorrect. On the contrary, it is in
agreement with many attentional hypotheses. It suggests
an underlying problem with schizophrenic cognition that
could produce disordered speech, but it does not permit
us to say that schizophrenics have a language competence
deficit.
Communicability deficit in schizophrenia
The possibility that schizophrenic speakers violate the
rules of communication has been noted by clinicians and
experimenters (Bleuler 1950; Sullivan 1944). Much of the
work on this hypothesis consists of word-frequency
counts and type-token ratios. Although schizophrenics
were found to differ from others on a number of dimen-
sions (see Maher 1966 for a thorough review), this early
work did not give rise to much theory, and modern
workers have turned to other methods. An interesting
line of research has been conducted by B. D. Cohen and
his colleagues (see B. D. Cohen 1978 for a review). In
their prototypical task, schizophrenics and nonschizo-
phrenics are required to serve either as speakers or
listeners. The speaker's task is to give a clue or clues that
allow the listener to choose from a pair of stimuli the one
designated by the experimenter as the "referent."
In one study, Cohen and Camhi (1967) found schizo-
phrenics to perform poorly in the referential communica-
tion task when they played the speakers role (that is,
when they were giving clues) but to do as well as normal
subjects when they were in the listener's role (receiving
clues). In a later study by Nachmani and Cohen (1969),
schizophrenics were compared with nonschizophrenics
in memory for words using both a recognition and a recall
test. Schizophrenics did approximately as well as non-
schizophrenics when memory was tested by recognition
but performed poorly when memory was tested by recall.
Since recall requires memory retrieval and recognition
does not (or at least it requires very little), these results
suggest that schizophrenics have a problem in memory
retrieval. Retrieval difficulties may also be responsible for
schizophrenics' failure to retrieve helpful cues when
playing the speaker's role.
Although not all the experiments in this field have
yielded clear-cut results (Smith 1970, for example, failed
to find a statistically significant difference between
schizophrenics and normal subjects in the speaker's
role), it would seem fair to conclude that schizophrenics
do perform poorly in referential communication. On the
basis of these data and additional evidence, Cohen,
Nachmani, and Rosenberg (1974) have proposed a "per-
severative-chaining" model of referential communica-
tion, which has as its basis the idea that schizophrenics
sample each cue they generate from a "repertoire of
associations to the immediately preceding response
[cue] rather than the referent" (p. 11). According to this
view, the schizophrenic is thought to say each cue aloud
although he has already rejected it. He continues this
process until a response "passes the probabilistic self-
editing" stage, when he stops talking. Although this
theory appears to account for schizophrenics' perfor-
mance in the referential communication task studied by
Cohen, it does not offer a comprehensive explanation for
schizophrenic speech in general. For one thing, it is not
clear how perseverative chaining is responsible for the
incoherence produced by the schizophrenic speakers
responsible for excerpts a and b, presented at the outset
of the present paper. Undefined, ambiguous referents
are at least as responsible as their incoherence. Nev-
ertheless, Cohen's work, with its focus on discourse and
the communicative function of speech, is certainly closer
to naturalistic language than most laboratory research.
His work suggests a problem for schizophrenics that may
be in the realm of pragmatics - the rules for conducting
conversations. This point is returned to later.
The competence of schizophrenics as communicators
has been studied outside the laboratory by Rochester and
her colleagues (Rochester 1978; Rochester et al. 1973),
who analyzed free-speech samples. They found that
schizophrenics judged "thought-disordered" (by raters,
on the basis of the schizophrenics' speech) produced noun
phrases with ambiguous and unclear referents more often
than other schizophrenics or normal speakers. They also
found a tendency to repeat phrases in adjacent clauses
and to repeat (perseverate) at the end of clauses; this was
particularly true among "thought-disordered" schizo-
phrenics. It is little wonder that schizophrenic verbaliza-
tions are difficult to understand or to reconstruct (Rutter
1979), when they present so few links among sentences
and referents. Unfortunately, normal adults and children
may produce similar speech (Maratsos 1976). Moreover,
despite extensive analyses, Rochester's observations of
schizophrenic speech errors only account for 38 percent
of judges' estimates of "thought disorder." Although most
of the characteristics that make schizophrenic speech so
uncommunicative remain unspecified, Rochester's work,
like Cohen's, indicates a pragmatic and possibly a seman-
tic deficit in schizophrenics.
Hypotheses based on the content of
schizophrenic speech
Content analysis, as applied to schizophrenic language,
is a way of making inferences about the mental organiza-
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tion of schizophrenic speakers from their speech. A ma-
jor contributor to this literature is Laffal (1965; 1979),
who believes that "semantic structure is intact in schizo-
phrenic individuals" (1979, p. 33) and that we could
understand their "core conflicts" if we could make sense
of their speech. Laffal's technique is to look for those
instances in which key words occur in similar contexts.
From these contexts, inferences are made about the
meaning of these words for the subject. Laffal (1979)
seems to be able to uncover the thematic context of
confusing schizophrenic speech, but it is not certain that
other content analysts (Forrest 1976; Gottschalk &
Gleser 1964; 1969) would always agree with his in-
terpretations. It is not clear how to decide which in-
terpretation is correct, and, for our present purposes, it
probably doesn't matter, because none of the content
analysts has provided an explanation for why such analy-
ses are necessary. That is, content analysis does not
address the question of why schizophrenic speech is so
difficult to understand in the first place.
Some researchers have gone beyond studying schizo-
phrenic patients to look at the speech of their relatives.
Singer and Wynne (1966), for instance, reported that the
parents of schizophrenics produce more deviant speech
than the parents of neurotics. This report r.eceived only
weak support from studies by Hirsch and Leff (1975), who
suggested that the parents of schizophrenics just talk
more than others. Why they talk more and how parental
speech produces incoherence in their children are not
explained.
Pragmatic deficits in schizophrenia
Verbalizations such as those illustrated by speakers a and
b at the beginning of this paper are difficult for listeners to
understand. This difficulty is sometimes overcome after
one has spent some time getting to "know" the patient
(Bleuler 1950). This suggests that the schizophrenic
speaker may be taking too much for granted, assuming
the speaker knows enough about him to understand what
he is trying to say. Cohen's work on communicability
certainly supports the view that schizophrenics do not
follow the accepted social rules for conversations. Similar
views have been expressed by Cameron (1944) and more
recently by Ostwald (1978).
Ostwald (1978; 1981) also describes peculiarities in
schizophrenic speech production and nonverbal behav-
ior. Speech may be too high or too low, noises may
intrude, tone can be flat, articulation unclear, and pauses
too long or too short. Inappropriate gestures, staring,
facial grimaces - in fact, all nonverbal avenues of commu-
nication - may be disturbed in schizophrenia. Bleuler
(1950) made similar observations about his patients.
Clinical observations and laboratory experiments ap-
pear to agree. Schizophrenics often violate the pragmatic
rules regulating conversation.
Is schizophrenic speech the result of an
information-processing deficit?
The notion that schizophrenic speech actually reflects
some deeper and more general problem in processing
information is not new. Many of the contributors to
Kasanin's (1944) volume held such a view (although it was
not expressed in so many words). Goldstein (1944), for
instance, thought that schizophrenics lacked the "ab-
stract attitude." Schizophrenic speech, he said, reflects
this tendency toward "concrete" thinking. This hypoth-
esis received a large amount of experimental attention in
the 1950s and 1960s. Virtually all controlled studies failed
to find any difference between schizophrenics and non-
schizophrenics when the groups were matched for educa-
tion (see Maher 1966 and Reed 1970 for reviews of this
literature). Goldstein himself did not use controls and
labeled as "concrete" subjects who did not perform the
experimental task, those who disobeyed instructions, and
those who were unable to give a clear account of their
performance.
Von Domarus (1944), another contributor to Kasanin's
volume, suggested that schizophrenic logic deviates from
the formal laws of logic. Von Domarus's report gives
almost no details about the experimental data on which
his work was based; moreover, researchers have tended
to interpret his ideas in different ways. After reviewing
the relevant literature, Maher (1966) concluded that "the
Von Domarus principle [schizophrenics are paralogi-
cians] is unsupported by observations of the actual rea-
soning process of schizophrenics" (p. 429). Williams
(1964) and Reed (1970) concur with Maher. Little work on
the Von Domarus principle has appeared in the past
decade.
A series of papers by Cameron (including one in Ka-
sanin's book) described schizophrenic speech in some
detail. An important problem, according to Cameron, is
"overinclusion." Schizophrenics, he says, have trouble
maintaining boundaries. They tend to include too many
items in the same conceptual category, to overgeneral-
ize, and to ignore specific differences. Payne and his
colleagues have conducted a series of experiments de-
monstrating that schizophrenics are overinclusive in a
variety of circumstances (see Payne 1966 for a review).
Overinclusion is more or less the opposite of Goldstein's
"concreteness," and its experimental support is far
stronger (see Reed 1970). Overinclusion appears to be
closely related to the "distraction" theories favored by
many experimenters today (Neale & Oltmanns 1980). If
schizophrenics are easily distracted, they should re-
spond to many stimuli, overgeneralize, and so on. It's
worth noting that overinclusion is not specific to schizo-
phrenics. Payne and Hirst (1957) report overinclusive
thinking in depressives; Payne and Friedlander (1962)
found overinclusive thinking in neurotics.
Several experimenters whose work has already been
reviewed also see schizophrenic language as the result of
a more general deficit in processing information. Sal-
zinger et al. (1978) saw the problem as arising out of
schizophrenics' responsiveness to immediate stimuli.
Others have alluded to general response biases (Chap-
man & Chapman 1973) or to response interference (Broen
& Storms 1967). More recently, researchers have turned
their attention to memory deficits and attentional
dysfunctions.
Although most memory research has focused on short-
term memory, at least one study had as its concern the
storage structure of schizophrenics' long-term memory
(Koh, Kayton & Schwarz 1974). Schizophrenic patients,
nonschizophrenic patients, and nonpatients were re-
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quired to sort a deck of cards, each card bearing a
common word, into piles on the basis of perceived sim-
ilarity. Although overinclusion has long been thought to
characterize schizophrenics (see Cameron 1944), cluster
analyses revealed that the structure of each group's card
sorts was similar. This was true even under time pres-
sure. Clearly, this finding is in accord with the evidence
(reviewed earlier) that schizophrenics do not have strange
word association repertoires.
The possibility that the schizophrenic deficit may lie in
short-term memory has received considerable attention.
Although some researchers have postulated a smaller
short-term memory capacity for schizophrenics, there is
little evidence for this position (see Koh 1978, for a
review). It is much more likely that schizophrenics have a
problem with the cognitive processes used to enter and
manipulate information in working memory.
In recent years, much effort has been devoted to the
problem of selective attention in schizophrenia; the abil-
ity to attend selectively to aspects of the environment is
essential for language learning and performance. Much of
the work in this area has been performed by Neale and his
colleagues (see Neale & Oltmanns 1980 for a review)
using visual stimuli. Although this research is probably
less relevant to language than studies of auditory atten-
tion, it is worthwhile noting that these studies do not
clearly identify a specific schizophrenic information-pro-
cessing deficit. Rather, they have been interpreted (see
Davidson & Neale 1974, for example) as indicating that
the information-processing operations of both schizo-
phrenics and nonschizophrenics are similar, although the
schizophrenics may perform them at a slower rate.
Schizophrenics' auditory selective attention has been
studied extensively with dichotic listening tasks in which
words or other stimuli are presented to the two ears, and
subjects are asked to shadow some of the stimuli while
ignoring the rest (Friedrich, Emery & Fuller 1974;
Payne, Hochberg & Hawks 1970; Wishner & Wahl 1974).
In general, schizophrenics omit more shadowed words
and recall fewer of the shadowed words than non-
schizophrenic patients or normal individuals. They also
recall fewer of the shadowed words on subsequent recall
tests. Moreover, schizophrenics are much more likely to
make intrusion errors (saying or recalling a word that they
were instructed to ignore), particularly when presenta-
tion is fast. The dichotic listening studies have been taken
to indicate that slow information processing and defective
filtering are the two most important determinants of the
schizophrenics' performance. The conclusions of other
experimenters (Friedrich et al. 1974, for instance) are
similar. A problem in "filtering out" unwanted informa-
tion was also suggested by Reed (1970) and fits in with
findings on overinclusion mentioned earlier. There are
several meanings to the term "filtering, " however, and
these must be clearly understood if we are to characterize
the schizophrenic deficit accurately.
Broadbent (1958) used the term "filtering" to charac-
terize a "stimulus set" in which the stimuli of interest
can be differentiated from unimportant stimuli on the
basis of a common physical feature (for example, acoustic
similarity or color). More recently, Broadbent (1971)
has introduced an additional attentional mechanism,
"pigeonholing." Pigeonholing occurs when one adopts a
"response set, " selecting from a large number of items
(for example, a list of words), those constituting a sub-
vocabulary (for example, articles of furniture). The dis-
tinction, then, is that filtering leads to stimulus selec-
tivity, whereas pigeonholing results in response selec-
tion. Much of the work on attention in schizophrenia
(see Hemsley 1975) has confused filtering with pigeon-
holing. For example, although Wishner and Wahl (1974)
interpret their results as supporting the hypothesis that
schizophrenics are deficient in filtering, it appears that in
their study, schizophrenics were deficient in pigeonhol-
ing. That is, both schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics
attended to the shadowed as well as the nonshadowed
words (as evidenced by the results of their subsequent
recall and recognition tests). The nonschizophrenics,
however, rarely gave these nonshadowed words as re-
sponses, whereas the schizophrenics often did.
The importance of the filtering/pigeonholing distinc-
tion is dramatically demonstrated by two recently re-
ported shadowing experiments. Pogue-Geile and
Oltmanns (1980) asked schizophrenic and control (non-
schizophrenic patients and nonpatients) subjects to shad-
ow (repeat) messages going to a particular ear while
ignoring whatever was heard in the other ear (a distrac-
tor message or silence). The shadowing performance of
all groups was equivalent and not affected by distraction.
In our present terms, this was a "filtering" experiment.
Attention had to be allocated on the basis of a physical
factor - ear of entry. Compare these results with those
reported by Hemsley and Richardson (1980). In their
experiment, two messages using the same voice were
presented simultaneously to both ears. The subjects
(schizophrenics, nonschizophrenics, and nonpatients)
were required to shadow one of the messages. In this
experiment, attention could not be allocated on the basis
of a physical cue. Instead, attention had to be allocated
on the basis of the meaning of the target message - a
process we have labeled pigeonholing. Hemsley and
Richardson found schizophrenics inferior to control sub-
jects on this task. Not only do the findings of these two
studies underline the necessity for distinguishing be-
tween filtering and pigeonholing; they also suggest that
schizophrenics have difficulty only with the latter.
Evidence in favor of the pigeonholing hypothesis also
comes from memory-encoding studies. Most of the work
on the encoding of information by schizophrenics has
been performed by Koh and his associates and is de-
scribed in detail by Koh (1978). Some methodological
problems with this work are discussed by Schwartz
(1978b). An experiment with important implications for
the pigeonholing hypothesis was reported by Koh, Kay-
ton, and Berry (1973). They found that schizophrenics
and nonschizophrenics do not differ in their ability to
recognize previously presented words. This common
finding suggests that a problem in recall or retrieval
strategy (perhaps attributable to poor organization) is
responsible for the schizophrenic memory deficit. These
investigators went on to analyze their results using sig-
nal-detection statistics and found that schizophrenics
and nonschizophrenics did not differ in their respective
sensitivities (d') to the originally presented words. This
finding is relevant to the filtering/pigeonholing distinc-
tion because Broadbent (1971) has related changes in d!
to filtering, whereas pigeonholing is related to the bias
parameter, B. Koh et al.'s finding that schizophrenics do
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not differ from nonschizophrenics in d! indicates that the
schizophrenic deficit is not in filtering but in some more
central form of attentional allocation.
The relation between pigeonholing and speech is prob-
lematic, but it is possible that defective pigeonholing is
responsible for at least some of the peculiarities of schizo-
phrenic speech. For example, defective pigeonholing
may be responsible for Chapman and Chapman's (1973)
"response bias" observation, overinclusive speech, and
even perserveration. A pigeonholing deficit may also be
responsible for schizophrenics' tendency to rely on shal-
low levels of encoding (Rochester & Martin 1979).
Is there a schizophrenic language?
Schizophrenics are sometimes difficult to understand. So
are nonschizophrenic patients, poets, and even "nor-
mals," but perhaps not quite so often (see Reed 1970 for a
comparison of poets and schizophrenics). Although vir-
tually all observers agree that schizophrenics sometimes
say bizarre things, it has not been clearly demonstrated
that their problem is the result of a language deficit. They
appear to use syntactic rules appropriately (the evidence
with regard to semantic rules is unclear), they do not have
peculiar word association hierarchies, and their speech
errors are similar to those made by nonschizophrenics.
Schizophrenics often ignore the pragmatic rules under-
lying conversations. They may fail to provide sufficient
context for their listeners; they may also talk in a strange
voice, grimace, or gesture inappropriately. Naturally, all
this makes them hard to follow, but it does not reflect on
their language competence - only on their performance.
Schizophrenics' speech is disturbed, but their language
competence appears intact.
Schizophrenics are easily distracted, somewhat biased
toward the strong meaning of words, and sensitive to only
a limited amount of verbal context. It is plausible that
lying at the basis of these problems is a central defect in
pigeonholing (adopting a response set). Thus, when a task
can be performed merely on the basis of filtering (picking
out a red disc from those of several colors or recognizing a
word from a list of several previously presented words),
schizophrenics perform about as well as normal subjects,
but when a task requires pigeonholing (putting words into
semantically related categories or shadowing only words
on a particular theme), schizophrenics perform poorly.
Future research may reveal how this information-
processing deficit produces the peculiar language associ-
ated with schizophrenia. A start has been made by Knight
and Sims-Knight (1979) who found that some schizo-
phrenics fail to integrate ideas from simple sentences into
more complex sentences. Their testing procedure re-
quired that subjects judge whether or not test sentences
were seen earlier. Schizophrenics could distinguish be-
tween totally irrelevant sentences and those encountered
earlier about as well as nonschizophrenics. Schizo-
phrenics also appeared to have little trouble recognizing
sentences that they had actually encountered earlier.
Some schizophrenics, however, judged complex sen-
tences made up of the ideas conveyed originally by
several simple sentences as "new," whereas non-
schizophrenics misjudged these sentences as old.
Since schizophrenics had little trouble discriminating
irrelevant sentences from those they actually saw earlier,
it is clear they have no "filtering" problem. On the other
hand, their failure to judge sentences that integrate
ideas as "old" suggests that they did not alter their
"response biases" on the basis of linguistic information -
a problem in pigeonholing.
With more research we may be able to characterize
completely the deficit responsible for schizophrenic
speech. We may never be able to explain the schizo-
phrenic language deficit because it probably doesn't
exist.
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There may be a "schizophrenic language"
Nancy C. Andreasen
Department of Psychiatry, University of Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa
City, Iowa 52242
Schwartz is to be complimented for making a group of useful
distinctions that are necessary in order to dissect and identify
the various abnormalities that may underlie or characterize
anomalies in the speech of some schizophrenic patients. He is
also to be complimented for a comprehensive (almost) review of
recent literature in the area (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b) and for
providing a thoughtful critique of it. I share much of his conster-
nation about imprecise or tautological definitions and poorly
conceived methods. The "stout Cortez" who surveys recent
literature in this area is indeed more likely to feel grim dismay
than "wild surmise." On the other hand, the field is intrinsically
difficult, and therefore hard to study well. After all, one is
samplingan ocean rather than a pond, and it is small wonder that
investigators have sometimes been confused about which ocean
they are surveying.
In spite of my overall agreement with many of Schwartz's
theses, some areas of disagreement also exist. In this review
Schwartz concludes that "we may never be able to explain the
schizophrenic language deficit because it probably doesn't ex-
ist." This conclusion may be erroneous for several reasons.
In addition to the many useful distinctions that Schwartz
makes, another important and useful distinction should be made
between input and output, or language perception and process-
ing versus language production. Most of the research completed
to date suggests that schizophrenics are, indeed, competent in
perception and processing. On the other hand, they may not be
competent in the area of language production. We have just
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completed a comprehensive series of studies in which we have
attempted to map abnormalities in various aspects of language,
including syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and discourse in a
sample of 50 schizophrenics, 25 schizoaffectives, and 25 manics.
The results of this study, most of which are not yet published
(Andreasen 1982), support the finding of abnormalities in pro-
duction, specifically in semantics, pragmatics, and discourse.
The work of Rochester and Martin (1979) also supports this
conclusion.
Part of the disagreement may be definitional. It is unclear to
me why Schwartz considers defects in the pragmatic aspects of
language to represent a deficit in performance rather than
competence, or in speech rather than language. Many psycho-
linguists consider pragmatics and discourse to be aspects of
language. Depending on how one views the world, defects in
pragmatic (or discourse) aspects of language are deficits in
language (as opposed to speech) and may reflect a deficit in
competence (as opposed to performance).
The DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia (American Psychiatric
Association 1980) are probably not as tautological as Schwartz
implies. Six symptomatic criteria are listed for schizophrenia in
DSM-III. Five of the six involve delusions or hallucinations.
The sixth criterion, as Schwartz indicates, refers to various
forms of disorganized speech when accompanied by other nec-
essary symptoms. A patient need only have one of these six
symptoms for a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be made. Disor-
ganized speech need not be present, and indeed in most clinical
practice it is used for making a diagnosis of schizophrenia much
less often than are delusions or hallucinations.
I concur with Schwartz that much work remains to be done in
this area before we can reach any valid conclusions. For the
purposes of argument, however, I should like to submit that
there may be a "schizophrenic language" that can be charac-
terized as follows:
1. Schizophrenics are able to perceive and process language
normally, at least in terms of its syntactic and semantic aspects,
and probably in terms of its pragmatic and discourse aspects
(Carpenter 1976; Knight & Sims-Knight 1979; Rochester, Har-
ris & Seeman 1973).
2. Schizophrenics do show definite deficits in language pro-
duction, occasionally in semantic aspects and more often in
pragmatic and discourse aspects (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b;
1982).
3. These deficits do not represent a specific "schizophrenic
language" in the sense that they occur only in patients suffering
from schizophrenia. Similar deficits do appear in patients with
other "functional psychoses" such as mania (Andreasen 1979a;
1979b; 1982). They also occur in patients suffering from
dementia.
4. These deficits occur only in a subset of schizophrenic
patients, not in all (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b; 1982).
5. The language of this subset of schizophrenic patients does
differ from that of manics in that the abnormalities appear to be
less reversible when the patients are followed longitudinally.
When manic patients recover from their affective illness, most
produce language that does not differ significantly from that of
normal individuals. On the other hand, longitudinal follow-up of
schizophrenic patients in our laboratory indicates that language
abnormalities persist in many of these patients even after exten-
sive treatment and after discharge from the hospital (Andreasen
1982). Thus, the deficit may be specific to schizophrenia (as
compared with mania) in that it is irreversible. On the other
hand, it probably would not appear to be specific if schizo-
phrenic patients were compared to those suffering from demen-
tia, who also tend to have irreversible language abnormalities.
Research in the area of schizophrenic language has too often
been preoccupied with definitional issues, single case studies,
and "black box" paradigms. We need more careful and thought-
ful studies conducted longitudinally on larger samples of pa-
tients classified according to a variety of diagnoses. The empha-
sis in the studies should be on designs that may illuminate the
underlying mechanisms of the disorder, particularly the func-
tional brain systems that may be involved. In this sense, the
aphasias may serve as a useful model.
Schizophrenic thought disorder: Linguistic
incompetence or information-processing
impairment?
Robert F. Asarnowa and John M. Watkinsb
'Division of Child Psychiatry/Mental Retardation, Department of Psychiatry,
and Neuropsychiatric Institute, University of California School of Medicine,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90024 and bPsychology Department, University of
California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024
Much of the evidence for Schwartz's conclusion that schizo-
phrenic thought disorder is not attributable to linguistic incom-
petence consists of findings that suggest that: (1) when studies
are properly conducted schizophrenics are shown to have ade-
quate language, and (2) impaired language is found in other
psychiatric disorders. Another set of data that can help clarify
the relation between thought disorder and language compe-
tence comes from studies of the temporal relation between the
onset of thought disorder and the presence of problems of
linguistic competence. If schizophrenic thought disorder is
caused by language impairments, those impairments should
antedate episodes of thought disorder. Since most schizo-
phrenic individuals experience multiple episodes of thought
disorder, one strategy for determining whether language in-
competence antedates episodes of thought disorder is to study
schizophrenic individuals between episodes — during the
postpsychotic stages of the disorder. This research strategy
reflects a widely held belief that "fundamental" aspects of
schizophrenia should be present across the course of the disor-
der. This belief can be traced back to Bleuler's (1950, p. 13)
assertion that "certain symptoms of schizophrenia are present in
every case and in every period of the illness."
Studies of schizophrenics during the postpsychotic stages of
disorder reveal that many aspects of language impairment in
schizophrenia are transient disruptions associated merely with
the presence of acute psychopathology. For example, in a one-
year follow-up of chronic schizophrenics, Flekk0y, Astrup, and
Hartmann (1969) found that performance on a word association
measure of associative intrusions had been normalized relative
to the initial admission to the hospital. These trends held up at a
16-year follow-up, leading Flekk0y (1975) to conclude that
normalization of language occurs relatively soon after the initial
admission. Similar results were obtained by Siegel, Harrow,
Reilly, and Tucker (1976), who scored loose associations from
the free verbalizations obtained in an interview of chronic,
partially recovered schizophrenics. They found a low frequency
of loose associations and suggested that looseness of association
appears to be associated primarily with the acute stage of
schizophrenia. Associative interference (the intrusion of pre-
established associations) was found by Spence and Lair (1965) to
be characteristic of actively disturbed schizophrenics and was
not seen in even partially recovered chronic patients. The fact
that impairment in the acquisition of new verbal associations is
found primarily during the acute stages of schizophrenia is
consistent with the well-known phenomenon of intense anxiety
interfering with the acquisition of complex responses (Mandler
& Watson 1966; Spence & Spence 1966). A number of other
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5 589
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
transient conditions such as prior set approaching the task,
perceptual dysfunction, and speed of responding, all appear to
contribute to producing deviant responses on a word association
test (O'Brian & Weingartner 1970). Many of these factors can
readily be seen in schizophrenic patients taking a word associa-
tion test for the first time in the midst of an acute disturbance. In
sum, studies of schizophrenic language during the postpsycho-
tic stages of the disorder do not support the contention that
schizophrenics have stable linguistic competence deficits.
These data are consistent with Schwartz's conclusion that a
linguistic competence problem is not a central aspect of
schizophrenia.
In contrast, studies of information processing during the
postpsychotic stages in children at risk for schizophrenia have
revealed impairments that appear stable across wide variations
in clinical state. Cross-sectional studies of partially recovered
schizophrenics reveal impairments on tasks like the span of
apprehension (Asamow & MacCrimmon 1978). A subsequent
study (Asarnow & MacCrimmon 1981) replicated and extended
these findings, showing that a sample of partially recovered
schizophrenics was impaired on this task and differed from a
group of partially recovered manic-depressive patients. A re-
cently completed longitudinal study (Asarnow & MacCrimmon
1982) replicated these results obtained from cross-sectional
studies by finding persistent information-processing impair-
ment even as there were significant deteriorations of general
clinical state, and specific aspects of schizophrenic thought
disorder, including associative intrusions and deviant word
associations. Wohlberg and Kornetsky (1973) and Asarnow and
MacCrimmon (1978) found that another information-processing
task, the continuous performance test, is also sensitive to dys-
function in partially recovered schizophrenics.
Converging evidence that impairment of information pro-
cessing in schizophrenic patients is not merely a reflection of
acute psychopathology is also provided by studies of children at
risk for schizophrenia who, by definition, have not yet man-
ifested overt thought disorder. Children at risk in virtue of
having a schizophrenic biological parent show impairment on a
number of information-processing tasks, including the span of
apprehension (Asarnow, Steffey, MacCrimmon & Cleghorn
1977) and versions of the continuous performance test (Corn-
blatt & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, in press; Erlenmeyer-Kimling &
Cornblatt 1978; Nuechterlein 1982b). The fact that deficits in
information processing occur both prior to the development of
and after substantial reductions in thought disorder is consistent
with Schwartz's conclusion that impaired information process-
ing may underlie some aspects of schizophrenic thought
disorder.
Schwartz notes that there are a number of instances in which
schizophrenics' speech appears to be normalized. Specification
of these "normalizing" conditions directs our attention to the
specific aspects of linguistic performance that must be ac-
counted for by any information-processing model of schizo-
phrenia. When prompted to use clustering strategies, schizo-
phrenics have been found to show improved performance on
tests of short-term verbal memory (Koh 1978). Meichenbaum
and Cameron (1973) found that when schizophrenics are pro-
vided brief training in verbal mediation to encourage monitor-
ing and evaluation of the quality of their performance, they
make fewer deviant verbalizations during a standardized inter-
view, and show improved perceptual integration and abstract
reasoning. These findings suggest that when schizophrenics are
provided with general problem-solving strategies that are task
appropriate, or are prompted to use strategies already in their
repertoire, their performance is greatly enhanced. This pattern
of performance is quite similar to the description in the litera-
ture on cognitive development of a "production deficiency."
A production deficiency is defined as: (1) a failure to produce
appropriate mediators spontaneously; (2) a tendency to show
enhanced performance when the appropriate mediators are
induced; and (3) a tendency to abandon the mediational strategy
when the external demand for strategy production is removed
even though the use of the strategy had enhanced performance
(Keeney, Cannizzo & Flavell 1967). We are not suggesting that
schizophrenics show "maturational lags." The similarities be-
tween some aspects of schizophrenic performance and a "pro-
duction" deficiency do highlight the impairments in the way
schizophrenics use language or verbal mediation instrumentally
to organize and integrate their own behavior. Vygotsky (1962)
and Luria (1961) have emphasized the role that speech and
language play in the development of self-regulated behavior. In
the Soviet view, private speech guides and controls access to
other cognitive structures. It has an executive regulatory func-
tion in the planning, organization, integration, and monitoring
of behavior. It may be precisely in this other "pragmatic" aspect
of language function - in the way language is used to regulate
behavior - that important clues to the enigma of schizophrenic
thought disorder may lie.
The nexus, then, of both the information-processing impair-
ment and the speech disturbance in schizophrenia may involve
failure of systems initially acquired through verbal mediation
and involved in the planning, integration, and monitoring of
behavior. This hypothesis is consistent with recent views (Asar-
now & Asarnow, in press; Neale & Oltmanns 1980) that it is at
the level of controlled information processing that schizo-
phrenics encounter their major difficulties. If this hypothesis is
correct, it would have profound implications for attempts to
construct neurobehavioral models of schizophrenia, for it is by
successively circumscribing (Asarnow, in press) the nature of
functional impairment that progress toward understanding the
psychobiological substrates of the schizophrenias is made.
Is there a schizophrenic condition?
D. Bannister
High Royds Hospital, Menston, Ilkley, W. Yorks., LS29 6AQ, England
Studies of a population diagnosed as "schizophrenic" and any
review interpreting the meaning of such studies face a question.
Is the concept of "schizophrenia" logically viable for research
purposes? Schwartz accepts "schizophrenia" as a viable concept
for research purposes on the grounds that the diagnosis has a
moderate degree of interjudge reliability. In psychiatric prac-
tice, schizophrenia is a disjunctive category (Bannister 1968).
Thus, if we assume, say, five major defining characteristics for
schizophrenia (e.g. the traditional thought disorder, primary
delusions, loss of volition, incongruity or flattening of affect, and
disturbances of motility) then people may be included in the
category because they manifest some (but, since the category is
used disjunctively, not necessarily all) of these characteristics.
We may therefore diagnose some people as schizophrenic be-
cause they manifest characteristics A and B and others as
schizophrenic because they manifest characteristics C, D, and
E. The two groups are now firmly placed in the same category
while not specifically manifesting any common characteristic at
this level of abstraction. It can be argued that disjunctive
categories are logically too primitive for scientific purposes, and
certainly the procedure outlined means that we can have a fair
degree of interjudge reliability about who is to be designated
"schizophrenic" while the category remains highly hetero-
geneous in its content. The penalty of trying to use such a
disjunctive concept is manifest in Schwartz's review in that
"saying odd things," "schizophrenia," and "thought disorder"
are used as more or less interchangeable concepts, when in
practice only a limited percentage of schizophrenics are ever
judged "thought disordered," and these on the grounds that
they manifest disorders of "form" rather than disorders of
"content." Clinical psychiatry traditionally distinguishes be-
590 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
tween delusional talk (disorders of content) and the presence of
vagueness, inconsequentiality, clang associations, thought
blocking, and so forth, which are designated disorders of form.
Schwartz cites Rochester (1978) who makes the distinction
between thought-disordered and non-thought-disordered
schizophrenics, but he fails to take her point.
We can take this argument in its strong form and accept
(Agnew & Bannister 1973) that the language of diagnostic
psychiatry is a pseudo-specialist language which can be experi-
mentally shown to be less structured, consistent, and communal
than lay language; or we can at least suspect that many of the
contradictory results detected by Schwartz are less a product of
methodological and theoretical inconsistency and more an out-
come of the ambiguity of the target population.
Putting aside this kind of root and branch objection,
Schwartz's review poses a problem in its reliance on a distinction
between language and speech. Clearly the distinction can be
made at a social level. We can talk about the general characteris-
tics of language and the particular characteristics of a specific
person's speech. However, when it conies down to distinguish-
ing within single individuals between their "language' and their
"speech," difficulties arise, because defects in either will lead to
defective output. If my "language" is competent but the content
of what I want to say is strange then you will find my speech
output confusing. If what I want to say is conventional but my
language is malformed then you will find my speech output
confusing. To make the distinction work we need operational
measures that effectively distinguish between the two.
In relation to this problem Schwartz adversely criticises
studies for "their tendency to reduce language to what may be
studied in the laboratory," but he concludes, "Nevertheless,
taken together, they seem to suggest that schizophrenics do
have the ability to use at least syntactic if not semantic and
pragmatic rules in experiments of this sort." This hopeful con-
clusion hardly amounts to the kind of clear theoretical and
operational distinction between language and speech which
would be required to justify Schwartz's concluding statement
that "with more research we may be able to characterize com-
pletely the deficit responsible for schizophrenic speech. We
may never be able to explain the schizophrenic language deficit
because it probably doesn't exist."
Outside the experimental laboratory there are grounds for
favouring Schwartz's proposition that we should not reduce the
oddity of the schizophrenic to an oddity of language. First,
language is part of life, and if you persist in "saying odd things"
people will react oddly to you, your relationships and roles may
be distorted, and the experience may cause you to say even
odder things. More important, the group on which Schwartz's
cited researches focus are not primarily defined by the oddity of
their language but by the oddity of their life. They usually arrive
within the category schizophrenic (and institutions for schizo-
phrenics) because they have done odd things rather than simply
because they have said odd things, and again, life being a
process, their life often becomes odder still once we have
reacted linguistically to them by calling them "schizophrenic."
So perhaps the mystery of the odd things schizophrenics say is
not to be solved simply by focussing on what they say, any more
than (as linguistic experimenters admit) the meaning of a word
can be understood without looking at the sentence, or indeed
the sentence without looking at the paragraph. Not included in
the many astute and thoughtful criticisms Schwartz makes of the
researches he reviews, is the criticism that they are all within a
tradition that is too ad hoc, too specific to traditional topic areas.
What is needed is research based on a general theory of the
nature of human functioning: general not only in seeing all
human experience and action as integral but in picturing "nor-
mal" before trying to explain "abnormal." Even at the level of
the studies reviewed we know so little about the general nature
of language and speech that we are unlikely to be able to explain
"odd" speech.
Attempts to deal with Schwartz's area of concern in terms of
total psychology range from Sechehaye (1951) with Freudian
theory to Bannister, Adams-Webber, Penn, and Radley (1975)
within the premises of personal construct theory (Kelly 1955).
Such attempts appear overly ambitious, if not grandiose, on first
inspection, but in the long run they may prove less ambitious
than the (literally) thousands of experiments made over a period
of 70 years that seek to make sense out of schizophrenic speech
by constructing minitheories and ad hoc methods to that end.
Inconstancy of schizophrenic language and
symptoms
M. Bleuler
Department of Psychiatry, University of Zurich, CH 8702 Zollikon,
Switzerland
Concerning Schwartz's interesting discussion I have one sug-
gestion: It is an old clinical observation that schizophrenic
language (just like schizophrenic thinking and behavior) is not
stable. In many patients it undergoes astonishing changes. One
patient may speak in a very dissociated way that is difficult to
understand, but the same patient may write letters as good as
those of a healthy person. Another schizophrenic may speak in a
clear and coherent way to me but in a very incoherent and
peculiar way to his relatives. Another patient may not have
uttered so much as an understandable phrase for several weeks
but may suddenly give me in a coherent way (just as if he were
healthy) the reasons for his wish to be discharged from the
hospital. It might be interesting to include the inconstancy of
formal schizophrenic language of the same patient in the discus-
sion of schizophrenic language.
The inconstancy of schizophrenic symptoms is hard to ob-
serve if one only deals with schizophrenics for a restricted
number of hours during psychopathological research. It is easy
to observe, however, when one lives under the same roof with
schizophrenics for decades.
A neurologist looks at "schizophasia"
Frangois Boiler
Department of Neurology, University of Pittsburgh and Pittsburgh Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Penn. 15261
Earlier researchers had expressed the hope that analysis of
schizophrenic speech ("schizophasia") would throw valuable
light on the nature of schizophrenia itself: "Might the secret of
schizophrenia lie in a hitherto unknown high-level aphasic
disturbance?" asked Rumke and Nijam (1958, p. 623). On the
whole, however, this approach has not been a very fruitful one,
probably because "schizophasia" is not primarily a disorder of
language.
Schwartz is correct in stressing the importance of the concep-
tual distinction between speech, language, and thought but may
have confused some readers by illustrating this distinction with
examples derived from the work of de Saussure (1915) and his
French terminology. In current neurolinguistic research and
in neurological clinical practice, speech refers to the neuro-
mechanical process of articulation. Language is more difficult to
define but usually refers to the various processes involved in
communication. These include perception of auditory or visual
stimuli, integration of these stimuli with prior knowledge, and
activation of appropriate response mechanisms. Thought is even
more difficult to define but many researchers have discussed in
detail the separation of language and thoughts (e.g. Binet 1903;
Critchley 1970; Vygotsky 1962). Despite these problems of
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conceptualization and precise definition, it is useful for neurolo-
gists and neurolinguists to separate clearly disorders of speech,
disorders of language, and disorders of thought because they
have different clinical manifestations, and because they involve
different pathogenic mechanisms, different prognoses, and dif-
ferent therapeutic approaches.
Speech disorders can be of either organic or psychogenic
origin and include stuttering, palilalia, and mutism. Disorders
of language are synonymous with aphasia and are, by definition,
secondary to cerebral lesions. Disorders of thought, on the
other hand, can also be either organic or psychogenic; they
include such conditions as dementia, depression, and mania as
well as schizophrenia. The topic has been recently reviewed by,
among others, Critchley (1964) and Benson (1975).
Even though there may be overlap between these different
types of disorders, they are known to occur in isolation. For
example, some patients with a severe speech disorder have
been shown to have intact processing of verbal material (Nebes
1975). Starting with the work of Marie (1906), there has been
considerable controversy about whether aphasic patients have
an impairment of intelligence (see Basso, De Renzi, Faglioni,
Scotti & Spinnler 1973 and Lebrun & Hoops 1974 for recent
discussion of this problem). As pointed out by Ombredane
(1951), it is clear that at least some asphasic patients retain
normal thought processes and are not demented. On the other
hand, the great majority of workers who have studied "schizo-
phasia" have found that schizophrenic patients do not generally
demonstrate aphasic features in their language (e.g. DiSimoni,
Darley & Aronson 1977; Fromkin 1975; Kelter, Cohen, Engel,
List & Strohner 1977). One exception to this rule may be the so-
called schizophrenic word salad (Bleuler 1950), which is charac-
terized by neologism and jargon and therefore bears some
resemblance to aphasia. As pointed out by Benson (1975), this
disorder is rarely observed in current practice and often repre-
sents a fluent paraphasic aphasia which is in turn secondary to a
specific brain lesion.
These considerations reinforce and perhaps put a different
perspective on Schwartz's conclusions. The language of schizo-
phrenic patients is often abnormal in its content and reflects the
abnormal thinking that characterizes schizophrenia. It is the
expression of a disorder of thoughts and is not a disorder of
language.
Can listeners draw implicatures from
schizophrenics?
Hugh W. Buckingham, Jr.
Program in Linguistics and Department of Speech, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, La. 70893
In his paper, Schwartz failed to mention perhaps one of the most
fruitful approaches to the analysis of schizophrenic discourse -
the conversational implicature of H. P. Grice (1975). At several
junctures, however, Schwartz does suggest that the schizo-
phrenic's disruption is likely to involve the socially accepted
rules for conducting conversation and that therefore the prob-
lem resides in the realm of pragmatics. Nowhere, however,
does he provide any detailed guidelines; nor does he refer to any
of the literature on implicature. In my commentary I would like
to suggest that Grice's ideas be incorporated into the analysis of
extended schizophrenic spoken texts.
Societal norms are such that people expect each other to be
cooperative in most spheres of transaction - especially when
speaking with one another. The logic of conversation demands
this cooperative principle, to which, according to Grice, there
are four maxims attached. The first is the maxim of Quantity,
which has two parts to it. One's contribution should be as
informative as the current purposes of the conversation require.
The converse is that the speaker should not make the contribu-
tion more informative than existing purposes call for.
The second Gricean maxim, that of Quality, also has two
sides. One requires that speakers not say what they believe to be
false, while the other stipulates that speakers should not say that
for which they lack adequate evidence. The third maxim is the
maxim of Relation. That is, make your contribution relevant to
the topic at hand.
The fourth maxim, referred to as the maxim of Manner,
requires that speakers be perspicuous. They should avoid ob-
scurity and ambiguity, while being brief and orderly. Speakers
should avoid unnecessary prolixity. A crucial facet of Grice's
maxim of Manner involves ambiguity. Herbert Clark and Susan
Haviland (1977) have attributed the full status of a maxim to
ambiguity. Their maxim of Antecedence dictates that speakers
must try to construct utterances such that the listeners have only
one direct antecedent for any given piece of information. Fur-
thermore, it must be the intended antecedent.
Intimately connected with principles of antecedence in dis-
course is the notion of given information. In a real sense, given
information is antecedent information, and without it hearers
will lose the thread of conversation. There are two types of
information contained in utterances - given and new. In gener-
al, the given information is provided early in sentences, while
the new is provided later. New information is most often
signaled by a preceding indefinite article (I saw a man), or it is
syntactically marked in a cleft sentence (It was a man whom I
saw). Once man is established as given, it may follow the definite
article (The man I saw was your brother). Surface structure
subjects virtually always contain the given information. This
tendency appears to be universal across many language groups
(Clark & Clark 1977, p. 548).
In order to comprehend, listeners must be able to isolate
given and new information in some current utterance. They
must then search their memory for a direct antecedent - some
structure whose propositions match the given information ex-
actly. The listener may then, and only then, integrate the new
information into memory structure by attaching it to the ante-
cedent just located. On analogy with computerese, the given
information indicates the "address" in memory to which the
new information is affixed. A universal constraint upon com-
prehension strategies of hearers would require that they initially
locate the antecedent in memory before attaching new informa-
tion to it. The most straightforward way to go about the task,
therefore, would be to take in given material before new mate-
rial. Were new information provided initially, the hearer would
be obliged to hold it in short-term memory while searching for
the address to which it is to be attached. This explains why most
languages of the world order surface sentential subjects first and
why those subjects normally carry the given information. Ob-
viously, then, if speakers do not abide by the maxim of Antece-
dence, hearers will have increased difficulty following the
conversation.
There is another significant feature of the given-new princi-
ple. Given information (as antecedent information) may be
supplied initially (as new) from within what is called an "anaph-
oric island" (Haviland & Clark 1974), but no pronoun may refer
to it. That is, I may say She opened the picnic basket, but the
beer was warm, and hearers will immediately appreciate beer as
given information contained in the anaphoric island picnic
basket. However, beer cannot serve as a linguistic antecedent
for a pronoun. Hence, for the sentence She opened the picnic
basket, but it was warm, it can only refer to the picnic basket.
Quite clearly, then, if speakers do not adhere to this constraint,
listeners will misunderstand a great deal of what is said to them.
There are four ways in which a speaker may fail to fulfill a
maxim. The first three involve the collapse of the cooperative
principle. First, a speaker may clearly violate a maxim with the
express purpose of misleading the hearer. Furthermore, speak-
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ers may opt to forgo the cooperative principle by simply pro-
claiming to the hearer that they are not willing to adhere to the
requirements of the maxim. Third, there may be a clash be-
tween maxims whereby one may not be fulfilled without violat-
ing another in some way.
The fourth and most interesting way in which a maxim may
fail to obtain is by being "flouted" - in the sense of being
disregarded. This is the most common way for a maxim to fail;
the cooperative principle is still in force, and the hearer can in
general draw the implicature (i.e. make the inference). Given
that the cooperative principle is in effect, hearers have a minor
problem when confronted with flouted maxims, since speakers
should be saying what they mean. The minor problem is re-
solved, however, by the generation of the conversational
implicature.
Flouting the maxim of Quantity by providing a prospective
department chairman with extra detail (uncalled for) on how
good a candidate's teaching is will often allow the chairman to
draw the implication that the candidate does not publish much.
The maxim of Quality is flouted with irony (sarcasm), metaphor,
understatement (meiosis), and exaggeration (hyperbole), but
most hearers can easily draw the inferences. In order to prevent
a social blunder, the hearer may (upon responding to the
speaker) flout the maxim of Relation by abruptly changing a
potentially embarrassing topic of conversation to something
totally different when an unwanted third party approaches. The
hearer usually infers that it is best not to pursue the topic and is
not puzzled by the irrelevant utterance. The maxim of Manner
can be flouted when, for example, new information is intro-
duced first in an utterance and preceded by a definite article.
When this maxim is flouted, hearers will infer that the new
information is crucial and that they had better concentrate on it.
As a ploy in writing novels and short stories, flouting in this
manner will quickly draw the reader into the story - probably
because of enhanced awareness that there is some as yet unre-
vealed address in the mind of the writer. These, then, are some
of the ways normal speakers may fail to fulfill maxims. The
question now becomes, How could schizophrenics fail them?
The only studies I am aware of that make any attempt at all in
this direction are those by Hoffman, Kirstein, Stopek, and
Cicchetti (1982), Rochester, Martin, and Thurston (1977), and
Rochester and Martin (1977). Hoffman et al. (1982) refer to
Griee's work, but for some reason they focus exclusively on the
maxim of Relation - often miscategorizing other maxims. For
instance, they discuss indefinite reference in schizophrenic
speech but fail to tie this in with the Gricean maxim of Manner.
The following is from a 41-year-old chronic schizophrenic male
patient of Hoffman et al. (1982, p. 228):
Interviewer: Tell me some of your thoughts about school.
Patient: I hate school. You wanna know why? I threw a spitball and she
made me swallow it.
Note that the patient pronominalized from an anaphoric island.
She cannot refer back to an antecedent, presumably "teacher,"
for the same reason that it could not refer to "beer" in the
example discussed earlier. Had the patient uttered "and the
teacher made me," the hearer could have easily inferred that
"the teacher" was given information, and that the antecedent
was implied as part of the material in the anaphoric island
school. We need more research into how often schizophrenics
use pronouns whose antecedents reside in anaphoric islands. In
any event, here is a clear demonstration of how a schizophrenic
fails to fulfill the maxim of Manner.
Indefinite reference has also been analyzed in the speech of
schizophrenics by Rochester et al. (1977) and Rochester and
Martin (1977). The question that must ultimately be answered
in all the work on indefinite reference is whether the schizo-
phrenics' failures with the maxim of Manner as regards the
principle of antecedence are actually pragmatic or, rather,
adumbrate retrieval problems. This is a crucial distinction,
because it can be shown that Wernicke's aphasics and anomic
aphasics, both of whom exhibit severe word-finding difficulties,
produce a plethora of indefinite anaphora (Buckingham & Ker-
tesz 1976, p. 94). In other words, do schizophrenics fail to
provide linguistic antecedents for pronouns because they can-
not retrieve them from their lexicons, or do they break discourse
principles of antecedence by using pro forms whose antecedents
are simply not clearly provided? Schizophrenia would only be
aphasiclike in the first case. The interpretive problem is, howev-
er, that the surface linguistic behavior would be identical for
both populations. In any event, it is clear that aphasics have
lexical retrieval blocks, but it is not so clear that schizophrenics
do.
Yet another identical marker of Wernicke's aphasics and
schizophrenics is their remarkable ability to produce anaphoric
forms whose antecedents are not linguistically specified in
discourse but rather are present in the explicit situational
context. For example, a dog enters a room where two people are
talking, whereupon the speaker utters, Boy is he cute! The
hearer easily locates the antecedent for he from the contextual
setting. This is referred to as pragmatic anaphora (or "deep"
anaphora) by some authors (e.g. Hankamer & Sag 1976).
Rochester et al. (1977, p. 105) have noted that schizophrenics
demonstrate perfect command of this pronominalization pro-
cess. Buckingham (1979, p. 279) has described the same ability
in Wernicke's aphasics and in anomics. Providing pragmatic
anaphors does not seem to depend on intact lexical access for
content words.
The maxim of Quantity may also be broken by schizophrenics.
The tendency for "overinclusion" that Schwartz writes of could
easily lead to the inclusion of excess items from the same
conceptual category. This would result in an overload of detail
not required for the specific purpose of the conversation. In
addition, Hoffman et al.'s (1982, p. 217) typology of disordered
discourse (what they refer to as "non-strong hierarchical bases")
includes the general rule that there is a nontransitive dependen-
cy among chains of statements. For instance, there could be a
chain of statements that meteorologically explains the current
situation that "it is presently raining." This utterance could then
give rise to another chain of statements that would deal with
social engagements that had to be canceled because of the
inclement weather. However, taken as a complete discourse,
the text would appear aberrant, not because the meteorological
statements are irrelevant to the cancellation of the plans for the
day (i.e. not a failure of the maxim of Relation), but rather
because the meteorological information is more than the situa-
tion calls for. The statement "It is presently raining" is all that is
required for explaining the cancellations. This type of break in
presuppositional transitivity is witnessed in schizophrenia, as
Hoffman et al. (1982) point out. It leads to a great deal of
incoherence and, although this is not mentioned by Hoffman et
al., shows quite clearly how the schizophrenic could fail Griee's
maxim of Quantity.
We may now ask the following questions: How are the
schizophrenics failing to fulfill the conversational maxims, and
why are they failing them?
It would appear that schizophrenics are by and large flouting,
but in some exacerbated sense such that hearers quite often
cannot draw implicatures. In the strict sense, of course, the
schizophrenics are not flouting for the simple reason that their
hearers are not bridging to the implicatures. However, they
certainly do not appear to be violating (misleading or lying),
opting out, or clashing. This, in turn, implies that they are still
abiding by the principle of cooperation when they are speaking.
I believe it would be wrong to claim that schizophrenics are
willfully misleading listeners or volitionally lying to them. Nor
do I believe that there is necessarily any desire to be vague or
ambiguous. Griee's claim is that normal speakers flout maxims
with regularity, but they flout them in such a way that their
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listeners can normally make the "bridges" or "link," and there-
by draw the inferences with ease. The extreme flouting by
schizophrenics, however, quite often leaves too many bridges
for hearers to span. The patients fail to take the view of the
listener into account, but the failure does not appear to be
purposeful, and so they cannot rightfully be labeled as un-
cooperative. Listeners, nevertheless, are forced to operate
under a computational overload when decoding schizophrenic
discourse.
Why, then, are schizophrenics flouting in the extreme? Most
researchers, including Schwartz, have ruled out thought disor-
ders, language problems, aberrant word associations, and lower
intellectual functioning. I would also suggest we rule out word-
finding deficits, at least in the normal definition of the term.
An inability to sustain attention could be at the heart of much
of the incoherence, as Schwartz suggests at one point. It could
lead to disruptions of the nontransitivity constraint and thus to a
failure of the maxim of Quantity. Attention to the first chain of
statements could be more easily diverted to the second chain by
the intermediate utterance (e.g. "It is presently raining" in our
example). A reduced attention span may make it more difficult
for the schizophrenic to hold on to the manner in which some
antecedent was provided - or to whether it was provided at all.
In this case the maxim of Manner would fail to be fulfilled. For
example, if antecedent information is provided in an anaphoric
island (i.e. semantically, not syntactically), the speaker would
have to attend to this fact so as to produce the given information
later as an item preceded by the definite article and not as a
pronoun. Hoffman et al. (1982, p. 228) suggest that schizo-
phrenics probably begin speaking with a coordinated topic in
mind, but that in the course of the text part or all of the
contextual frame is lost. Later utterances may only hold to-
gether in immediate discourse sections, while losing their links
to earlier statements.
I would point out, however, that attentional difficulties need
not imply, in general, that the problem rests with short-term
memory. Hoffman et al. (1982, p. 230) have evidence that a
patient's attention to a topic was derailed by some "intrusive"
thought, but that after several utterances concerning that intru-
sion the patient returned to the original context and continued.
Intrusive thoughts or ideas are usually inhibited or edited out by
normal speakers, and so what we have is perhaps a breakdown in
discourse editing caused by a reduced ability to maintain mo-
ment to moment focus on what is being said.
To the extent that we can ultimately discover a clear-cut
cognitive explanation for the conversational aberrance of schizo-
phrenics, we will be able to show unambiguously that when
speaking they are operating in a cooperative manner and that
the problems their hearers have are not the product of volition
or a willful desire to confuse or mislead. Since the whole issue is
ultimately social in nature, it makes sense to approach the
language of schizophrenics from the standpoint of the sociology
of conversation and the logic that it entails. For this reason, I
suggest that we use Grice's conversational maxims as an avenue
of research into the discourse of this patient population. In so
doing, we stand to learn a great deal concerning normal com-
prehension strategies as well.
Accounting for linguistic data in
schizophrenia research
Elaine Chaika
Linguistics Program, Providence College, Providence, R.I. 0291 a
Language is a multilayered system of communication whereby
meaningless elements form by rule into meaningful messages.
In this sense, schizophrenics do not have a language. Rather,
that subset of patients who evince odd speech can be said to
manifest deviation from a language. Many researchers, rightly
or wrongly, have still referred to schizophrenic language, appar-
ently because of the recognized syndrome of linguistic deviation
that can occur in schizophrenics. If these deviations are caused
by a lapse in linguistic competence, albeit usually temporary or
intermittent, then we can speak of the disruption in the lan-
guage of schizophrenics, which is evidenced in disordered
speech. If, however, we do not admit that such a lapse repre-
sents disruption in language, then the conclusion must be that
schizophrenics who talk in odd ways do so when they have
complete command of their language. That is, they deliberately
utter glossomanic chains, inappropriate rhymes and alliterative
strings, perseverative phrases, word salads, even total gib-
berish. Since the only population I know of that does all of these
things as part of their illness is the subs jt of schizophrenics who
exhibit speech disorder, perhaps, schizophrenics do indeed
have a language of their own.
The first problem in research is to ensure that one is compar-
ing like populations. Schwartz does not consider repeated diag-
noses of schizophrenia by psychiatrists an adequate assurance of
this criterion. Unfortunately, few studies have elucidated the
actual criteria of diagnosis of patients. Some content themselves
with reporting only discharge diagnoses, without telling how
those were arrived at. If we were to take Schwartz seriously, we
would have to scrap a large portion of the existing studies.
Fortunately, as Schwartz himself notes, there is very good
interjudge reliability in determinations of the schizophrenias, so
this is hardly necessary, and studies like Chaika (1974), which
rely heavily on comparative data, may still have validity.
A far greater failing in reported studies arises from the
sporadic nature of speech disruption. Some diagnosed schizo-
phrenics never exhibit structurally deviant speech, others do so
occasionally, with only a very few, those who used to be called
"process" schizophrenics, doing so virtually all the time. If we
are to understand the nature of deviation, then, we must be sure
that we are testing only those patients who are or have been
speech disordered at some time(s) in their illness. Too often, this
elementary precaution seems not to have been taken. Re-
searchers, especially those doing formal experimental pro-
tocols, do not even mention the degree of deviation, if any, in
their subjects. Perhaps this is why so many researchers have
come up with conflicting results. Chaika (1974), in an effort to
define the problem accurately, compared the speech of one
chronic schizophrenic to several samples from others long re-
ported in the literature as typically schizophrenic. Contrary to
what Fromkin (1975) and the target article assert, that paper did
consider speech data from more than one source.
Not only is it necessary to include only those patients who
show pathological structural deviation, it is necessary to account
for all reported deviations in that population. Again, researchers
have typically tried to explain some, but not all of the syndrome.
For instance, it is common to say that schizophrenics rarely
show agrammatism (e.g. B. D. Cohen 1978, p. 1). However,
word salads have long been recognized as symptomatic of
schizophrenia, and examples of both agrammatism and outright
gibberish are not impossible to find, either in patients or in the
literature [sic] (e.g. Chaika, 1974; 1982c; Herbert & Wal-
tensperger 1981). Any explanation for schizophrenic speech that
refuses to account for all of the data is suspect. Furthermore, any
explanation for pathological speech should also account for the
reasons some schizophrenics rarely if ever evince it, or at least
be consistent with that fact. Other facets of schizophrenia must
also be accounted for in any explanation. For instance, Chafe
(1980:13-16) shows the parallels between normal eye move-
ments and normal discourse. Dysfunctions in schizophrenic eye
movements have been well documented (Holzman 1978). The
connection between these and all of the reported speech dys-
functions must also be considered. Other facets of schizo-
phrenia, such as hallucinations and effective medications, also
cannot be ignored (Chaika 1982b).
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The final challenge in linguistic investigation is to ensure that
one's procedure actually tests for abilities and processes used in
normal speech production (Chaika 1982b). The real problem
with word association testing is that it does not mirror actual
strategies of production. Normal speech is subordinated to a
topic. If a person is reminded of something outside of the topic,
there are regular strategies to announce a topic change. If
normal individuals do change a topic, they flit to another topic,
not to a series of random associations like "Looks like clay/
sounds like gray/take you for a roll in the hay/hay day/May day/
help" (B. D. Cohen 1978, p. 29). Subordination of utterance to
topic is not just pragmatics. We know today that syntax operates
not on the level of sentence, but on the level of the discourse as a
whole (see, e.g., Labov & Fanshel 1977; Van Dijk 1980).
Sentential grammar is usually determined by requirements of
discourse, such as the signaling of new and old information. In
fact, so important is topic to comprehension that even if speak-
ers do not overtly signal the connections between sentences,
hearers can usually fill in their relationship simply by relating
them to the topic at hand (e.g. Slobin 1979, p. 52). This is why so
many actual conversations may seem on the surface to be
disjointed when, in fact, they are perfectly lucid (Chaika 1981).
Salzinger's findings of poor predictability in schizophrenic
speech (Salzinger, Portnoy & Feldman 1978) arise from the
failure to adhere to topic. Normal speakers can predict so well
that frequently they can even fill in a word for a speaker
(Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). Failure to adhere to dis-
course rules, then, is a serious disruption in speech. Similarly,
eye contact and kinesics are integral parts of linguistic communi-
cation. Failures in this sphere are, accordingly, serious (Chaika
1982a).
The relevance of studies of pigeonholing to normal speech
production is doubtful. Synonyms often cannot be used in the
same environments. That is why translation is so difficult."
Hence, it is not clear how a deficit in putting words in seman-
tically related categories explains, for instance, glossomanic
chains which, as it happens, often take the form of uttering
seinantically related words. In the same vein, the idea that
schizophrenics have a semantic deficit is not borne out by the
evidence. Quite the opposite frequently seems to be true:
semantic overloading, thinking of too many meanings of a word
at once (Chaika 1974; 1982c; Vonnegut 1976).
Finally, tests of memory do not test for the intactness of
abilities needed for linguistic production. Knight and Sims-
Knight's (1979) interesting protocol does not demonstrate that
schizophrenics have no filtering problems, as Schwartz sug-
gests, or that they do have a pigeonholing problem. It has long
been known that hearers extract the semantic meaning of
utterances and then forget the actual syntax that was used in
encoding (e.g. Slobin 1979, p. 42). It is expected that normal
speakers would misjudge paraphrases as old sentences, as they
are judging on the basis of meaning. It is entirely possible that
schizophrenics who judge paraphrases as "new" have simply
forgotten the meanings of the previous sentences.
How should schizophrenic thought and
language be studied?
Loren J. Chapman and Jean P. Chapman
Psychology Department, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison,
Wise. 53706
We disagree with several of Schwartz's conclusions about the
evidence on schizophrenic thought and language. Our disagree-
ments reflect a basic difference concerning the principles of
useful evaluation of research. We believe that Schwartz over-
states the importance of negative findings. He rejects other
writers' formulations unless they are so robust that supportive
data are found regardless of the kinds of schizophrenics studied
(acute or chronic, severely disturbed or slightly disturbed), the
conditions of testing (on drugs or off drugs), or the methods of
measurement (reliable or unreliable measures, tasks matched or
unmatched on psychometric characteristics in measuring differ-
ential deficit). Also, although he acknowledges that schizo-
phrenia is heterogeneous, he implicitly assumes, in his evalua-
tion of evidence for specific theories or hypotheses, that a single
defect should be found in all patients. Differences between
subjects who do and do not show a defect may indicate meaning-
ful subgroups within schizophrenia. Differences between tasks
or conditions that yield differing results may clarify the nature of
the defect.
To review the evidence concerning each disputed conclusion
would require a discussion much longer than is possible in the
allotted space. We shall, therefore, limit our remarks to two of
Schwartz's conclusions that illustrate our different view of re-
search evaluation.
Schwartz argues that further work on word associations is not
likely to lead to greater understanding of schizophrenia because
schizophrenics' associates are not less common or more deviant
than those of nonschizophrenics. Several recent studies com-
pared conventional word-association task performance of
schizophrenic and control groups matched by age, education,
and, frequently, an intellectual measure, such as vocabulary;
they have found that schizophrenics, or at least some specified
set of schizophrenics, give less common word associations than
control subjects (Lisman & Cohen 1972; Magaro, Abrams &
Cantrell 1981; Moran, Mefferd & Kimble 1964; Penk 1978; and
Penk & Kidd 1977). Yet Fuller and Kates (1969) did not find
less common associates in schizophrenia, and even those inves-
tigators who did, did not find them in all their schizophrenics.
Several investigators have made progress in resolving this
apparent contradiction by studying the kinds of stimulus words
to which schizophrenics make deviant responses and the kinds
of schizophrenics who make them. Schizophrenics are found to
show a clearer deviancy of commonality on stimulus words that
have been described as "high interference," "flat slope," "am-
biguous," "low commonality, ' or "weak. " All of these terms
designate stimulus words that elicit two or more response words
nearly equal in frequency rather than eliciting a single dominant
response that is much more frequent than other responses. Less
common responses to flat-slope words were reported by Lisman
and Cohen (1972) and was reconfirmed by Magaro et al. (1981),
Penk (1978), and Penk and Kidd (1977). The findings appear to
indicate that competition between potential responses is a
source of schizophrenics' deviant commonality scores.
Other studies have given evidence on the kinds of schizo-
phrenics who give low commonality responses. Dewolfe and
Fedirka (1978) found that reactive schizophrenics showed a
greater increase in disturbances in a high-interference condition
than did process schizophrenics. Magaro et al. (1981) found that
nonparanoid schizophrenics are deficient in popular word asso-
ciations to low-interference stimulus words but paranoid schizo-
phrenics are not. Such findings may make it possible to identify
meaningful subgroups within schizophrenia that differ in these
congitive symptoms.
Although several of the above investigators matched groups
on age, education, intelligence, and sex, none reported social
class. Schwartz renders a service by reminding investigators of
the relevance of social class to measures of cognition, but he
renders a disservice by concluding, in the absence of appropri-
ate data, that social class accounts for the differences that have
been found. Also, the finding that schizophrenics give uncom-
mon responses to high-interference stimulus words seems more
consistent with what is known about schizophrenia than with
what is known about social class.
Several of Schwartz's arguments that schizophrenic word
associations are nondeviant were based on tangential, almost
irrelevant, theory or evidence. Lisman and Cohen's (1972)
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contention that schizophrenics have a normal associative reper-
toire from which to sample does not contradict the empirical
phenomenon of schizophrenics' associative deviancy. Lisman
and Cohen were merely offering an alternative interpretation of
the observed deviancy; specifically, they suggested that schizo-
phrenics are unable to edit out inappropriate responses from
their nondeviant repertoires. Similarly, Schwartz errs in point-
ing to our own work (Chapman & Chapman 1973) as relevant to
the issue of schizophrenic deviancy in associative responses. We
found that when schizophrenics interpret the meaning of a word
presented in the context of a sentence, they often rely on the
strongest aspect of meaning regardless of whether that meaning
is appropriate to the context at hand. Schwartz points to this
principle as "just the opposite of the pattern expected if schizo-
phrenics give rare associations." We disagree. We never sug-
gested that schizophrenics, when presented with words out of
context, interpret them in accordance with more common
meanings than do control subjects; in addition, interpretation of
words is not a free-associative response.
We also disagree with Schwartz's reiteration of Hemsley's
(1975) and Hemsley and Richardson's (1980) conclusion that the
evidence is weak for a schizophrenic defect in Broadbent's
(1973) filtering, that is, in the selection of stimulus input on the
basis of its physical characteristics. Dozens of studies have
reported a schizophrenic deficit on tasks that require the subject
to ignore one of two voices, or noise, or a message presented to
one of the ears, or some other distracting stimulus. The studies
of Oltmanns and Neale (1975) and Oltmanns (1978) are es-
pecially convincing. By using tasks matched on reliability and
difficulty for normal subjects, these investigators ruled out
generalized performance deficit as a source of the schizo-
phrenics' lower accuracy on the distraction task than on the
control task. Schwartz's rejection of a filtering defect in schizo-
phrenia on the basis of a single negative study by Pogue-Geile
and Oltmanns (1980) is inappropriate.
A useful evaluation of a field of research must be based on all
the major studies on the topic. The evaluation should consist of a
fine-grained analysis of designs, measures, and kinds of sub-
jects, and the relation of each to the findings. When faced with
conflicting evidence, the reviewer's proper task is to study the
variables that distinguish studies with differing outcomes. The
study on conflicting findings can often increase understanding of
the phenomena under investigation.
Schizophrenic speech as cognitive stuttering
Bertram D. Cohen
Department of Psychiatry, Rutgers Medical School, Piscataway, N. J.
08854
Schwartz's title asks the question, Is there a schizophrenic
language? On the basis of available evidence, the answer to this
question is, no, there isn't. Other things being equal, schizo-
phrenic persons appear to be no better able to understand one
another's communications than are other listeners (Cohen &
Camhi 1967). Nor does the evidence support the more plausible
notion that there are idiosyncratic schizophrenic languages
(Cohen, Nachmani & Rosenberg 1974). As Schwartz concludes,
schizophrenic speech peculiarities do not imply a language
deficit, as such. They represent deficiencies in linguistic perfor-
mance rather than competence. Bleuler (1950) considered the
speech symptoms to be "secondary symptoms," secondary to a
primary cognitive deficit which, for him, involved a disturbance
of "association."
Schwartz brings Bleuler's approach up to date in his delinea-
tion of several "information processing" variables by means of
which he hopes to specify the nature of the primary cognitive
deficit(s) underlying the more superficial and variable secondary
symptoms.
There is, I believe, an implicit assumption shared by many
investigators in this field to the effect that the "deeper" or more
"central" the cognitive processes one implicates in the primary
deficit, the closer one gets to the discovery of links between the
phenomena of schizophrenia and something pathological in the
brain. This is consistent with an older tradition in which schizo-
phrenic speech has been compared to aphasia (see Woods 1938).
However, it may be worth emphasizing here that such centrally
conceived variables as "filtering" or "pigeonholing" - to name
two discussed by Schwartz - are susceptible of radical alteration
by social and psychodynamic processes which can affect human
information processing even in the absence of nervous system
pathology.
While no one doubts that aphasia is based on specific brain
lesions, there is considerable doubt that stuttering, another
speech disorder, is. Most treatments of stuttering imply that its
acquisition and evocation are primarily in response to psychoso-
cial determinants - although, to be sure, there are hypotheses,
and some data, that implicate disturbances in stutterers' brain
function (Eisenson 1958; West 1958). Be that as it may, I
consider stuttering to be a psychosocial disorder and have found
it useful in teaching and clinical practice to consider schizo-
phrenic communication disturbances as forms of "cognitive
stuttering." This analogy has some support when one recognizes
that both sets of phenomena involve serious nonfluencies, for
example, blocking and perse veration. It is true, of course, that
schizophrenic nonfluency is ideational, involving the semantic
and pragmatic aspects of language function, while stuttering is
exclusively phonological: The communicability of stutterers'
utterances, once uttered, remains normal. Nevertheless, the
similarities are intriguing. To name a few more: Both phe-
nomena are likely to increase at points of high uncertainty in
verbal discourse (Goldman-Eisler 1958; Maher 1972; Schlesing-
er, Forte, Fried & Melkman 1965); both increase when the
speaker is under heightened stress or anxiety or when the
speaker anticipates listener antipathy; and both are, in fact,
aversive to listeners.
Flimsy as the analogy of stuttering may be, and acknowledg-
ing that the overlap noted may not altogether exclude aphasia, I
believe that stuttering is a more constructive analogy to schizo-
phrenia than aphasia, if for no other reason than that it is
somewhat less likely to seduce researchers and clinicians into
pigeonholing schizophrenic communication phenomena as
symptoms of a brain disease and thus possibly filtering out
prematurely very different approaches to their understanding
and treatment.
Psychiatric diagnosis: A double taxonomic
swamp
Kenneth Mark Colby
Neuropsychiatric Institute, University of California School of Medicine, Los
Angeles, Calif. 90024
Before a category or natural kind can be related to another,
there must be some acceptable agreement as to what properties
characterize the kinds. Physics and chemistry got off the ground
with a workable preliminary classification of natural kinds such
as "water," "mineral" and "glass," whose defining cluster of
properties are taken as fixed for the time being. What the
Schwartz article forcefully indicates is that we are getting no-
where slowly because neither the kind "schizophrenia" nor the
kind "language deviance" can be reliably specified. To be mired
in one category swamp is plenty, but when faced with two, the
conceptual and empirical questions become irremediable, at
least under existing taxonomic formulations.
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Behavioral and biological scientists tend to be trustingly naive
when they enter the domain of clinical psychiatry. The oft-run
scenario plays something like this. "We have a new test for
measuring X. Let's try it on schizophrenics to see if they score
differently from normal subjects or other patients." Psychia-
trists obligingly provide a group of schizophrenics and the test is
tried out. The resultant inconclusive mess stems from the
simple fact that since the construct "schizophrenia" lacks both
definition and criteria, the conglomeration of "schizophrenics,"
provided in good faith by the psychiatrists, possess such a wildly
disjunctive set of properties that nothing useful comes of the
study, except perhaps the suggestion that this is not the way to
go.
Schwartz refers to DSM-III studies in which the kappa for
interrater reliability of a diagnosis of schizophrenia reached .81
(Spitzer, Forman & Nee 1979). Kappa is a statistic that applies to
the agreements of only two judges. In the field trials of DSM-
III, in one-third of the cases, the diagnostic assignments of two
clinicians were made after a simultaneous interview with the
patient during which the clinicians may well have exchanged a
considerable amount of information by means of the way in
which questions were asked and emphasis placed, and by other
sorts of indirect shared code-signals. In the other two-thirds of
the cases, clinicians were encouraged to exchange "relevant
data." If one clinician tells another that "the patient reported an
auditory hallucination in which a voice keeps up a running
commentary on his thoughts and he said he's never told anyone
about it before," the information is a giveaway as to what
diagnosis the reporting clinician is thinking about, since the
category "schizophrenic disorder" is the only one in which that
particular symptom is described. It is not just interjudge agree-
ment that is important but how the agreements are arrived at.
Although astutely critical of the research in this area,
Schwartz rolls right along throughout his article discussing
schizophrenics doing this and schizophrenics doing that under
the assumption that we all know what he is talking about when
he refers to "schizophrenics."
When it comes to the property set characterizing language
deviance, we sink into another swamp. If patients are diagnosed
by psychiatrists as "schizophrenic," in part because they talk or
write oddly, then it should be no surprise when linguistic
studies find these patients show language deviance. A functional
class X is one whose members produce actions or objects of class
Y. Members of a functional kind (e.g. "schizophrenia") can be
hypothesized to produce actions or objects that are members of
another functional kind (e.g. "language deviance"). To establish
a dyadic lawfulness, or at least correlation, between two func-
tional kinds, the properties of each kind must be delineated
independently. Why this tautologous mistake, generously sup-
ported by federal grants, has been made so repeatedly remains a
mystery for all to ponder. Schwartz drives this circularity point
home, and I hope his article will help the error become
obsolete.
When a psychiatrist says a patient shows "loose associations"
or "thought disorder," he usually means he finds it difficult to
follow and understand what the patient is saying. The patient
seems to jump around so much in his speech that his flow of
communication lacks referential continuity, at least to the psy-
chiatrist. From an information-theoretic point of view, "being
difficult to follow" is as much a functional property of the
receiver as of the speaker. Messages have both semantic and
pragmatic meaning, signification and significance. As sign com-
plexes, they signify webs of concepts and they are used by
purposeful message-sending agents to produce intended re-
sponses in recipients. From a sender's messages, a recipient
selects those features that are functionally important or salient
to him. The selections may or may not correspond to the
signification and significance of the messages intended by the
sender. The semantic and pragmatic meanings of a received
message are relative to the recipient's ensemble of alternative
possibilities whose ordering has been determined by the recip-
ient. That meanings of messages are relativized to the reference
frame of recipients is hardly a new idea.
A beginning psychiatrist may have great difficulty in under-
standing some of his patients. Experienced psychiatrists may
have much less difficulty with the same patients. Even the
beginner will learn that the longer he talks with his patient, the
more background information he obtains about the patient's
history and present situation; and the more he knows about his
beliefs, desires, and values the easier it becomes to "follow"
him. With each gain of information, it becomes less obscure
what the patient is referring to and what semantic and pragmatic
meanings are being carried by his idiosyncratic expressions,
which on a first hearing appear bewildering. This suggests that
in choosing his messages the patient attributes too much initial
information to his listeners or an obfuscating strategy is being
called up to protect himself in an unfamiliar, difficult, and
distressing situation which can harm as well as benefit him. It is
not just language that is involved in clinical discourse but
communication in which the sender's beliefs and attitudes about
himself, about the recipient, and about the subject matter of the
message must be taken into consideration. All this is such
elementary communication theory that perhaps it should not be
brought up in a journal of this sophistication. As Gide remarked,
however, one must say the same things over and over because
nobody listens.
It is easy enough to criticize the obvious. What is to be done?
The problem is taxonomic. My feeling is that we have gone as far
as we can with the few signs and symptoms currently available.
No amount of statistical juggling or computer programming is
going to yield new clusters of clinical usefulness. We need new
properties. Also, it seems to me that clinical classifications
require a new approach in which individuals, rather than disor-
ders, are grouped into functional similarity classes. Rather than
trying to fit individuals into kinds based on clinically intuited
property sets, we need new class-defining properties based on
systematic empirical inquiry, including responses to manage-
ment decisions that feed back into the initial groupings to
stabilize or revise the taxonomic structure (Colby & McGuire
1981; Colby & Spar, in press).
Schizophrenia: First you see it; then you
don't
Rue L. Cromwell and Lawrence G. Space
Department of Psychiatry, University of Rochester Medical Center,
Rochester, N.Y. 14642
Schwartz's target article presents some useful critical analyses of
the question, What is all this about schizophrenic language?
Perhaps of greatest impact on current thinking is his challenge
as to whether thought disorder as most people think of it today
exists. This cardinal feature, which interview-dependent clini-
cians have used for diagnosis of schizophrenia, has implied a
breakdown in conceptual structure, that is, a "marked loosening
of associations" (American Psychiatric Association 1980). From
Kelly (1955) we have operations to measure conceptual struc-
ture that are far better than Jung's word association technique.
For example, in our culture people typically have an association
between "honest-dishonest" and "sincere-insincere," but this
association differs reliably from one person to another. For one
person, the correlation coefficient may be 0.9, for another, 0.4.
Seldom would it be 1.0 (as for synonyms) or 0.0 (no association at
all). The notion held for decades (see Bannister 1962; 1963) is
that schizophrenia loosens these ties of association and cluster-
ing. Essentially, Schwartz is challenging this. So have we.
We (Dingemans, Space & Cromwell 1982) have gone about
making the challenge in a different way. We gave "repertory
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grids" to schizophrenics, depressives, and normal control sub-
jects and then had the grid ratings repeated within a week. (A
repertory grid is a matrix of subject-nominated people, each
rated on each of a number of subject-elicited construct dimen-
sions - see Kelly 1955.) We know (e.g. Bannister 1962; 1963)
that schizophrenics have lower correlations (both positive and
negative) among the various pairs of elicited constructs, which
suggests that their associational bonds (conceptual structures)
are looser. We also know that there is no remarkable change in
associative strength if the ratings are repeated. Suppose, how-
ever, we assume that these lowered correlations do not result
from loosened conceptual structure (in long-term memory) but
instead from temporary attentional disruptions. If so, then we
should find the following sequence of consecutive ratings: quite
reliable test-retest stability, then (once an attentional disruption
occurred) a string of consecutive inconsistencies (test-retest
discrepancies) regardless of constructs and persons being rated,
and then a recovery of consecutive test-retest agreement This is
what we found and demonstrated statistically.
Since a momentary deficit followed by complete recovery is
more probably an attentional rather than a long-term memory
problem, and since we could demonstrate no persistent impair-
ment in the use of specific constructs or in the ratings of specific
persons, the conventional notion of thought disorder is placed in
doubt.
The alternative attentional deficit interpretation which we
offer is not one of a permanent or persisting specific deficit in the
sequence of information processing, nor is it a processing-
capacity deficit. Instead, the deficit comes and goes. And,
indeed, Schwartz describes the same thing for schizophrenic
language.
The phasic nature of schizophrenic deficit can also be de-
scribed with choice reaction time (Space, Nideffer, Cromwell &
Dwyer 1982). A person looks at a pair of lights and lifts his right
finger off a key if the right light goes off, his left finger if the left
light goes off. Among normal subjects an impressive straight line
function of speed-accuracy trade-off can be plotted. With more
speed, there is less accuracy in lifting the correct key; with less
speed, more accuracy. The steepness of this straight line slope
can be related to sensitivity in signal detection analysis. Do
schizophrenics operate in this straightforward fashion? No. The
faster trials of the schizophrenics are indeed like the faster trials
of the normal subjects: a straight line slope. With slower trials
the slope shifts. There is less purchase of increased accuracy
with the decreased speed, that is, less sensitivity than the same
schizophrenic subjects demonstrated in their fast trials. A trial-
by-trial interpretation makes the shifting slope simple to under-
stand. Once in a while the schizophrenics have trials that are
both slow and inaccurate: a phasic attentional deficit. On other
trials they show the same speed-accuracy trade-off as normal
subjects. First it is there. Then it isn't.
Schwartz argues effectively for a pigeonholing deficit in
schizophrenia. So do we. In fact, in the repertory grid study
cited above, schizophrenics and depressives were equally defi-
cient with respect to test-retest changes in ratings, but the
schizophrenics made significantly more slot movements
(changes in ratings that crossed the midpoint from one side of a
6-point scale to the other). This slot movement (also called
polarity change) is a clear illustration of pigeonholing difficulty.
On the other hand, the evidence for pigeonholing does not rule
out the possibility of filtering and sensitivity deficit. The in-
terpretation of our choice reaction time study in terms of
sensitivity fluctuation is an illustration of this.
Another aspect of the problem is definitional. After we leave
the operations of the earliest stage of information processing
(iconic registration and decay) the operations for filtering, short-
term memory, and response selection do not seem clearly
separated. Thus, an interpretation of pigeonholing to the exclu-
sion of filtering or sensitivity would seem hazardous.
In conclusion, we would argue that we will not understand
schizophrenia unless we take into account the phasic aspects of
the deficit. Time segments frequently occur where a previously
identified deficit cannot be found. We would also argue that the
problem of schizophrenia will not be solved as long as we restrict
ourselves to primitive interview techniques to identify global
clinical symptoms. Only with more precise measures of deficit
can causal pathways be traced in order to interrelate etiology,
current impairment, effective intervention or prevention, and
favorable prognosis.
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Advances in schizophrenia research:
Neuropathologic findings
John K. Darby
Department of Neurobiology, Stanford University School of Medicine,
Stanford, Calif. 94305
Schizophrenia is a diagnostic term which describes an associa-
tion of characteristic disturbances found in a group of disorders
of differing etiologies. A chronic subgroup, marked by deterio-
ration of the course of the illness and negative, anhedonic
symptoms, is highly suspect for having a neurobiologic distur-
bance. On the other hand, acute and remitting disorders are not
necessarily associated with either a biologic disorder or a poor
prognosis. Therefore, generalized conclusions about "schizo-
phrenia" are fraught with hazard.
Schwartz's review on schizophrenic language and cognition
oversimplifies comprehensive discussions of the material pre-
sented in Language and Cognition in Schizophrenia, edited by
Schwartz (1978b). In that volume the contributors discussed
critical variables such as heterogeneity of the syndrome, medi-
cation effects, genetic predisposition, time course and chron-
icity, and the degree of psychotic decompensation, thus point-
ing to the provisional nature of conclusions from their research.
For example, Koh's chapter (1978) draws only interim conclu-
sions about memory function in schizophrenia and cautions that
research findings were derived from a population that was not
acutely psychotic but in various phases of recuperation and on a
variety of medications. Schwartz (1978c) reviewed a study by
Dokecki, Polidoro, and Cromwell (1965) of rare word associa-
tions which is of interest with respect to the acute-chronic
dichotomy. In this report the poor premorbid schizophrenic
subgroup gave rare associations whereas normal individuals and
good premorbid schizophrenics gave common responses.
Most of the language and cognition research has been con-
ducted under the assumption that structural or neurologic
defects were not present in either childhood or adult schizo-
phrenia. Recent research, however, may provide a neu-
robiological framework for understanding schizophrenia that is
relevant to language and cognition studies. A brief review of
research on neuropathology will summarize trends.
Darby (1976) reviewed 33 cases of childhood psychosis who
had postmortem exams. He summarized a variety of neu-
ropathologies found in 27 cases. Campbell, Rosenbloom, Perry,
George, Kricheff, Andersen, Small, and Jennings (1982) found
ventricular enlargement by computerized tomography (CT)
scans in a subgroup of diagnostically homogeneous autistic
children. Andreasen, Olsen, Dennert, and Smith (1982) identi-
fied a subgroup of chronic schizophrenic patients with ventricu-
lar enlargement (by CT scan) who showed impairment in sen-
sorium and symptoms of alogia, affective flattening, avolition,
and anhedonia. Golden, Graber, Coffman, Berg, Newlin, and
Bloch (1981), using CT scan density measurements, proposed
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that a subgroup of schizophrenic patients who are generally
labeled as process schizophrenics have structural deficits, par-
ticularly in the left frontal areas of the brain. Luchins, Morihisa,
Weinberger, and Wyatt (1981) reported an inverse relationship
between abnormal occipital asymmetry and vermian atrophy in
postmortem brains and hypothesized that brain atrophy and
abnormal cerebral asymmetry represent two distinct etiological
factors in schizophrenia. Abrams, Redfield, and Taylor (1981)
found lower verbal, performance, and full scale IQs in
rigorously diagnosed schizophrenic patients with relatively
poorer performance on language tests when compared to pa-
tients with affective disorders. Gattaz, Beckmann, and Men-
dlewicz (1981) suggest that human leucocyte antigens (HLA-
B27) may provide a genetic marker for vulnerability for a
subgroup of schizophrenics and offer the potential to differenti-
ate certain subtypes.
These and subsequent studies are likely to bring further
refinements to our diagnostic classifications and improve our
understanding of the etiology of these disorders.
Failure to establish appropriate response
sets: An explanation for a range of
schizophrenic phenomena?
David R. Hemsley
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, University of London,
London SE5 8AF, England
I should first like to make a few specific points concerning this
target article, addressing in particular the issue of whether a
greater concern with certain subgroupings of schizophrenia may
clarify the nature of their cognitive functioning. This will be
followed by an attempt to indicate the ways in which defective
pigeonholing may relate to the more general abnormalities
shown by schizophrenic patients, in particular its possible role
in the mechanisms underlying hallucinatory experiences.
Schwartz's discussion of schizophrenic response biases fails to
mention research by Williams, Hemsley, and Denning-Duke
(1976) which suggested that it is only chronic schizophrenics
who show the strong meaning response bias. These authors
indicate that their findings are consistent with Broen's (1968)
hypothesis that reduced consideration of alternative meanings
"may be learnt over time in an attempt to cope with response
disorganization" (p. 146). In this connection it is also worth
clarifying the results of the study by de Silva and Hemsley
(1977). Schwartz reports this as indicating deteriorating perfor-
mance by schizophrenics, on a task requiring the guessing of
missing words, with increasing context. It should be noted that
this was a feature only of the acute schizophrenic subgroup, the
chronic schizophrenics' performance remaining stable across
context conditions. Again, an interpretation of the data in terms
of a learned narrowing of attention in chronic patients appears
possible. Evidence for reduced cue use by chronic schizo-
phrenics on perceptual tasks has been presented by Cegalis and
Tegtmeyer (1980). Hence, although the interpretation of acute-
chronic differences in terms of intraindividual change rather
than sampling biases remains hazardous, it would appear worth-
while to consider this dimension in the assessment of cognitive
abnormalities. There is also evidence that subgroupings of
schizophrenia derived from psychophysiological assessment
may be relevant to performance on the kind of tasks reviewed by
Schwartz. Gruzelier and his colleagues (e.g. Gruzelier & Ven-
ables 1975) distinguish two patterns of skin-conductance re-
sponding in schizophrenia, an absence of skin-conductance
orienting responses to auditory stimuli (nonresponders) or a
failure to habituate (responders). Straube (1979) compared
schizophrenic responders and nonresponders on a dichotic
listening task, subjects being required to shadow material com-
ing from one earphone. The nonresponder group made signifi-
cantly more errors of omission than the responders and also
showed a symptom pattern of low spontaneous activity and
withdrawal. Straube suggests that the increased omission errors
should be interpreted in terms of reduced stimulus intake and
that both withdrawal and hyporesponding should be regarded as
protective mechanisms.
Research into cognitive impairment in schizophrenia has
sought to specify the structural limitations and capacity re-
strictions of particular stages of processing. However, cognitive
psychologists are increasingly interested in the factors affecting
the use of these structures to achieve particular goals. Under-
wood (1978) has argued that the strategies we can isolate will be
defined in terms of the information used by the subject, the
stages of processing applied, and the effects of a given strategy
upon behavior. The acute-chronic differences discussed above
may reflect the operation of one such strategy.
In part, optimal strategies are dependent on expectancies,
built up on the basis of the redundancy and patterning of sensory
input, which may be used to overcome the processing limits of
the structural features in the system. A failure to establish
appropriate response sets, put forward by Schwartz as the
central defect in schizophrenia, would indeed be expected to
have wide-ranging effects upon behavior. It may even be possi-
ble to relate such a disturbance to schizophrenic hallucinations.
It has been suggested by Hartmann (1975, p. 73) that "possibly
something in the realm of ability to pattern sensory input, or
interact with it may be involved in the inhibitory factor" (for
hallucinatory experience). As Schwartz points out, schizo-
phrenics may indeed be less able to make use of structure in
presented material. It is also clear that the extent of hallucinato-
ry experiences in schizophrenia varies according to the form of
the auditory input present (Margo, Hemsley & Slade 1981).
These authors demonstrated a negative relationship between
both the structure of the material presented and its attention-
commanding properties and the extent of reported hallucina-
tions. One might therefore speculate that schizophrenic halluci-
nations are related to a cognitive abnormality which, even under
normal conditions of sensory input, results in ambiguous mes-
sages reaching awareness.
An interpretation of abnormalities of schizophrenics' lan-
guage and cognition in terms of a defect in pigeonholing has one
major strength; it may be possible to construct tasks on which
schizophrenics would be predicted to perform better than
normal subjects. As indicated above, response biases may be
viewed as a way of making use of the redundancy and patterning
of sensory input to reduce information-processing demands.
However, when the actual stimulus presented is unexpected,
biases may act to impair performance. Hence, if there is consid-
ered to be a general defect in the pigeonholing mechanism in
schizophrenia, tasks in which context is misleading for normal
subjects may result in schizophrenics' superior performance.
Such findings would be less open to alternative explanations
than are the many instances of schizophrenics' deficits present-
ed in Schwartz's interesting review.
Verbal encoding and language abnormality
in schizophrenia
Stanley R. Kay
Department of Psychiatry, Albert Einstein College of Medicine and
Department of Psychology, Bronx Psychiatric Center, Bronx, N.Y. 10461
Schwartz's proposal that schizophrenics' disorganized language
may be explained by thought disorder is compelling but not
sufficiently clarified. Although he convincingly disarms the
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language deficit hypothesis, his alternative view draws upon
purported methodological weaknesses in the literature rather
than a broad synthesis. His critical review traces the cognitive
dysfunction to defective information processing but does not
specify the nature of the abnormality and, therefore, cannot
integrate the diversity of research findings or generate predic-
tions. Information processing can be described as involving
sequenced phases in which input is detected by the sensory
apparatus, registered (coded) for later retrieval, briefly entered
into short-term memory, transferred to long-term storage, and
possibly responded to (Klatzky 1975). Schwartz's imprecision
about the stage at which this process breaks down for schizo-
phrenics leads to several inaccuracies.
First, Schwartz makes little distinction between findings that
derive from different stages of information processing (most
commonly, response emission and short-term memory in
schizophrenics). This confounds the interpretation of outcomes,
which are surely a function of the stage inspected. Failure at an
earlier level necessarily entails deficit at a later one because of
the hierarchical sequence; however, abnormalities in overt
responding to stimuli tell nothing about the initial processing.
Second, Schwartz suggests that the schizophrenic disorder may
be one of pigeonholing, which he defines as "adopting a re-
sponse set" and possibly "responsible for schizophrenics' ten-
dency to rely on shallow levels of encoding. " This is a reversal of
the actual information-processing chain, in which defective
encoding precedes and could account for pathological response
selection.
In contrast to Schwartz's conclusion, a broader and more
parsimonious theory implicates problems in schizophrenics'
encoding, the first stage of information processing after a stim-
ulus impinges on the sensory organ. Whereas research has not
delineated specific sensory deficits in schizophrenia (Salzinger
1973), there is mounting evidence to suggest an atypical pattern
of registering information. In the normal adult population,
stimuli are processed mainly according to their semantic prop-
erties rather than physical characteristics or emotional tone.
Thus verbal encoding is usually keyed to the meaningful con-
ceptual attributes of words (Wickens 1972). Schizophrenics,
however, tend to be lured by the physical and emotional cues
embedded in stimuli. The former has been observed in studies
of similarity judgment, in which schizophrenics differed from
normal individuals in matching pictures based on their color or
position instead of their shape or meaning (Kay & Singh 1975;
1979; Kay, Singh & Smith 1975). The latter has been evidenced
in the various findings that underlie the affective hypothesis
(Buss & Lang 1965), in which schizophrenics showed a subnor-
mal threshold for emotionally loaded words. Failure to use
semantic cues has also been demonstrated in verbal memory
research, which finds schizophrenics deficient in applying
mnemonic strategies dependent on semantic organization
(Larsen & Fromholt 1976; Traupmann 1975).
A recent study tested the hypothesis that schizophrenic
thought disorder may be traced to abnormal verbal encoding,
dominated by salient affective and physical cues (Kay 1982).
Schizophrenics and nonschizophrenic psychotics were present-
ed, for short-term recall, a series of word triads related either in
concept (taxonomic class), affective quality (good-bad connota-
tion), or physical property (rhyming sound). The fourth triad in
each series introduced a shift to words of a different concept,
connotation, or sound. The measure of release from proactive
interference in recalling the new sets indicated the degree of
encoding for each dimension, as per Wickens (1972), while
controlling for attentional and other performance deficits (Chap-
man & Chapman 1978). It was found that schizophrenics,
particularly those with thought disorder, relied significantly less
on conceptual cues and more on the affective element. This
effect was attenuated with more potent concepts, suggesting
overall that schizophrenics are oriented to stimulus salience,
encoding at a "shallow" level.
The first implication of these data is that the various theories
that allude to abnormal schizophrenic responding - for exam-
ple, "idiodynamic response sets" (Moran, Mefferd & Kimble
1964), "response competition" (Broen & Storms 1966), "associa-
tive response intrusion " (Chapman 1958), "response inter-
ference" (Lang & Buss 1965) - should perhaps be reconsidered
in terms of an earlier stage of information processing. Schwartz's
observation of only weak confirmation of these theories may
reflect the lack of focus on coding processes.
A second implication is that schizophrenics seem to register
whichever input is most intense in a given situation. This
"stimulus salience hypothesis " is more robust than Salzinger's
(1973) proposal that schizophrenics are attracted to stimuli that
are temporally or spatially most immediate. Unlike Salzinger's
model, it can accommodate findings that interference in schizo-
phrenics' performance varies with the nature of the target
stimuli, distractors, and task requirements (e.g. Neale & Crom-
well 1972). Moreover, it can encompass the immediacy hypoth-
esis, since salience is usually conferred by prominence in time
and space.
The current position also offers a means of disentangling
contradictions in the literature cited by Schwartz. One such
contrast is the evidence that schizophrenics are highly concrete
(Goldstein 1944) but also overinclusive in their conceptual
boundaries (Payne 1966). These may both be understood as
reflecting failure in encoding conceptually relevant cues. An-
other seeming paradox is the finding of defective semantic
processing of verbal material (Koh & Kayton 1974; Larsen &
Fromholt 1976) in the face of Chapman and Chapman's (1973)
claim that schizophrenics are biased toward the strong meaning
of words. Yet the former data were derived from a free response
paradigm, in which nonsemantic alternatives naturally compete
with the semantic, while the latter design was limited to a forced
choice among semantic alternatives. According to a stimulus
salience model, schizophrenics are likely to register the more
potent among semantic alternatives (strong meaning) but, when
permitted a free range of choice, may overlook the conceptual
content of words in favor of the more compelling emotional
connotations.
The same principle can explain discrepancies in studies of
schizophrenics' word associations (Schwartz 1978a): In forced-
choice situations they tend to select more common associates,
but they appear "loose" and "idiosyncratic" when responding
freely because of competition from the salient affective dimen-
sion of words. Likewise schizophrenics' greater difficulty in
recall as compared to recognition memory (Nachmani & Cohen
1969) underscores their deficiency in encoding relevant cues,
which surfaces mainly where semantic organization is essential.
More generally, one may contend that the special disadvantage
for schizophrenics posed by situations that are unstructured
(Senf, Huston & Cohen 1955), novel (Shakow 1979), or fraught
with irrelevant or competing information (Lang & Buss 1965)
devolves from inadequate semantic encoding. Thus, their pa-
thology is most striking when the demands for meaningful
organization are greatest, that is, when external and preexisting
guides (structure and familiarity) are lacking or masked by
interfering stimuli. From this perspective, the central problem
in schizophrenics' cognitive functioning is not selective atten-
tion, as suggested by Schwartz, but rather the effect of ordinary
distraction on impaired coding processes.
We therefore concur with Schwartz's general conclusion that
schizophrenics' peculiar language reduces to disordered infor-
mation processing but propose that the abnormality resides at
the stage of encoding. Disturbances of attention, memory, and
response set as well as other schizophrenic phenomena can be
explained in these terms.
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Schizophasia is distinct but not aphasic
Andrew Kertesz
Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences, University of Western
Ontario, St. Joseph's Hospital, London, Ontario N6A 4V2
Schwartz takes a safe side with the majority opinion in the
schizophrenic language issue by stating that the disturbance is
not that of language competence but performance. One can
hardly argue with this in view of the ample evidence in the
literature. As a clinician, I found the statement in the abstract
provocative but untrue (" 'thought disorder' . . . is usually de-
fined . . . as incoherent speech"). Although thought disorder is
often manifested in incoherent speech, nobody denies that one
can occur independently from the other. The dichotomous
nature of thought and language, however, is enormously com-
plex, as is their interdependence. No matter how much the
dichotomy is emphasized, the information processing (or
thought) that seems to be disturbed in schizophrenics is also
manifested in altered language behaviour. Whether one empha-
sizes the differences between normal aphasic and schizophrenic
speech output (Chaika 1974; Lecours & Vanier-Clement 1976)
or the similarities (Fromkin 1975), clinicians agree that schizo-
phrenic language behaviour is identifiable and in many in-
stances clearly deviant from normal and aphasic productions.
The similarities to Wernicke's and transcortical sensory aphasia,
however, are significant enough that they should have been an
important part of the thesis.
Although Schwartz states that his paper is not merely a
review, he produces no new data, except to say that word
associations by schizophrenics are not different from normal. I
am afraid that this does not ring true to clinicians either. The
word associations schizophrenics produce may not be rare in
word pair paradigms, but they are certainly bizarre in almost all
of the examples of discourse in the published literature, or
encountered in my practice (see sample below).
The defective information processing that Schwartz considers
the essence of schizophrenic communication is an interesting
theoretical abstraction supported by some experimental evi-
dence for a central problem of attentional allocation. The em-
phasis on this, however, fails to answer the basic question, Is
there a specific language disturbance in schizophrenia?
A more detailed review of some of the linguistic peculiarities,
especially jargon production, morphemic transformation, and
the semantic and syntactic errors, would have been more
productive. Schwartz, like Fromkin (1975), fails to account for
the prominence of jargon in schizophrenia. The distinguishing
features of schizophrenic jargon are: (1) intermittency (in-
terspersed with intelligible speech), (2) less structural complex-
ity (Lecours & Vanier-CIdment 1976), (3) frequent morphemic
derivation, (4) frequent semantic referents and explanations, (5)
apparent volitional nature (not always evident), (6) less re-
striction to replacement of a certain word class (nouns and verbs)
than jargon aphasia, (7) high degree of repetitiousness, (8) lack of
association with anosognosia (denial of or failure to recognize
illness).
Some of the above features may be present in jargon aphasics
and some may not be evident in schizophasia, but when a
sufficiently large sample of language output is examined, the
pattern is distinctive. The occasional patient presents a problem
in differential diagnosis, as with the written and oral production
of a patient with postencephalitic epilepsy whose irrational
behaviour also suggested schizophrenia. The following is a
verbatim transcript of his written production:
Thought for the day — The confrontation with always that of a phase
swinging negative which holds purpose to penetrate the resistivity
placed by the protective shell surrounding one's being must be
experienced prior to one's true ability to radiate a written terminology
for means of truely being helpful to another.
Commentary/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
This is similar to "semantic jargon" in our terminology (Ker-
tesz 1981) with some important differences. Each word is
intelligible, yet often mismatched, such as the verb phrase,
"holds purpose", inappropriate, like the noun "resistivity" or
"phase swinging negative" (borrowed from his electronic back-
ground); or bizarrely complex: "radiate a written terminology."
One can get the gist of the idea, which is not the case with
transcortical sensory aphasia, where meaning is often com-
pletely lost. The impression of impaired syntax is derived
mainly from the missing punctuation and clause markers.
There are syntactic anomalies, although a syntactic frame-
work is preserved as a rule in both schizophasia and fluent
aphasia. Schizophrenics fail to use some syntactic rules, such as
concurrence restrictions or discourse markers like "but,"
"thus," "then," "however." This, in conjunction with bizarre
content, at times produces the impression of impaired syntax.
However, this is clearly distinct from the agrammatism of
Broca's aphasia or the paragrammatism of Wernicke's aphasia.
The oddity of content, as evidenced from the above sample
and loosened associations, are acknowledged by everyone, in-
cluding Schwartz, to be the central manifestations of schizo-
phrenic language disturbance. He is justified to look at it from
the point of view of information processing. However, seman-
tics are an integral part of linguistic considerations, and this
aspect deserves more emphasis in the discussion of schizo-
phrenic language.
Evaluating pigeonholing as an explanatory
construct for schizophrenics' cognitive
deficiencies
Raymond A. Knight8 and Judith E. Sims-Knightb
'Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. 02254
and bDepartment of Psychology, Southeastern Massachusetts University,
North Dartmouth, Mass. 02747
The general conclusion of Schwartz's article, that schizo-
phrenics do not have a language deficit, but rather show some as
yet unspecified deficiencies in their information processing, is
cogently argued and well supported. That schizophrenics' pro-
cessing deficit is unlikely ultimately to be explained simply by
distractibility or by attentional abnormalities in feature detec-
tion at the initial stages of stimulus input (what Schwartz calls a
"filtering" deficit) is also consistent with our view. We feel,
however, that two major issues in the target article need elab-
oration, clarification, and development. The first is Schwartz's
choice of Broadbent's filtering versus pigeonholing distinction
to characterize the differential cognitive deficit in schizo-
phrenics. The second is his avoidance of the important issue of
subtype differences in cognitive abilities among schizophrenics.
We consider each in turn.
We first outline Schwartz's arguments regarding filtering and
pigeonholing, and then summarize our assessment of them.
Citing evidence on word association studies and a lexicon
structure study (Koh, Kayton & Schwartz 1974), Schwartz
argues that schizophrenics' basic categorization with respect to
word meanings in general, including hierarchical class-labels as
a crucial subset, appears intact. Focusing on selected shadowing
and recognition studies, he concludes that schizophrenics' abil-
ity to filter stimuli is also adequate. This leaves pigeonholing as a
possible basis of the schizophrenic processing deficit. Schwartz
cites the results of Hemsley and Richardson (1980) and Koh,
Kayton, and Berry (1973) to support his hypothesis of a
pigeonholing deficit.
We see strengths and weaknesses in three aspects of
Schwartz's argument. First, while we agree with his conclusion
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that basic word meanings and their hierarchical relations are
intact in schizophrenics, this does not mean that schizophrenics
show no deficit in other forms of categorization or organization.
Indeed, Schwartz (1978b) himself has made that point. If in
some situations schizophrenics organize differently from normal
individuals, deficits that appear to be pigeonholing deficits may
stem from those organizational differences rather than from
differences in pigeonholing. Second, Schwartz does provide
some research that suggests that schizophrenics are deficient in
pigeonholing and not in filtering. Nevertheless, it is not always
easy to determine whether an experimental result is best ex-
plained by filtering or pigeonholing. Two examples of this are
Schwartz's explanation of the findings of Wishner and Wahl
(1974) and of Knight and Sims-Knight (1979). The nature of each
type of selective attention has to be specified carefully, particu-
larly when they are generalized beyond Broadbent's formula-
tion. Our third problem derives from the second. Schwartz
seems to want to use pigeonholing as a general explanatory
construct to account for schizophrenics' cognitive deficiencies.
It may be more heuristically useful to keep the notions of
filtering and pigeonholing narrow and more precise, and to
allow the possibility of other kinds of deficits as well. For
example, selective attention occurs only under circumstances of
overload of information-processing capacity, and schizophrenics
may exhibit deficiencies even when they are not overloaded.
An explanation of our objections requires that we explicate
certain of Broadbent's notions. Broadbent originally derived his
notions from studies of perceptual attention (1971). Filtering
refers to selective attention based on a single feature. Every
stimulus that possesses that feature gets attended to and every
stimulus that does not possess that feature gets ignored. In one
classic filtering situation, subjects were asked to monitor a voice
being presented to one ear while ignoring a voice in the other
ear (Broadbent 1958). Pigeonholing is also selective attention,
but the basis of selection involves multiple features. A common
example (Broadbent 1971; 1981) is selection on the basis of
categories, for example, a set to respond to names of animals and
not to other names. Broadbent (1971) argues that categorization
is a separate process, one that occurs automatically as humans
process stimuli. This hypothesis leads to one of the important
differences between filtering and pigeonholing. Filtering does
not require full processing (categorization) of the stimulus,
although occasionally such full processing occurs and leads to an
intrusion error. Because filtering prevents some stimuli from
being fully processed, Broadbent calls it a stimulus set.
Pigeonholing requires more initial processing of information. It
is thus termed a response set and intrusion errors should not
occur.
Although Broadbent's notions of filtering and pigeonholing
were developed from experiments in which subjects were in-
structed to attend to some stimuli and to ignore others during
initial perception, Broadbent has applied these notions to other
circumstances as well. Selective attention can occur uninten-
tionally, that is, when the subject is not so instructed (e.g.
Broadbent 1977). Selectivity can also occur after initial percep-
tion. In his 1971 book Broadbent applies filtering and pigeon-
holing to retrieval selectivity in memory as well. Whether
selective attention will occur as a result of filtering or pigeonhol-
ing can ajso depend on the stimulus set. For example, if the
letter "R" is to be distinguished from "P" and "B," this is a task
in filtering, since the criterion can be presence or absence of a
diagonal. If "R" is to be distinguished from "P" and "Q,"
pigeonholing is required, since this distinction requires multi-
ple features (e.g. Broadbent 1981). Furthermore, whether the
selection is based on single or multiple features sometimes
depends on the subject, not the stimuli. If a person "treats each
stimulus as a kind of bundle of features, with no internal
structure, and supposes that the presence or absence of one
feature dictates whether the others are to be analyzed" (Broad-
bent 1977), he will use filtering. If that same bundle is processed
as a hierarchically structured set, it can't operate as a filter, but
may operate as the basis for pigeonholing.
On the basis of these criteria we have to disagree with
Schwartz's classification of the Wishner and Wahl (1974) and the
Knight and Sims-Knight (1979) studies. Schwartz classified
Wishner and Wahl as a study of pigeonholing, because the
subjects remembered both shadowed and nonshadowed words.
We would argue that the task measured neither filtering nor
pigeonholing because information-processing limits were not
surpassed. The lists were only 7 words long, which is well within
the processing capacities of normal adults. In addition, the data
analyses were based on 8 or 16 word lists, and the same words
may have appeared on each of those lists.
The Knight and Sims-Knight study did strain the information-
processing capacities of the subjects in one sense, in that the
sentences were easily confused and subjects' performance level
was low. This is not, of course, the classic Broadbent sense of
straining limits, since all sentences were initially perceived
correctly. If one assumes that there are no differences in organi-
zation between normal individuals and schizophrenics, one can
argue that normal subjects attended relatively more to the
events the sentences described, while poor premorbid and
chronic schizophrenics attended relatively less to the events the
sentences described; one can thereby attribute their discrimina-
tion to pigeonholing. We cannot agree that the ability to differ-
entiate between sentences that described the central events
(which we called Cases) and sentences that described other
events involving the same objects (what Schwartz called "irrele-
vant" sentences and we called Noncases) is filtering. We do not
see how such differentiation can be based on a single feature.
Both of these discriminations (which Schwartz attributed to
pigeonholing and to filtering) required full semantic processing
of the initial sentences, and both involve complex distinctions
based on multiple features. One could call both pigeonholing,
but then one has not explained poor premorbid and chronic
schizophrenics' differential performance. Since we see no basis
for assuming that the ability to organize disparate stimuli into an
integrated schema of an event is intact in schizophrenics just
because the meaning of the words in the sentences is intact, we
prefer an integration deficit interpretation of this linguistic
paradigm. In a second study involving this same paradigm with
visual stimuli (Knight & Sims-Knight 1980), schizophrenics'
performance equaled that of controls on all dimensions, suggest-
ing that this integration deficit might be limited to linguistic
stimuli. Once again, it would be difficult to explain the discrep-
ancy in performance in these two studies in terms of a pigeon-
holing deficit.
We have focused on determining whether a particular phe-
nomenon found in schizophrenics is a problem of filtering,
pigeonholing, categorization, or "none of the above." Most of
the research gathered to address this issue was originally de-
signed to test other hypotheses. It must be stressed that ulti-
mately the only way to assess whether the filtering-pigeon-
holing model can account for such phenomena as response bias,
subjective organization, linguistic integration, overinclusion,
distractibility, perseveration, shallow versus deep processing,
encoding strategies, and the like is first to design clear, empiri-
cal studies using Broadbent's paradigms to establish the validity
of the model for schizophrenics, and then to design studies that
demonstrate that a pigeonholing deficit is the best explanation
for these other phenomena.
Schwartz notes some of the problems with the current pletho-
ra of diagnostic systems for selecting schizophrenics. He seems,
however, to underestimate the seriousness of the problem. It
has been shown empirically that different research criteria
categorize the same populations in diverse ways (Overall &
Hollister 1979) and that each system relies heavily on different
subject characteristics in the selection process (Marvinney,
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Rosenberg & Knight 1982). We agree strongly with Schwartz's
suggestions that researchers should employ objective research
diagnostic scales, defend the rationale for their choice of crite-
ria, and provide detailed descriptive data on their subjects. This
will allow for some post hoc determination of the comparability
of samples when discrepant results arise across studies, but it
will only permit weak speculation about which sample dif-
ference is crucial. We would suggest, therefore, that investiga-
tors systematically measure and analyze various subject charac-
teristics that have been found in other studies of schizophrenics
to covary with performance on cognitive tasks, such as premor-
bidity (Knight, Sherer & Shapiro 1977; Knight & Sims-Knight
1979) and paranoia (Magaro 1981). Also, if specific subject
variables have been found important in predicting the course of
the disorder (such as, for instance, an affective deficit: Jansson
1968; Knight, Roff, Barrnett & Moss 1979; Strauss & Carpenter
1972), such variables should be assessed to determine whether
they play a role in schizophrenics' information-processing ca-
pabilities. Only by clear selection criteria and systematic analy-
sis of possible differences within our selected samples will we be
able to progress toward the specification of what cognitive
process is deficient in what subset of schizophrenics.
Language disorder and hemispheric
asymmetries in schizophrenia
R. G. Knight
Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
It is difficult to take issue with Schwartz's main conclusion that
an information-processing deficit underlies the communication
problems of schizophrenics. How specific it is possible to be
about the nature of the defective processing mechanism causing
the language disorders is a more contentious matter. The search
for a fundamental flaw in the schizophrenic cognitive system, a
defect that is as specific to that system as thought disorder is
seen to be to schizophrenia, has a long and inconclusive history.
There has never been any difficulty finding tasks that discrimi-
nate between normal individuals and schizophrenics. Evaluat-
ing their significance, however, has been more problematic, for
two reasons. First, many studies have not included control
groups of psychiatric patients to allow it to be determined
whether the deficit is specific to schizophrenia or can be ob-
served in other types of patients. Second, task matching has
generally been inadequate. As Chapman and Chapman (1973)
made clear, if two or more tasks are used with groups of
schizophrenics and controls, then demonstrating a schizo-
phrenic deficit specific to one task can only be conclusive where
the tasks are matched for difficulty and reliability over a reason-
able range of normal performance. If the tasks are not so
matched then ceiling or floor effects of varying degrees of
subtlety may occur which will reduce the possibility of discrimi-
nating between the groups on one or more of the tasks.
The reason for reiterating the second widely accepted meth-
odological consideration is as a prelude to examining Schwartz's
contention that the filtering-pigeonholing distinction may be of
some significance in establishing a processing defect unique to
schizophrenia. He contrasts results from two studies of the
effect of auditory distraction on schizophrenic information han-
dling. The first study, by Hemsley and Richardson (1980), used
a binaural presentation, and in the distraction condition both
ears received the same simultaneous presentation of two male
voices reading a prose passage. Following Broadbent (1971), it is
proposed that this type of task depends on the integrity of the
pigeonholing mechanism. The problem with the interpretation
of this experiment, however, is that the control task (shadowing
with no distraction) was not equivalent in difficulty to the
distraction task. All groups performed on the control task at a
greater than 90% accuracy level, whereas percentage correct for
the distraction task sank to about 50-60 for normal subjects.
Because the tasks are in no sense matched it is not possible to
conclude in this instance that schizophrenics are differentially
affected by irrelevant input of this type. While they probably
are, this study does not provide the necessary evidence. In the
second study (Pogue-Geile & Oltmanns 1980) this criticism does
not apply. Oltmanns and Neale (1975) established the principle
of task matching for distraction tasks, and in this more recent
study, normal performance is equivalent across all task condi-
tions. In this case dichotic presentation of the simultaneous
messages in the distraction condition was used, and the cogni-
tive mechanism under investigation is labelled filtering by both
Schwartz and Broadbent. As Schwartz reports, schizophrenics
did not differ from normal subjects and other psychiatric con-
trols on the shadowing task, although it is interesting to note that
after the distraction condition the schizophrenics were less able
to recall the content of the relevant messages. The point that
needs to be made, however, is that without completing an
experiment in which tasks requiring pigeonholing or filtering
are carefully matched and used with groups of schizophrenics
and appropriate controls, it is premature to become too enthusi-
astic about defective pigeonholing as a possible explanation for
thought disorder.
Distraction tasks have proved to be relatively robust and
specific with respect to demonstrating schizophrenic defects,
and this seems to be a worthwhile future line of research.
However, this is not the only direction along which research
into schizophrenic language deficits might profitably proceed.
Flor-Henry (1969) drew attention to the apparent similarities
between the effects of left-sided lesions in temporal lobe epilep-
tics and the symptoms of schizophrenia. Drawing together the
results of a variety of studies, he has suggested that schizo-
phrenia is associated with alterations in the organization of the
dominant hemisphere and has also proposed that affective
disturbances may be characterized by nondominant hemi-
sphere dysfunction. Much of the strongest support for this
hypothesis comes from the work of Gruzelier and Venables
(1974) on lateral asymmetries in the sympathetically mediated
electrodermal activity of psychotic patients. Cruzelier (1979)
has reported consistent lateral asymmetries in schizophrenics,
which possibly reflect higher levels of arousal in the limbic
system of the left hemisphere when it is in a passive state, and
that these asymmetries are particularly marked in institu-
tionalized process schizophrenics with poor prognosis. Such
asymmetries are not seen in normal controls. The notion of an
overactivated left hemisphere in schizophrenics has profound
implications for the understanding of language disorders in such
patients and provides a promising link between the bulk of the
studies Schwartz reviews and the possibility he raises of an
underlying information-processing defect.
Some preliminary results pertinent to this possible link are
available. Researchers investigating behavioral asymmetries in
schizophrenia have made use of the repeatedly demonstrated
result that in normal right-handers, verbal stimuli presented to
the right visual hemifield are more accurately recognized than
the same stimuli presented to the left hemifield (Hellige 1975;
Kimura 1973). Gur (1978), however, found that the usual pat-
tern of asymmetries was completely reversed for right-handed
schizophrenics, implying that the left hemisphere in these
patients was in some way dysfunctional. Connolly, Gruzelier,
Kleinman, and Hirsch (1979) similarly found more rapid pro-
cessing of lexical stimuli in the right hemisphere than the left,
relative to the performance of normal controls. It is important to
note, however, that in this study very similar asymmetries were
found in a group of psychotic depressives, undermining the
specificity of the deficit to schizophrenia. Complete reversal of
asymmetry has not been found in other studies using visual
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presentation of stimuli (for example, Colbourn & Lishman 1979;
Eaton 1979) although further (more equivocal) evidence for a
dominant hemisphere deficit in schizophrenics does emerge.
In reviewing a number of studies that have focussed on ear
preferences in dichotic listening tasks as an indication of hemi-
spheric functional specialization, Gruzelier (1979) concludes
that a diversity of results which defy easy synthesis has
emerged. Only with particular subgroups of schizophrenic pa-
tients, with certain forms of auditory input, has it been possible
to find results indicative of a left hemisphere problem. Review-
ing the range of literature relevant to the hypothesis of dominant
hemisphere overactivation in schizophrenia is not feasible in
this context. The trends that have emerged must be interpreted
cautiously, and at this time Flor-Henry's proposal can only be
described as intuitively attractive. It is nevertheless a proposi-
tion that may prove to be valuable in providing a substantial
bridge between changes in the patterns of verbal information
processing in normal subjects and occurrence of language and
communication difficulties in schizophrenia.
Language competence and schizophrenic
language
Julius Laffal
Connecticut Valley Hospital, Middletown, Conn. 06457
In his target article Schwartz calls attention to the lan-
gue-parole distinction made by Saussure (1959) and the parallel
competence-performance distinction made by Chomsky (1965).
La langue and competence refer to an abstract set of rules which
all speakers of a language are presumed to know, and la parole
and performance refer to realization of these rules in actual
speech or writing. Schwartz finds, as have others (see Laffal
1979, p. 34) that there is no basis for believing that schizo-
phrenic patients lack competence in their language. However,
competence in a language does not ensure that the language
behavior of a schizophrenic individual will fulfill the rules of the
language.
That language competence is not the sole determinant of
language behavior has not escaped the notice of linguists whose
own thorn in the side has been poetic language. Nor, for that
matter, has language deviance failed to pique such a philosopher
of language as J. L. Austin (1962) who devoted considerable
attention to "infelicities" in language.
Chomsky (1964) proposed an approach to analyzing such
strings as Golf plays John and a grief ago on a scale of relative
grammaticalness, based on the proposition that an adequate
grammatical description of a deviance amounts to an under-
standing of it. The argument is that interpretation of deviant
utterances is mediated by their reduction to the well-formed or
competent structures presumed to underlie them. Katz (1964),
in his discussion of deviant utterances, makes a distinction
between semisentences (SS) and nonsense strings (NS). He says
(1964, p. 410): "a semi-sentence is a string that has not deviated
from grammaticality so far that it no longer has sufficient struc-
ture to be understood. Strings in NS may exhibit structure, but
they do not exhibit the right sort to be comprehensible to
speakers." Scientists truth the universe is a semisentence; The
of is likes man the is a nonsense string.
Katz concedes, however, that some nonsense strings can be
understood. He goes on to say (1964, p. 415):
But there is nothing damaging in this admission because we do not
have to say that these nonsense strings are understood by virtue of the
speaker's knowledge of the structure of his language and the patterns
of deviation from structural normality that preserve intelligibility . . .
but rather . . . his pattern recognition skills.
In the debate that followed these propositions about deviant
language, Fowler (1969, p. 76) postulated
a unifying interpretative capability for all ungrammatical strings,
independent of linguistic competence (i.e. not greatly dependent
upon "sufficient structure"). Thus, mature, fluent, native speaker-
hearers can interpret utterances of the type Katz labels NS....
Although this skill includes use of vestigial structure in cases where
this exists, it has also other nongrammatical, techniques to employ.
Fowler suggests that one such technique or skill is the ability
to invent nonce rules for relating deviant utterances to the
grammar. As an example of the application of skills outside of the
domain of linguistic competence, Fowler considers the in-
terpretation of the E. E. Cummings line, he sang his didn't he
danced his did. A stepwise grammatical analysis of this string
converts it at best to the well-formed source sentence, He didn't
sing, he did dance, not a very satisfactory result. However, if as
Fowler (1969, p. 80) says, we "dodge into the inventive chaos of
literary semantics," substituting the idea of rejoicing for song
and danced, and the noun phrases what he didn't do and what he
did do for the words didn't and did, the interpretation becomes
he rejoiced in what he didn't do, he rejoiced in what he did, or
He was happy with everything in his life, good or bad.
Levin (1971) also takes up the question whether language
competence may account for or model the understanding of
poetry. He focuses on nonrecoverable deletions or deletions of
words that cannot be supplied by analysis of phrase markers
(stepwise grammatical analysis), since poetry often shows such
deletions. The compression in John is taller than Jack is not a
poetic compression, since [Jack] is tall is readily recovered from
the underlying grammatical structure. Recoverability of a dele-
tion depends on the deleted item being completely predictable,
given the rest of the structure from which it has been deleted.
However, in such a sentence as John is happy; he has been
working hard, the deletion may be because, since, although,
even though, or some other conjunction. Levin's argument is
that the required deletion cannot be supplied by successive
phrase-marker analysis and deletion transformation. An entirely
different interpretative strategy must be brought into play, one
that crosses the boundaries of sentences to take into account
other relationships of form and content in the text as a whole.
These are examples of strings in which rules of grammar or
semantic selection restrictions of particular words are breached,
or in which omissions cannot be supplied from the structure of
the sentence. However, perfectly well-formed, nondeviant
statements or phrases may also be strange for entirely different
reasons. Thus, there is an element of strangeness in the re-
sponse of B to A:
A. How are you?
B. It is cold today.
I choose the word odd to characterize anomalous utterances,
because it suggests an initial alert and a sense of strangeness on
the listener's part, prior even to the conclusion that there has
been rule deviance. In the case of poetry the listener or reader is
assured of an organized plan and consistent intention which will
reward efforts at interpretation. In the case of psychopathologi-
cal language the listener is not assured of consistency, although
neither may randomness be assumed.
What has been said about odd and rule-deviant language
suggests the following picture of a speaker's understanding of
language.
1. The speaker knows the rules of the language (has language
competence).
2. The speaker can recognize rule-deviant language, the first
reaction to which is often a sense of oddness.
3. Given an odd or rule-deviant string, the speaker-hearer
employs a variety of techniques to make it understandable, such
as nonce rule making, pattern analysis, and adduction of infor-
mation from the context. Other methods may also be used.
The production of utterances and the understanding of utter-
ances do not follow the same steps, although they draw on
common processes. A naive process is involved in the language
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oddncsscs in psychopathology, which perhaps even more than
the self-conscious rule deviance in poetry, may shed light on the
general process of production and understanding of language.
Among more recent authors, Maher (1972) has suggested that
schizophrenic language is related to an attentional deficit; Co-
hen and Camhi (1967) hypothesized that a central selection
process may be at fault; Mednick (1958) proposed an anxiety-
drive theory in which remote responses come into play because
they reduce anxiety; Broen (1968) proposed a theory similar to
Mednick's in explaining the emergence of ordinarily weak
responses; Chapman and his coworkers (Chapman, Chapman &
Daut, 1976; Chapman, Chapman & Miller 1964) have suggested
that in schizophrenia there is an accentuation, sometimes inap-
propriate, of a normal response bias.
I have found that the ideas of M. Lorenz (1957; 1961) fit the
clinical phenomenon of oddness in free-flowing schizophrenic
language best. She says (1957, p. 650): "[Schizophrenic] lan-
guage appears to become a more plastic medium by which
meaning is pursued, explored, expressed, and only secondarily,
if at all, communicated." Language, for some schizophrenic
individuals appears to have become a means primarily of operat-
ing upon the patient's world, but only at considerable cost to
communication with others.
Despite all that has been written about it, schizophrenic
language remains a puzzle. Further studies of it may be more
fruitful if undertaken within the framework of an effort to
understand rule-deviant language in general.
Schizophasia
Andre Roch Lecours
Centre de Recherches, Centre Hospitaller C6te-des-Neiges, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada H3W 1W5
So schizophrenic speech is "a central defect in pigeonholing" (is
this a cyst-producing type of CNS ornithosis?) not to be "con-
fused " with a defect in "filtering," and therefore Schwartz's BBS
target article "is not merely another literature review": Ok.
Agreed also that Noam Chomsky has read Ferdinand de Saus-
sure very attentively (although de Saussure thought that Hellene
Smith's behavior was interesting, Flournoy 1900) and that
schizophrenic speech is neither a disease of langue nor a disease
of competence (my impression is that someone with a disease of
competence could only moan or shut up, or at least should). Also
agreed: The study of schizophrenic speech has so far been
"flawed by errors in experimental method" and by "meth-
odological weaknesses"; however, it does not strike me that this
will be entirely corrected by asking "several colleagues" to rate,
"on a five-point scale ranging from 'schizophrenic' to 'normal,'"
four "excerpts taken from several published conversations"
(including one from a familiar individual regarded by some as
psychotic). On the other hand - and I indeed consider this to be
one of the strong points of Schwartz's paper - I learned with
great interest that making a diagnosis of schizophrenia is neither
more nor less difficult than making a diagnosis of appendicitis:
One should reflect on this fact, as Schwartz does.
Now, in 1864, Trousseau coined a word, "aphasia" (H6caen &
Dubois 1969) which has proved useful; and some 30 years later,
Kraepelin (1896) coined another word, "schizophasia," which -
in my opinion - has also proven useful. Although I will be
adding an "s" at the end of each, I will thereafter be using those
two words; and I do not agree that whether or not the latter
designates a subvariety of the former "remains problematic"
(see infra).
If I were asked to answer Schwartz's question - Is there a
schizophrenic language? - my answer would be that I do not
know. Nonetheless, I would find it appropriate to formulate a
number of comments, all of them having to do with spontaneous
language production (i.e. disregarding metalinguistic data):
a. One can describe, in linguistic terms, various types of
linguistic deviations that can be observed to occur both in the
aphasias and in the schizophasias. With the exception of phonet-
ic disintegration (if one is not drunk), similar deviations can also
be observed to occur in the discourse of standard speakers, as
nearly everybody working in the field has emphasized. Whether
or not such deviations are deliberate, and whether or not they
are the manifestations of a thought disorder, or else of a language
disorder, is not relevant in the present context. On the other
hand, although the deviant utterances of aphasics, schizo-
phasics, and standard speakers are not qualitatively different
(Fromkin 1975; Lecours & Vanier-Ckiment 1976), there exist
interesting quantitative differences, such as predominance of
phonemic deviations in conduction aphasis and in a particular
type of poetry, or predominance of word choices primarily
determined by paradigmatic formal or semantic kinship (rather
than by a conventional topic) as in glossomanic schizophasia
(Navet, Lavalle'e-Huynh, Lecours 1982) and in another particu-
lar type of poetry, and so on.
b. Just as there exist several clinical types of aphasia there also
exist several clinical types of schizophasia. I have personally
observed two of the latter, but I would not be surprised if several
others remained to be described. The first - and best known - is
the glossomanic type mentioned above, and it seems to me that
this is the type in which Schwartz is interested; as far as I know,
it is (or has become, with the increasing use of new drugs) very
infrequent; when they attribute a clinical label to psychotic
patients whose speech production is of this type, psychiatrists
(and their equivalents) sometimes talk of schizophrenia, some-
times of mania. The second type that I have observed is glos-
solalic schizophasia; this is characterized by fluent, entirely (or
nearly entirely) neologistic-discourse-like behavior (produced
without articulatory distortions); it is also infrequent (among
diagnosed psychotics), and has been observed in patients con-
sidered by their doctors to be schizophrenics (Bobon 1952;
Cenac 1925; other references; Lecours 1982). Had he been
interested in this particular type of "schizophrenic speech,"
Schwartz might not have decided to reject the Markovian
hypothesis as peremptorily as he did. (I do not know who coined
the word "glossomania, " but I do know that it was coined long
ago, and I think that the word "glossolalia" was coined by Saint
Paul, perhaps on the day of the first Pentecost, and conceivably
under the influence of both the Holy Ghost and good wine.)
c. If you are a neurologist of the French or the German school,
that is, if you think that the anatomoclinical method has been
and remains a fundamental source of knowledge in the field of
neurolinguistics, you are not likely to consider schizophasia "the
result of aphasia." If you are not, you might still argue that
organic brain disease is not likely to cause the creative, severe
overuse of morphosyntactic rules such as those of derivation,
composition, nominalization, and so forth, which constitutes the
main characteristic of glossomanic schizophasia (Navet et al.
1982; Levi-Valensi, Migualt & Lacan 1931). Of course, one
might also wish to suggest a new definition of aphasia, which
might in turn be the topic of another BBS target article.
Schizophrenic language: An ephemeron
hiding an ephemeron
James C. Mancuso,8 Theodore R. Sarbin,b and William A.
Heerdt*
"Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Albany,
Albany, N.Y. 12222 and bDepartment of Psychology, University of
California, Santa Cruz, Calif. 95064
Schwartz, like many other scholars interested in "schizophre-
nia" rather than in the "concept of schizophrenia," has labored
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hard to find a fragile thread to tie the putative disease to that
annoying way of communicating which sometimes - but not
always - earns one the label "schizophrenic." His review of the
literature provides yet another example of the long string of
failures (see Sarbin & Mancuso 1980) to discern linkages among
the investigations of those people called schizophrenic.
Schwartz nonetheless attempts to bind together a mass of
contradictory findings with the most gossamer of threads. "It is
plausible that lying at the basis of these problems is a central
defect in pigeonholing (adopting a response set)." In other
words, his effort was strenuous, the findings were inconclusive,
and the weak interconnecting nomological net is "plausible."
Schwartz half-heartedly agrees with this assessment when he
presents his final equivocating sentence, "We may never be
able to explain the schizophrenic language deficit because it
probably doesn't exist." We shall propose that his doubts about
the supposed language deficit should extend into our thinking
about the basic concept, schizophrenia.
The elusive variable, schizophrenia. In another place (Sarbin
& Mancuso 1980), it has been noted that in the typical study that
uses the concept schizophrenia, the presence or absence of the
label provides investigators with the means of delineating the
predictor variable. In language studies, for example, the investi-
gator tries to establish the presence or absence of a language
anomaly - the predicted variable - in relation to the presence or
absence of schizophrenia - the predictor variable. The effort
promotes the inference that the specific language anomaly is
caused by schizophrenia, the presence of which had been
established through the judgment of an expert diagnostician.
This practice, aside from being tautological, violates the basic
tenets of mechanist science. Mechanistic metaphysics would
dictate that there be independent validation of the entities in a
causal relationship. Considering, however, that the diagnostic
process is a social judgment process, it becomes apparent that
the predictor variable in these studies is established by polling.
For example, a polling process, vividly described by Spitzer,
Williams, and Skodol (1980), established the diagnostic criteria
for DSM-III. Furthermore, as diagnosis is currently practiced it
can be nothing other than a moral judgment. An expert deter-
mines that the bothersome conduct that encouraged significant
others to take action indeed is present, that it is bothersome,
and that the actor may be awarded the label schizophrenic.
Schwartz does note the centrality of the outcome of this
judgmental process, relative to the matter of schizophrenic
language. He notes that to make this moral judgment, in the first
place, the judge determines that the putative patient, among
other things, has failed to speak appropriately. Thereupon
investigators search for a specific language deficit, as if to
validate the original moral judgment masked as diagnosis. A
qualitative assessment of the sought-after deficit would then
replace fallible moral judgments made by diagnosticians. As
close examination of scores of reports reveals (Sarbin & Mancuso
1980), the research efforts have failed to produce one single
variable that could replace the "diagnostic" process. It is not
atypical, as Schwartz shows with the search for a language
deficit, that investigators fail to replicate each other's findings.
In the face of these constant failures we are encouraged con-
stantly to reconsider the judgment process.
In considering the judgment process, Schwartz discusses
interrater reliability and concludes that despite shortcomings,
the level of reliability "compare[s] quite favorably with those
achieved in other branches of medicine." Showing further that
he is ineluctably committed to applying a disease model to the
study of inappropriate discourse, Schwartz provides the follow-
ing metaphoric rationale: "Pathologists may have difficulty de-
ciding whether a particular tissue sample is malignant, but no
one has argued that this means that cancer does not exist." We
deduce that Schwartz intends that this disjunctive logic chain be
metaphorized to read, "Diagnosticians may have difficulty in
judging the presence of schizophrenia, but we need not argue
that schizophrenia does not exist." The flaw in the metaphor,
however, is immediately apparent. The test of the predictive
validity of the judgment of "malignancy " is delivered by the
"natural" course of events. The test is an external validational
test. It is not a closed circle of interrater reliability measures. To
date, no external test of validity has been applied to schizo-
phrenia (see Grove, Andreasen, McDonald-Scott, Keller &
Shapiro 1981). The assignment of the "valid diagnostic label"
remains a self-contained and repetitive social judgment process
(Helzer, Robins, Taibleson, Woodruff, Reich & Wish 1977;
Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, 1978; Spitzer & Fleiss 1974; Spitzer
et al. 1980). Without valid predictor variables it is fruitless to
overextend the illness model - a mechanistic model which once
successfully guided the biological sciences - into explanations of
unusual conduct in discourse.
Studying language. As Schwartz's review illustrates, the con-
ceptions of language that have guided the study of schizophrenic
language also had their base in mechanistic paradigms. Radical
associationism held the field at the time when behavioral scien-
tists began to conduct studies of the schizophrenic language
deficit. In associationist models, at their simplest level, one
word in a discourse served as the stimulus for the ensuing word.
One word, in other words, served as the cause of the next word.
Schwartz rightly points out that studies of associative function-
ing, built on one or another variant of the simplistic cause-effect
chaining principle, could not, in any way, be useful to explain
speech in a social context. "In natural speech, the pronunciation
of a word, its meaning, and its syntactic [and semantic] role can
only be determined by an analysis of the context in which it
occurs." We have inserted the term semantic into Schwartz's
declaration, because we cannot overlook the immense implica-
tions of the work (Jenkins 1974; Olson 1970, Rommetveit 1974)
that has shown that meanings of word strings are also deter-
mined by the context in which they are uttered.
Having recognized that understandings of language are best
incorporated into contextual models, investigators may turn
attention to the immense advances that cognitive scientists have
achieved in this realm. One can draw from this work to declare
some basic assumptions that provide a foundation from which to
study unusual discourse patterns. Two principles are especially
relevant to this discussion. (1) The inner representations of the
world - the construction systems - which guide a participant's
discourse processing must be considered as a central strand in
the communicative context. (2) Communication depends on the
participant's ability to engage in a social process - that is,
playing a role in a communication requires that a participant
take into account the construings of other participant(s) as he
processes that discourse. At the base of these assumptions is a
third required, but not trivial, assumption: (3) One's construc-
tion system, including that part of the system by which one
construes the constructions of others, is developed through
interactions with the world of events - particularly social
events.
Current emphasis on studying the cognitive bases of commu-
nication encourages scholars to recognize that language use is
but one inextricably interlinked part of the much wider realm
that might better be discussed as "discourse processing." A
person is better regarded as a processer of discourse, rather than
as a "decoder and encoder of language." With these points fixed,
let us reconsider the issue of schizophrenic language.
Why study schizophrenic language? The study of schizo-
phrenic language began when scholars undertook to discuss
improper conduct in discourse processing. As Schwartz once
again shows, mechanistic conceptualizations have failed to il-
luminate this bit of unwanted conduct.
The following points supplement the foregoing critique:
Studies of "schizophrenic language" limit the context of a
discourse-processing situation. By an effort to uncover a con-
text-free deficit, investigators remove sources of environmental
feedback which are central to a discourse. In that context is
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crucial to the process, studies completed in this way cannot be
accepted as studies of discourse failure. In addition, when there
is a focus on the "disease" of the target person, investigators are
encouraged to ignore the place of the judge in the discourse
process. Scientists are not expected to explain the judge's failure
to process the targets communications. The scientists' task,
since they study a disease rather than a discourse process, is to
explain the failures of the "patient. "
What should be our direction? In the presence of failed
paradigms we are encouraged to ask, Why should we continue
to use our chosen explanatory paradigm? In the case of our
topic of concern the latter question may be elaborated into,
Why should we continue to use the disease model of the
mechanistic paradigm to explain a function - discourse pro-
cessing - which was not amenable to mechanistic explanation?
As representatives of our current society, scholars have de-
veloped an interest in explaining the perplexing conduct that
may be judged as failures in discourse processing. Our society
willingly supports efforts to develop explanations. Scholars
(Posner & Hanson 1980; Van Dijk 1980) have provided very
useful conceptions of discourse processing. In addition, other
scholars (Magaro 1980; Rommetveit 1974; Tschudi & Rommet-
veit 1982) have stressed the place of disrupting communication
patterns in those social interactions that lead to and surround
the "diagnostic situation." One may find ample foundation
from which to develop explanations of failures in discourse
processing. There is no need, from this perspective, to study
the elusive intermediary variable "schizophrenia" as a means
of explaining troublesome discourse processing.
What is language?
J. R. Martin
Department of Linguistics, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
I would like to comment briefly on Schwartz's definition of
language and the use he makes of it in determining that a
schizophrenic language deficit probably does not exist.
Throughout the paper Schwartz assumes a model of language in
which, following Chomsky, a clear line is drawn between com-
petence and performance: Competence is defined as an indi-
vidual's knowledge of an abstract set of phonological, syntactic,
and semantic rules, and performance as the use of this and other
relevant knowledge in speech production. Schwartz's position is
that everything that has been shown to distinguish schizo-
phrenic speech from that of other people is an aspect of perfor-
mance, not competence, and that therefore there is no such
thing as a language of schizophrenia.
Now the way in which Chomsky distinguishes competence
and performance has come under almost continual attack in
linguistics since it was first formulated. The two most telling
criticisms are that (1) it idealises language, treating as determin-
istic and categorical rules what is in essence a set of proba-
bilistically weighted tendencies; and (2) it trivialises language,
relegating to a theory of performance many aspects of language
that are essential to its function as a semiotic system. Criticism 1
has been articulated most forcefully by Labov and other varia-
tion theorists who have demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g.
Labov 1972a; 1972b) that linguistic rules are probabilistic in
form, and must be so formulated to account for the systematic
variation found in natural speech. Criticism 2 has been ad-
vanced by linguists interested in discourse who argue that
knowing how to use a language is part of knowing that language,
and that for this reason competence must either be rein-
terpreted as "communicative competence" (e.g. Hymes 1971)
or abandoned altogether (e.g. Halliday 1978).
Both of these criticisms are directly relevant to Schwartz's
paper. First, the question of categoricality: On several occasions
in the paper Schwartz dismisses characterisations of schizo-
phrenic language on the grounds that similar behaviour is found
in the language of other speakers. For example, Chaika's de-
scription of aphasiclike abnormalities is dismissed because nor-
mal speakers occasionally make similar mistakes; and Roches-
ter's account of unclear reference is dismissed because young
children and normal adults sometimes fail to identify partici-
pants in discourse correctly. These dismissals depend on the
assumption that quantitative differences between schizophrenic
and other language are not qualitative - that the only way in
which schizophrenic language can be distinguished is with
categorical rules. This assumption is highly questionable. Con-
sidered in light of Labov's work it would entail, for example
(among other absurdities), treating social dialects as a perfor-
mance feature! It may well be that differences between schizo-
phrenic and other language are probabilistic ones. But it does
not follow that these do not reflect a qualitative difference in the
system that produces them, unless one idealises language in
Chomsky's characteristically categorical way.
Second, the question of "communicative competence":
Schwartz refers at several points in his paper to semantics and
pragmatics, and he once again appears to be taking a very
Chomskian view of what these levels describe. Semantics has
always been rather vaguely defined within this paradigm, but
when it is defined (e.g. Kempson 1975) it is usually in terms of
truth functional relations between sentences and some possible
world. Note that sentences and not texts are taken as the basic
semantic unit. This effectively places discourse structure out-
side language - it is not an aspect of competence in this
Chomskian view. This position has been challenged by many
schools of linguistics since at least 1968 (see Gleason 1968; Van
Dijk 1972); it is pointed out that, after all, people talk to each
other in texts, not sentences, and that language is elaborately
structured to accomplish this (see Halliday & Hasan 1976 for one
account of this structure in English). As argued in Rochester and
Martin (1979), language failure in schizophrenia is essentially
discourse failure - and this is reflected in the analyses of
cohesion and reference in schizophrenic speech presented
there. Once again, schizophrenic speakers are quantitatively,
not categorically, different from other speakers. But once the
text, rather than the sentence, is taken as the fundamental unit
of semantic analysis, these differences can be inteqjreted
qualitatively and used to distinguish schizophrenic speech reli-
ably from normal speech. Schwartz does not discuss these
results, presumably because of the very narrow, sentence-
oriented view of linguistic semantics he is adopting.
Pragmatics is very clearly outside language proper for
Schwartz, and in this most linguists would probably agree. Even
those linguists who are most concerned with the relation be-
tween language and social context see pragmatics, or, to use the
Firthian (see Gregory & Carroll, 1978, for a representative
Firthian approach to register analysis) term, register, as realised
through, rather than as a level of language. Having granted this,
however, it is important to be cautious about assuming that
studies of pragmatics are thereby essentially sociological or
psychological in nature. For one thing, some linguists (e.g.
Halliday 1973) have argued that the ways in which language is
used have so influenced its own internal structure that (1) this
structure cannot be studied apart from consideration of its use;
and (2) very strong predictions can be made about the kinds of
meaning that are at stake in particular situation types. For
another, it is possible to interpret pragmatics itself as a semiotic
system - a language realised through language. For both rea-
sons, descriptive strategies developed by linguists for analysing
language are essential if an adequate account of pragmatics is to
be given; a purely cognitive approach to language processing is
certain to be inadequate.
In short, then, there is a danger is assuming that what is
quantitative cannot be qualitative; that what is not phonology,
syntax, or sentence semantics is not language; and that what is
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not language is not semiotic. As linguistics grows out of its
reclusive Chomskian shell, much of what Schwartz considers
extralinguistic phenomena may well turn out to be linguistic
after all. Recent research into variable rules, discourse, and
register is already showing this to be that case. It will be
unfortunate indeed if researchers in the language of schizo-
phrenia allow the eroded model of language that Schwartz
assumes to obscure these results.
The language of schizophrenic language
Charles Neuringer
Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans. 66045
Schwartz presents a thesis about the existential status of schizo-
phrenic language and a review of the literature which he feels
supports his theory. The review of the literature actually deals
with attempts to discover the cognitive deficit (or deficits) that
seem to mediate the phenomenon known as schizophrenic
language. The strangeness of schizophrenic language has fasci-
nated many investigators and has therefore been studied exten-
sively. Because of this there exists a voluminous body of litera-
ture in this area. Schwartz attempts to bring some conceptual
order to our understanding of schizophrenic language. The main
thrust of his thesis is that there is probably no particular
linguistic deficiency in schizophrenics, but only a verbal pro-
duction problem.
Schwartz is to be especially commended for his excellent and
scholarly literature review. Few such reviews can be definitive,
however, and Schwartz has not exhausted the available mate-
rials. One must be selective in preparing a review because of the
limits of space, the press of time, and the quantity of available
materials. Therefore some subjects must of necessity be deem-
phasized or ignored. However, the writer does exercise some
editorial judgment as to the importance or relevance of mate-
rials. Some of the topics not dealt with by Schwartz are the
relationship between psychotropic drugs and schizophrenic
language, schizophrenic language variability among different
diagnostic groups, the conditions relating to the waxing and
waning of schizophrenic verbalization, the operation of lan-
guage deficits in schizophrenic children, longitudinal changes in
schizophrenic language, and neuron biochemical activity corre-
lates of disordered language.
Each of the topics that Schwartz does review is germane to his
general thesis about schizophrenic language. He finds that for
each of his topic areas, there is no clear evidence to demonstrate
the existence of language deficit in schizophrenia. I should point
out that the failures described by Schwartz are only failures to
pinpoint clearly a definitive single language deficiency in schizo-
phrenia. I would also state that these failures do not imply that
language deficits are therefore nonexistent, but only that the
nature of the deficits may be a great deal more complicated than
originally suspected. Schwartz's conclusion about the nonexis-
tence of schizophrenic language is also bolstered by his own
particular definition of "language." The limitations of his defini-
tion are examined later.
I feel that there was one important omission from the catalog
of possible cognitive deficits underlying schizophrenic lan-
guage. I am referring to the early, but unfortunately neglected,
work of Norman Cameron (1938; 1944) and Paul Federn (1952).
They arrived at their conclusions from different avenues of
investigation, Cameron's work having been experimental and
Federn having relied on clinical observation. Both of these
investigators attribute the peculiarities of psychotic language to
a lowered level of energy in the schizophrenic. They feel that
the adequate organization of thought and its verbal manifesta-
tions uses a great deal of energy (i.e. one expends effort in
framing thought and then speech into precise forms and then
further shaping them for communicative purposes). They argue
that the schizophrenic is operating at a lower energy level than
the nonschizophrenic, and, therefore, does not have the re-
sources for careful and precise linguistic construction. The
schizophrenic's language is full of approximations of precise
words. The schizophrenic will also use any substitute phrase
rather than expend the effort to find a precise word because the
use of the former makes less demands on his psychic economy
than the latter. Intrusions occur because the schizophrenic does
not have the energy to focus on one particular problem area by
blocking out extraneous stimuli. In short, he does not have the
resources needed to attend and concentrate; consequently,
personal and irrelevant material from outside the problem area
cannot be resisted and leaks into his thoughts and verbaliza-
tions.
Cameron and Federn hypothesize that the so-called schizo-
phrenic verbal garbage is the result of the schizophrenic's low
capacity to control his mental operations. Cameron (1938; 1944)
has presented some persuasive evidence to support this
contention.
I also felt that Schwartz neglected the motivational basis for
schizophrenic language. He has described processing deficits
but has for the most part ignored views dealing with schizo-
phrenic language as a "defense" strategy. Sullivan (1953) has
argued that some inadequate individuals may develop schizo-
phrenic language in order to ward off contact with other human
beings. The personality theorists have argued that the main-
springs of most kinds of schizophrenia are a desire to withdraw
from or minimize contact with other humans. Strange language
or "crazy talk," besides making meaningful communication
difficult, also serves to frighten and alienate others. This is the
basis of Sullivan's argument that motivation plays a critical role
in the appearence of schizophrenic language. Sullivan's views
may account for the variability of schizophrenic bizarreness (i.e.
it is a function of the level of threat intrusion from the human
environment). The motives behind the appearance and use of
schizophrenic language need to be taken into account in any
comprehensive understanding of this puzzling phenomenon.
The main conceptual focus of Schwartz's paper is schizo-
phrenic language. He poses a question about the existence of
schizophrenic language and concludes his paper with the opin-
ion that "we may never be able to explain the schizophrenic
language deficit because it probably doesn't exist." This condi-
tional negative answer to his question is derived less from data
and more from the development of a restrictive definitional
system that appears early in his exposition. He defines language
as only linguistic rules (a "set of semantic, syntactic, and pho-
nological rules"). He implies that thought and speech are semi-
independent ("Thought is reflected in speech, but it is not the
same phenomenon," "Thought . . . can be studied indepen-
dent of verbal productions"). He then separates language from
speech, with the latter defined as verbal production. He also
argues that schizophrenics can be linguistically competent but
still be incoherent because only their speech is disorganized and
not their language. If one accepts Schwartz's restricted defini-
tions, then this last allegation is logically possible, although
psychologically puzzling.
Why should speech be disordered if linguistic rules are
intact? Schwartz quite correctly points out that speech is a
product of other factors besides linguistic rules and that many
individuals may have disordered speech on various occasions.
This, he claims, can occur without the presence of linguistic rule
deficiency. Individuals under the effects of great stress, high
fevers, intoxication, and the like may have disoriented speech.
However, the fact that nonschizophrenics may have disoriented
speech does not demonstrate that schizophrenics have an intact
linguistic structure. Schwartz's observations may also be used to
argue that disorganized speech in normal individuals actually
implies a temporary failure in linguistic structure. Schwartz also
points out that schizophrenics are often coherent. This observa-
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tion cannot be used to logically substantiate the presence of
their intact linguistic structure, but only to show that linguistic
integrity in schizophrenics is unstable. The problem is that
thinking and speech stand in a complicated relationship to each
other. To separate them and treat them as quasi-independent
phenonema invites conceptual difficulties. "Thought can pro-
ceed without speech," but can speech then also proceed without
thought?
We learn from the close and intimate relationship between
speech and thought because the former is the prime clue to the
nature of the latter. It is mainly from verbal productions that we
reconstruct the operations of the thought processes. "We only
know about the existence of schizophrenic thought from the
schizophrenic's strange utterances and behaviors. If we consid-
er thought, speech, and language as independent phenomena,
then we have no rational methodology for studying schizo-
phrenic thought. We must assume that thought and speech are
different manifestations of the same superordinate process. As
such, they can serve as indices of one another. The physicist
assumes a correlative identity between the observed measure of
heat and the activity of molecules. He can do this because in his
conceptualization of the physical world, he assumes that tem-
perature has an invariant correlative identity with molecular
activity. I am saying that speech and thought also have an
invariant correlative identity. They are different facets of the
same process and contribute, along with other processes, to an
even more comprehensive phenomenon - language. Only
through a trivialization of the definition of language can
Schwartz reach his conditional negative conclusion about the
existential status of schizophrenic language.
Language involves a much more complicated process than
simply following linguistic rules. It is linguistic rules. But it is
also verbal and nonverbal behavior. It is also thought. It is also a
desire to communicate. It is also perception and evaluation of
the external and internal environments. It is also biochemical
activity in the neurons. It is all of these and more. Language is a
superordinate, multilevel phenomenon in which constituent
processes operate simultaneously and are interdependently and
constantly affecting each other. We are, of course, woefully
ignorant about the character and operations of all of the multi-
level events in language, and this is especially true for the
configurations occurring in schizophrenia. But the ultimate
proof of the existence of schizophrenic language is that we have
schizophrenics who think, talk, and act strangely, and attempts
to deal with only one of these aspects of their illness leads to
failure.
I would like to conclude by pointing out that Schwartz himself
finds it difficult to adhere to his limited definition of language.
When summarizing his conclusions about the effects of
pigeonholing deficits, he wonders whether future research will
show how this "information-processing deficit produces the
peculiar language associated with schizophrenia" (italics add-
ed). If he had adhered to his own definitional system, he would
not have framed his question in the way that he did, since, by his
own definition, such a deficit could only affect "speech" and not
"language." It could be argued that the above quote illustrates
both the difficulties inherent in Schwartz's definitional system
[and his own full acceptance of it].
Schizophrenic information-processing
deficit: What type or level of processing is
disordered?
Keith H. Nuechterlein
Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, University of
California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024
Investigators of schizophrenic disordered speech have in-
creasingly emphasized the role of fundamental information-
processing deficits as the source of characteristic schizophren-
ic speech peculiarities and low communicability (Cohen,
Nachmani & Rosenberg 1974; Maher 1972; Rochester 1978;
Rochester, Martin & Thurston 1977). Schwartz has strength-
ened these observations by persuasively integrating the lack of
convincing evidence for a deficit in schizophrenic language
competence with the positive evidence of deficits in schizo-
phrenic speech performance and in certain information-pro-
cessing tasks. However, the particular type of information-
processing deficit that he concludes is characteristic of schizo-
phrenic disorder, involving Broadbent's (1971) pigeonholing or
response set, does not accommodate certain bodies of existing
data.
Broadbent's (1971) association of filtering with changes in the
signal-detection sensitivity index (of which d' is one example)
emphasizes that filtering involves a change in the quality of
information transmission for certain stimuli in the early pro-
cesses by which physical stimuli are transformed into internal
states of evidence. Alterations in sensitivity are independent of
shifts in B, the response criterion measure that Broadbent
associates with pigeonholing, which influences the later trans-
formation of internal evidence states to category states and
responses. Yet some studies have demonstrated that schizo-
phrenic patients show lower than normal sensitivity for auditory
stimuli as measured by either d' (Rappaport, Hopkins & Hall
1972) or an analogous technique, accuracy within a forced-
choice detection task (Emmerich & Levine 1970; Levine &
Whitney 1970). The former study shows a sensitivity deficit
among schizophrenic patients for pure tones in background
noise that parallels the impaired detection of visual patterns in
simultaneous visual noise found among schizophrenic patients
(Stilson & Kopell 1964; Stilson, Kopell, Vandenbergh & Downs
1966). Recent tachistoscopic studies have also shown that single
letter stimuli in a forced-choice task must be presented at a
longer duration for poor prognosis schizophrenic subjects to
achieve the same level of detectability shown by normal, de-
pressed, manic, or good prognosis schizophrenic subjects (Braff
& Saccuzzo 1981; Saccuzzo & Braff 1981).
These findings suggesting impaired perceptual sensitivity
among schizophrenic patients (at least for some subgroups) in
signal detection tasks have recently been extended to children
born to a schizophrenic parent, a group at heightened risk for
adult schizophrenia. Using adaptations of a visual vigilance task
involving monitoring a series of similar stimuli (the Continuous
Performance Test), overall d' level was found to be lower than
normal among children of a schizophrenic parent (especially in a
deviant subgroup) in a version requiring short-term memory
(Rutschmann, Cornblatt & Erlenmeyer-Kimling 1977) and in
one requiring only recognition of a single degraded numeral
(Nuechterlein 1982a; 1982b). Response criterion level (B) did
not differ from the normal level among the children born to
schizophrenic mothers, although it was significantly lower than
normal among hyperactive children (Nuechterlein 1982a). The
sensitivity deficit among these children of schizophrenic moth-
ers suggests that this difficulty might be linked to vulnerability
to schizophrenic disorder. Thus, both schizophrenic patients
and their offspring have been found to have lower sensitivity in
various signal detection and vigilance tasks, which appears to be
inconsistent with the suggestion that deviant pigeonholing asso-
ciated with altered B accounts for the information-processing
deficit in schizophrenia.
Although involving sensitivity deficits rather than response
criterion differences, most of the foregoing results do not in-
volve deviant sensitivity shifts within the task or discrimination
of relevant and irrelevant stimuli on the basis of a single common
physical characteristic (Broadbent's filtering). They might,
therefore, be construed as falling under a very broad conception
of defective pigeonholing, although faulty transformation of
stimuli into internal states would appear more likely. Other
results involving selection based on such a physical characteris-
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tic also reveal impairment of information processing in schizo-
phrenia, however. Performance under conditions of distraction
in which the distractor is distinguished by a clear physical
characteristic has in some cases been associated with greater
performance deficit among schizophrenic patients than normal
subjects. Walker (1981), for example, found a significant deficit
in visual target detections among schizophrenic patients, as
compared to schizoaffective and affective disorder patients,
during an auditory distraction condition of the Continuous
Performance Test. The performance of the groups did not differ
significantly without distraction. Although the enhanced differ-
ential deficits of schizophrenic patients under such distraction
conditions may sometimes be attributable to greater psycho-
metric discriminating power accompanying more optimal task
difficulty level, Oltmanns and Neale (1975) demonstrated that
schizophrenic short-term recall is abnormally vulnerable to
distraction even when the difficulty level of neutral and distrac-
tor conditions is equated for normal subjects. Schizophrenic
impairment attributable to distraction in this study reflects a
failure in filtering in Broadbent's terms, because the distracting
effect occurs despite a clear physical difference (sex of voice)
between the relevant and irrelevant stimuli.
A distinction between automatic processes and those that are
controlled and involve processing capacity (Posner 1978;
Shiffrin & Schneider 1977) may be more useful for characteriz-
ing the nature of schizophrenic information-processing deficits.
These information-processing models posit that the encoding
process (transformation of physical stimuli into internal codes) is
normally automatic, requires no processing capacity, and occurs
outside of conscious awareness. Thus, a more passive process of
encoding is proposed, rather than the active early selection of
Broadbent's (1971) filtering. Posner (1978) and Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) use the term "attention" in the sense of
processing capacity. Controlled processing (Shiffrin & Schnei-
der 1977) or conscious attention (Posner 1978) involves demands
on limited processing capacity, is under subject control, and
usually involves a limited serial comparison rate.
A deficit in controlled processing in schizophrenia and a
relative absence of deficit in automatic processing has been
proposed by Oltmanns (1978), Neale and Oltmanns (1980), and
Callaway and Naghdi (1982). Oltmanns (1978) found support for
this hypothesis by demonstrating that auditory distraction inter-
fered with schizophrenic short-term recall of a string of words
primarily by reducing recall for items early in each word string.
Since recall for such words is more dependent on active rehears-
al, whereas recall of items late in the string normally involves
more passive automatic processes, the short-term memory defi-
cit of the schizophrenic patients during distraction apparently
reflects deficient active, controlled processing. A parallel find-
ing among children of schizophrenic mothers has recently been
reported (Harvey, Winters, Weintraub & Neale 1981).
Whether this alternative hypothesis regarding the nature of
schizophrenic information-processing deficit is more adequate
than the pigeonholing deficit favored by Schwartz depends
partially on the future exploration of deficiencies among schizo-
phrenic patients in encoding and other normally automatic
aspects of information processing. The data cited earlier regard-
ing perceptual sensitivity in signal detection and vigilance tasks
suggest that the transformation of physical stimuli into internal
codes may be faulty or inefficient in schizophrenic patients and
in some of their offspring, especially when the target stimuli are
ambiguous. However, it is as yet unclear whether these deficits
represent malfunctions in the normally automatic encoding
processes or in the additional controlled serial comparison
processes that some theorists (Shiffrin & Schneider 1977) be-
lieve are required in situations of incomplete or ambiguous
automatic encoding.
A possible alternative to the view that defective controlled
processing is the central information-processing deficit in
schizophrenia should be considered, however, in light of these
suggestive results on perceptual sensitivity. If normally auto-
matic processes such as encoding and highly overlearned behav-
ioral sequences become deautomatized in schizophrenic disor-
der, as some subjective reports suggest (McGhie & Chapman
1961), processing capacity may be devoted to these de-
automatized operations and deflected away from other pro-
cesses to which it is normally allocated. If this reallocation of
processing capacity is sufficient, the deautomatized operations
(e.g. encoding to recognition) may be completed successfully at
the cost of controlled operations at other levels (e.g. active
rehearsal). This alternative conceptualization would account for
the results of Oltmanns (1978), for example, but would place the
basic problem in the realm of normally automatic processes
rather than controlled processes.
These considerations support the emphasis on information-
processing deficit in schizophrenia adopted by Schwartz, but
suggest that other conceptions of the nature of these deficits may
yield more productive ties to the disorders of schizophrenic
speech.
Criteria for evaluating hypotheses regarding
information processing and schizophrenia
Thomas F. Oltmanns
Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 47405
There is, as Schwartz suggests, considerable evidence indicat-
ing that schizophrenics perform differently from other people
on laboratory tasks designed to tap various facets of information
processing. This is particularly true if the schizophrenics are
either hospitalized or acutely symptomatic and if the compari-
son group is not psychologically disturbed. The data involving
comparisons between schizophrenics and other psychiatric pa-
tients (particularly patients with bipolar affective disorders) are
less consistent, and comparatively few studies have examined
schizophrenics during residual phases of recovery. Neverthe-
less, many investigators agree that some form of information-
processing difficulty is characteristic of schizophrenia, or of
some subset of schizophrenic patients (Neale & Oltmanns 1980).
The consensus also seems to be that schizophrenics are able to
use syntactic rules and structures in processing verbal informa-
tion (e.g. Straube, Barth & Konig 1979), although this ability
may be disrupted in the presence of verbal distraction (Olt-
manns, in press). If schizophrenics are linguistically "compe-
tent," then a reasonable explanation for their occasional failure
to communicate effectively may involve the interface between
their knowledge of the language and their information-process-
ing skills, as Schwartz and others have suggested (e.g. Maher
1972; Rochester 1978).
Beyond these very general conclusions, there is considerably
less agreement about the nature of cognitive functions in schizo-
phrenia and their relation to the development of the disorder.
For example, the specific nature of schizophrenics' problems in
information processing is a matter of dispute. Some results are
consistent with the hypothesis advanced by Hemsley (e.g.
Hemsley & Richardson 1980) and Schwartz that schizophrenics
experience special difficulties with tasks that require "pigeon-
holing." Other evidence seems better explained by the notion
that schizophrenics are inefficient in the area of controlled,
serial processes (Callaway & Naghdi 1982; Oltmanns 1978).
Consider the studies by Pogue-Geile and Oltmanns (1980) and
Hemsley and Richardson (1980). The former study found that
verbal distraction did not affect schizophrenics' ability to shad-
ow a prose passage, but the latter study did find such an effect.
Schwartz points out that this difference in results may be
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attributed to the manner in which the relevant and irrelevant
messages were presented (i.e. whether they were presented to
separate ears or simultaneously to both). This hypothesis is both
reasonable and testable. But it doesn't seem to provide a
complete account of all the phenomena observed in our study.
Although distraction presented to an alternate ear did not affect
the schizophrenics' shadowing performance, it did interfere
with their subsequent ability to recall the content of the relevant
passage. This aspect of the data is more easily handled by the
notion of a disruption in some aspects of controlled information
processing.
The results of another recently completed study (Frame &
Oltmanns 1982) are also relevant to Schwartz's argument. The
task in this study was identical to that employed by Pogue-Geile
and Oltmanns, but the messages were presented differently:
The relevant message was presented by a female voice and the
irrelevant message by a male voice, but both were presented
simultaneously to both ears. According to Broadbent's (1971)
theory, their separation should still depend on the filtering
process (because they were separated by a physical cue), and
according to Schwartz's hypothesis we should still expect that
distraction would not affect the schizophrenics' shadowing per-
formance. But it did. In contrast to our previous results, distrac-
tion interfered with the subjects' ability to shadow the relevant
message, but it did not affect their subsequent recall of its
content. Although the comparison of results across studies is
complicated by a number of factors, the general pattern of
results is perhaps most consistent with a suggestion made by
Knight and Russell (1978), who argued that schizophrenics may
suffer from a general reduction in the global capacity to process
information. According to their argument, the specific man-
ifestations of this global deficiency will vary as a function of task
demands.
Given the enormous complexity and seemingly infinite flexi-
bility of human cognitive functions, and the well-known hetero-
geneity of schizophrenia, it seems unlikely that we will find a
specific, uniquely schizophrenic deficit in information process-
ing. Various competing hypotheses are nevertheless useful to
the extent that they lead to further understanding of the sim-
ilarities and differences between the cognitive abilities of
schizophrenics and other individuals, and to the extent that this
knowledge is then systematically embedded in a network of
empirical relationships with other features of the disorder. As
Neale and I have argued elsewhere (Neale & Oltmanns 1980;
Oltmanns & Neale 1978), the latter point is particularly impor-
tant. Cognitive research that has focused on simple group
comparisons between schizophrenics and control subjects (par-
ticularly in the absence of other specific psychiatric groups) has
had a limited impact on our understanding of the development
of schizophrenia. Schwartz's hypothesis has the capacity to
generate more specific predictions than those that involve cross-
sectional, group comparisons, and psychological research re-
garding schizophrenia has reached a point where such notions
should be evaluated in terms of more stringent criteria. I would
like to emphasize two. First, it should be demonstrated that
within the general group of patients who are considered schizo-
phrenic, a relation exists between impaired information pro-
cessing (in this case a pigeonholing deficit) and overt problems
in verbal communication (e.g. Maher, Manschreck & Rucklos
1980). Since not all schizophrenics exhibit speech problems,
Schwartz's hypothesis should predict that those patients who
perform poorly on tasks designed to require efficient pigeonhol-
ing are also most likely to be considered "thought disordered"
on the basis of their verbal communication. Second, for those
patients who exhibit problems in information processing as well
as speech anomalies, the temporal relation between these prob-
lems should be determined. If information-processing problems
are responsible for discourse failures, and if the latter are
episodic phenomena (as they seem to be), then an exacerbation
of information-processing problems should coincide with, or
precede, the appearance of speech problems that are charac-
teristic of schizophrenia. Conversely, periods of symptomatic
remission should be accompanied by the recovery of more
adequate cognitive functioning. Of course, a somewhat different
pattern would be expected if impairments in information pro-
cessing are considered to be characteristic of a genetically
transmitted vulnerability to schizophrenia, in which case they
should be relatively stable phenomena (Zubin & Spring 1977).
Several years ago, Maher (1966) made the following observa-
tion regarding the literature on language and thought in schizo-
phrenia: "Hypothesis struggles with hypothesis in a conflict in
which new contenders enter the field but the defeated never
retire" (p. 433; also quoted in Rochester & Martin 1979).
Perhaps in the expanded context of longitudinal data and an
analysis of the relationship between performance on laboratory
tasks and overt communication difficulties, less useful hypoth-
eses will finally be discarded.
Aphasia as a model for schizophrenic
speech
Fred Ovsiew and Daniel B. Hier
Departments of Psychiatry and Neurology, Pritzker School of Medicine,
University of Chicago, Chicago, III. 60637
Schwartz concludes, "With more research we may be able to
characterize the deficit responsible for schizophrenic speech."
According to his criteria, aphasics show a deficit in "speech " as
well as "language." He argues that while schizophrenics com-
monly manifest aberrant "speech," they have not been shown to
have abnormal "language." His review correctly notes that prior
research into this problem has been bedeviled by two weak-
nesses: first, a failure to define adequately what is meant by
"abnormal language, " and second, the absence of a precise
definition of schizophrenia. Schwartz notes the difficulties in
diagnostic reliability in schizophrenia research. He is kind in not
concluding that much of the early work on schizophrenic lan-
guage is vitiated by inadequate diagnostic criteria. An unknown,
but probably large portion of patients studied for "schizophrenic
thought disorder" will in fact have had affective illness or
character disorders. These studies are unlikely to reveal any-
thing fundamental to schizophrenia. Furthermore, Schwartz
mentions other confounding factors such as chronicity of illness,
length of hospitalization, and drug therapy. It is possible that
each of these variables influences a schizophrenic's speech.
Moreover, as Schwartz recognizes, not all schizophrenics have
"thought disorder." Thus, given the fact that schizophrenia is a
heterogeneous disorder, attempts to characterize "schizo-
phrenic speech" may prove to be the quest for a phantom.
Of course, others (Jeste 1982; Meltzer 1979) have been
concerned about the research implications of heterogeneity
among schizophrenics. Analogously, it is incorrect to lump all
aphasics together and then look for a unifying linguistic defect.
In fact, the speech of aphasics differs considerably according to
aphasia type (see Table 1). Buchsbaum and Haier (1978) and
Buchsbaum and Reider (1979) have suggested certain pragmatic
research strategies that attempt to prevent the loss of illuminat-
ing observations by the averaging out of findings across hetero-
geneous subgroups. They argue that a diagnostic group such as
schizophrenia, no matter how rigorously and reliably defined, is
likely to be heterogeneous biologically. They suggest grouping
patients by some biological independent variable (putatively
related to mental disorder), such as abnormal platelet mon-
amine oxidase. These biologically homogeneous subgroups can
then be examined for differences in behavioral (dependent)
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Table 1 (Ovsiew & Hier). Some statistical measures of language in aphasia and schizophrenia
Normal speakers (N = 6)
Broca's aphasia (N = 3)
Wernicke's aphasia (N = 3)
Schizophrenic speaker A
Schizophrenic speaker B
Schizophrenic speaker C
Schizophrenic speaker D
Mean
length of
utterance
11.0
5.0
8.8
7.3
8.5
11.3
10.2
Clauses
per 100
sentences
48.7
0.0
25.0
13.3
23.1
150.0
100.0
Ratio of
pronouns to
nouns
0.9
0.1
2.0
1.1
0.9
1.7
1.4
Lexical
Common
words"
76%
72%
84%
77%
62%
93%
90%
diversity
Entropy^
(bits)
5.7
3.6
5.2
5.8
6.1
5.1
4.9
"Common words are percentage of words in sample that occur 1,000 times or more in the Lorge-Thorndike word count (Thorndike
& Lorge 1944). ^Entropy is a statistical index of diversity (expressed in bits) based upon information theory where Entropy =
2 Pr log2 Pr (Mclntosh 1967). Pr is the probability of occurrence of a word. If all words are identical, Entropy = 0 bits.
Source: A. G. Schindler and D. H. Hier (unpublished observations).
measures. Identification of a subgroup of schizophrenic patients
with abnormal language might emerge from such a strategy.
Furthermore, specific brain dysfunction (such as left temporal
lobe disorder) might be suggested by these language findings,
and the correlates of this dysfunction could be sought.
Unresolved remains the question as to what abnormal lan-
guage is. For language to be properly considered abnormal it
must in some sense violate phonological, lexical, or syntactic
conventions. The speech of aphasic patients violates these
conventions in predictable ways. Simple quantitative measure-
ments capture some of the aberrant nature of the speech of
Wernicke's or Broca's aphasics (see Table 1). The utterances of
Broca's aphasics tend to be short (low mean length of utterance
[MLU] and low number of subordinate clauses). Lexical diver-
sity is low, and there is an excess of "substantive" words (nouns)
over "filler" words (pronouns). Wernicke's aphasics show great-
er but still subnormal lexical diversity, a longer but still subnor-
mal MLU. Wernicke's aphasics also show marked word-finding
difficulties as manifested by a high ratio of filler words to
substantive words. As Schwartz points out, investigation of the
speech of schizophrenic patients has not yet revealed any
consistent or uniform pattern of deviation from normal such as
has been demonstrated in aphasic patients. Nonetheless, one
may question whether there may be unidentified subgroups of
schizophrenic patients with aberrant language as well as aber-
rant thought content. From a statistical point of view it is of some
interest that the speech of speakers A and B is most abnormal in
terms of "thought disorder" yet most normal "statistically." The
speech of speakers C and D is somewhat abnormal statistically,
showing an impoverishment of lexical diversity as well as an
excess of pronouns over nouns. These two speech samples show
some similarity to the speech of Wernicke's aphasics. We tend
to agree with Schwartz that the speech of schizophrenics often
sounds peculiar not because of abnormal language but rather
because of abnormal thought. Careful statistical analysis of the
speech of schizophrenics may settle the issue as to whether any
recognizable subgroup of schizophrenics shows persistent de-
viations from linguistic norms (cf. Faber & Reichstein 1981;
Silverberg-Shalev, Gordon, Bentin & Aranson 1981).
The study of aphasia has been the cornerstone of neuropsy-
chological research because it has followed two complementary
procedures. First, subgroups demonstrating particular patterns
of dysfunction, Broca's or Wernicke's aphasia, for example, have
been identified. Second, careful clinico-pathologic correlation
has been made. The research on "schizophrenic language"
reviewed by Schwartz has failed to carry out either of these
procedures and has been correspondingly unproductive.
Language in schizophrenia: A social
psychological perspective
D. R. Flutter
Social Psychology Research Unit, University of Kent at Canterbury,
Canterbury CT2 7NZ, Kent, England
For many years, experimental research into language in schizo-
phrenia has been guided by two main assumptions: that lan-
guage disturbance is widespread among schizophrenic patients
and easy to detect and measure; and that schizophrenia is
fundamentally a cognitive disorder, in which language distur-
bance is secondary and results from an inability to regulate
thoughts. According to Schwartz - and I agree - neither as-
sumption is justified. The majority of schizophrenic patients use
language perfectly normally most of the time; and what causes
the disturbances when they do occur is still far from clear. There
is nothing to suggest that competence is lacking, and the best
evidence at present points to a failure in performance. Many
schizophrenics have difficulty with selective attention - particu-
larly adopting a response set, or "pigeonholing" as Broadbent
(1971) has called it - and that, Schwartz argues, is what disturbs
their use of language.
"Is There a Schizophrenic Language?" is a very useful paper.
Many empirical areas are reviewed - among them, syntax and
grammar, semantic content, word associations, Salzinger's (Sal-
zinger, Portnoy & Feldman 1978) immediacy hypothesis, com-
municability, and pragmatic deficits - and, for the most part,
the arguments are well-balanced. There is, however, one major
weakness, in my view: Schwartz says too much about language
as regulation and too little about language as communication. To
be fair, the traditional literature shows exactly the same bias -
but the balance has changed since the mid-1970s, and a number
of rather different developments have begun to take place.
There are two approaches in particular that deserve attention,
and I shall try to demonstrate that, together, they offer a new
interpretation: The central problem for schizophrenics lies not
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in regulating their thoughts, but in communicating them in a
way that the listener can follow.
The first approach has been to analyse schizophrenic dis-
course; some of the most interesting work has come from
Rochester and her colleagues (Rochester & Martin 1979;
Rochester, Martin & Thurston 1977). They conducted a detailed
analysis of tape-recorded monologues involving three sample
populations: thought-disordered schizophrenics, non-thought-
disordered schizophrenics, and normal control subjects. Unfor-
tunately, there were only 10 individuals in each group, at least
in the 1979 account, and, as Schwartz rightly points out, the
ratings of thought disorder were made from the passages them-
selves; nevertheless, there were some promising results. First,
schizophrenic patients, especially those who were thought-
disordered, used fewer cohesive ties than the other subjects,
with the result that the links between their phrases and clauses
were often weak and tenuous. Second, the thought-disordered
group showed marked abnormalities in its reference networks.
Sometimes these patients would present new information but
then fail to follow it up, so that the listener was left wondering
what had become of the loose ends; and sometimes they would
presume information they had not actually given, or make
ambiguous references to earlier text in such a way that the
listener was simply unable to locate the referent. .What was
happening, it seemed, was a failure to take the role of the
listener.
The second approach has been to examine conversations. The
only reported study, so far as I know, is one of my own (Rutter
1982). Earlier, I had attempted to replicate Rochester's work,
with a sample of 25 schizophrenic monologues (Rutter 1981).
Although the findings for back reference were very similar to
hers, there were no effects for cohesive ties or presenting
information, and no differences between thought-disordered
and non-thought-disordered schizophrenics. To examine com-
munication properly, we concluded, we must move away from
monologues to conversations, and we therefore set up the
following experiment.
Twelve schizophrenic patients recently admitted to the hos-
pital each held two five-minute conversations, one with another
schizophrenic patient and one with a nurse. The conversations
were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim; a control group of
12 chest patients was examined as well. They too had two
conversations, one with another chest patient and one with a
nurse, and all the sessions were based on topics from the Choice
Dilemmas Questionnaire of Kogan and Wallach (1964). The first
20 utterances from each recording were typed onto strips of
paper in random order, and students were asked to reconstruct
what they believed to be the original sequence.
The experiment was run twice, under slightly different condi-
tions of reconstruction, but using the same material; there were
two main findings. First, the schizophrenic-schizophrenic con-
versations were consistently the least accurately reconstructed.
In the first experiment, the greatest difference was between
schizophrenic-schizophrenic and schizophrenic-nurse conver-
sations (t = 2.4; df 22; p < 0.025) while in the second it was
between schizophrenic-schizophrenic and chest patient-nurse
conversations (t = 2.5; df 22; p < 0.025). Second, schizophrenic
patients made very poor use of questions. In normal, everyday
conversations, people generally ask appropriate questions and
receive appropriate answers, and the result is that question-
answer sequences are redundant and predictable, and therefore
relatively easy to reconstruct. Schizophrenic conversations, we
found, were quite different. Whereas for chest-patient conver-
sations question-answer sequences were reconstructed signifi-
cantly more accurately than other sequences (t = 1.9; df 22; p <
0.05 in the first experiment, and t = 2.4; df 22; p < 0.025 in the
second), for schizophrenic conversations there was no dif-
ference. Schizophrenic patients, it appeared, had asked inap-
propriate questions and given inappropriate answers, and, once
again, they had failed to take the role of the other person.
What, then, can we conclude? Schizophrenic patients whose
language is disturbed find it difficult to take the role of the
listener and fail to structure what they say in a way that is easy to
follow and reconstruct. Their disturbance lies not in regulating
and organising their thoughts, but in expressing and commu-
nicating them - a conclusion very different from the traditional
view. For Schwartz, the most useful approach to language in
schizophrenia is cognitive; for me, it is social.
What is meant by schizophrenic speech?
Walter Weintraub
Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine,
Baltimore, Md. 21201
After reviewing the pertinent experimental literature, Schwartz
has concluded that schizophrenics may not differ from non-
schizophrenics in their language competence. Most investiga-
tors and clinicians would probably agree. The peculiarities of
"schizophrenic speech" rather than "schizophrenic language"
are what have always fascinated students of schizophrenia.
According to Schwartz, "schizophrenic speech" is "bizarre" and
"easy to recognize." Attempts to distinguish schizophrenics
from nonschizophrenics on the basis of form and content of
speech, however, have often been unsuccessful. Why?
Diagnostic style is certainly one factor. The less stringent the
criteria for making the diagnosis of "schizophrenia," the more
likely we are to include individuals whose speech contains little
"schizophrenese." Many of the language and speech studies
cited by Schwartz were carried out in an era characterized by
the overdiagnosis of "schizophrenia," compared to present
practices. Another factor has to do with severity of illness. "Easy
to recognize" schizophrenic speech is generally elicited from
chronic, deteriorated patients. The frequency of occurrence of
schizophrenic speech mannerisms in moderately or mildly ill
patients is probably rather low.
I believe that there is a still more important reason why
controlled studies have often failed to distinguish schizo-
phrenics from nonschizophrenics on the basis of language per-
formance. Analyzing "schizophrenic speech" requires that we
resolve the phenomenon into its various elements and look for
differences between schizophrenic messages and those of non-
schizophrenics for each of the speech categories we are study-
ing. But if we think of "schizophrenic speech" as a combination
of verbal and vocal elements, no one of which distinguishes
schizophrenics from nonschizophrenics, we will not be sur-
prised that studying one variable at a time has borne little fruit.
To analyze schizophrenic communication in this way is to
destroy its uniqueness.
The quality of bizarreness in schizophrenic messages is not
attributable to any one element. I believe that Steingart and
Freedman (1976) have come close to describing the essence of
schizophrenic speech in their characterization of it as the trans-
mission of incomprehensible messages in grammatically intact
form. When both the semantic and syntactic aspects of speech
are disorganized, the effect is more apt to be one of confusion
rather than bizarreness. Children are able to speak nonsense
without appearing bizarre because they demonstrate imma-
turity in both form and content. Entertainers can create non-
bizarre, comic effects by speaking nonsense in grammatically
correct language, but I suspect this is accomplished by a com-
bination of appropriate gestures, ordinary rather than esoteric
thematic content, normal vocal dynamics, and the absence of
obscure references.
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I would like to make a few comments on Schwartz's brief
discussion of the Watergate transcripts. According to the au-
thor, several of his colleagues judged a certain passage to be
"moderately schizophrenic." The excerpt in question was utte-
red by former president Nixon and is described as "repetitive,
loose, and difficult to follow." Citing Gold's book on the White
House transcripts, Schwartz goes on to attribute similarly con-
structed remarks to "many" of Nixon's colleagues.
In my own detailed analysis of the Watergate transcripts
(Weintraub 1981), I was unable to discover evidence of psycho-
sis in the speech of any of the participants. At most, Nixon may
have been suffering from a clinical depression at the time the
Watergate coversations were recorded. How can we account for
the fact that trained clinical psychologists judged a sample of
Nixon's speech to be "moderately schizophrenic"?
A close reading of the Watergate transcripts indicates that
none of the participants had the slightest difficulty understand-
ing the others. Certain portions of the transcripts appear "diffi-
cult to follow" only when taken out of context. We must remem-
ber that the transcripts record conversations among individuals
who shared certain assumptions and knowledge about the sub-
jects under discussion. These individuals had no need to pro-
vide each other with explanations and clarifications that a strang-
er would need. Most conversations among family members and
friends tend to be rambling and difficult for strangers to follow.
As Schwartz points out, schizophrenic speakers tend to as-
sume that their listeners know more about them and the sub-
jects they are discussing than they actually do. This assumption
contributes to the mysterious quality of schizophrenic speech.
To be sure, schizophrenics are not alone in making this assump-
tion. Children and certain ethnocentric adults often address
strangers as if they were relatives or friends. Readers wishing to
learn more about the effects of dialogue and social class upon the
formal characteristics of speech are referred respectively to
Vygotsky (1962) and Bernstein (1960).
Stages in the disintegration of thought and
language competence in schizophrenia
K. Zaimov
Department of Psychiatry of the Medical Academy, 1431 Sofia, Bulgaria
Schwartz's target article demonstrates an exhaustive knowledge
of the problem of schizophrenic thought and language. It pro-
vides a rich source for the reader. Particularly important is the
author's creative skepticism. In my opinion, however, this
skepticism goes too far when at the end of his paper Schwartz
comes to the conclusion that "we may never be able to explain
the schizophrenic language deficit because it probably doesn't
exist. "
For the clinician the schizophrenic's thought and language
competence disturbance is a reality. Two basic elements in this
reality are pointed out by Kraepelin (1913) and Bleuler (1911).
Kraepelin described the "derailment" of the associative process
in terms of semantic or phonetic relations that cause semantic
"hiatuses" in thought (as expressed in speech). Bleuler pro-
posed the term "looseness" of normal associative pathways as
the basis for the development of Kraepelin's derailments and for
other characteristic associative disorders described by him.
Thus when a schizophrenic patient says, "I have a triangular
medallion because the square root of 64 is 8," a peculiar thinking
disorder is at hand, the chain of thought being broken between
the words "triangular medallion" and "square root" by a "derail-
ment" of the semantic relationship (through a semantic hiatus).
In such a case the patient does not understand and cannot
correct the "mistake."
The process of deterioration of schizophrenic thought (as
expressed in language competence) can be presented schemat-
ically in four stages:
1. The first stage is one of disturbance of fine semantic
distinctions and of looseness of semantic associations without
apparent paralogical turns of thought and without gross seman-
tic hiatuses. This stage of semantic deformation of concepts is
difficult to objectify (unless there are premorbid records of the
patient's speech). It constitutes one of the signs giving the
researcher the "feeling" that schizophrenia is involved.
2. The second is a stage of looseness of semantic associative
relations with paralogical turns of thinking but without gross
semantic hiatuses. (I cannot concur with Schwartz's inclination
to deny the contributions of Von Domarus 1944. The validity of
vhe latter's contribution is supported convincingly by the work
of Arieti 1955; 1959; 1971; I too have studied paralogical think-
ing 1973; 1981a.)
It should be pointed out that whereas patients in stage 2 draw
logically unfounded conclusions (identifying part and whole
according to Levy-Briihl's 1927 law of participation, quadrup-
ling terms in syllogisms according to classical principles of
paralogism, etc.), in the subsequent stages of semantic derail-
ment they grossly violate the logical relations of thinking.
3. The third stage is one of gross semantic hiatuses but
without dissociation of the syntactic relations of sentences. This
stage of diverging semantic and syntactic disturbances is charac-
teristic of schizophrenic thinking and is denoted in the German-
speaking countries as "Zerfahrenheit des Denkens."
4. Finally there is a stage of semantic and syntactic disintegra-
tion of thinking terminating in forms of discourse termed "word
salad." (A classification of hiatuses in schizophrenia modeled on
slips of the tongue in normal people can be found in Zaimov
1981a.)
Naturally in many cases the patient's thought process exhibits
elements from more than one of the stages delimited above,
since the disturbances in thinking and language competence in
schizophrenia are very dynamic.
In a study of the thought process in 20 chronically ill schizo-
phrenic patients (with disturbances chiefly in the third stage) an
enumeration of the semantic hiatuses per 100 words (out of a
total sample of 400 words per patient) indicated that in a
conversation in the consulting room they made many more
hiatuses than in the process of ergotherapy, discussing well-
mastered work (average hiatus percentage decreased from 28.85
to 6.20). One of the patients had 36% hiatuses in the consulting
room, but no hiatuses at all when he was playing cards. Women
patients producing only word salad sharply decreased their
number of hiatuses while they were using caressing language
with children (Zaimov, Geranliev, Beltchev & Zaimova 1960).
In terms of the stages of disintegration of thought and lan-
guage competence described briefly above, it is evident that
Schwartz's suggestion of a similarity with the thought process of
"nonschizophrenic patients, poets and even 'normals'" could
apply only to the first stage (e.g. in cases of simple, slowly
progressing forms of schizophrenia). In the work of modernist
poets and in humor (anecdotes) unexpected turns of thought
similar to semantic dissociation are sometimes intentionally
used; such dissociations can also occur in the dreams of healthy
people.
In a series of papers I have tried to demonstrate that associa-
tive derailments of a "schizophrenic type" can be observed not
only in schizophrenia but also elsewhere, which means that
disturbances in thinking and language competence in schizo-
phrenia are relative rather than absolute. (A short review, with
references, of my investigations concerning this problem can be
found in Zaimov 1981b.)
So whereas Schwartz is right that many aspects of the problem
of schizophrenic thought and language competence remain
unclear, investigations in this field have nevertheless revealed
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certain characteristic stages which are useful to the clinician
both in diagnosis and in treatment.
Author's Response
If there were such people as schizophrenics,
what language would they speak?
Steven Schwartz
Department of Psychology, University of Queensland, St. Lucia,
Queensland 4067, Australia
It is not surprising that a paper concerned with psychi-
atric diagnosis, brain-behavior relationships, cognitive
psychology, linguistics, and social behavior should pro-
vide latitude for substantial disagreement and controver-
sy. As the commentaries touch on most sections of the
target article, I have used the same headings in this
response. In a change from the usual practice in these
Responses, I have left the general points for last as they
serve both to sum up the present state of knowledge and
to point out possible future research directions.
I. What is schizophrenia? As noted in the target article,
schizophrenia is clearly not a homogeneous category.
Bleuler (1950) referred to "the schizophrenias," and he
was doubtless right. Thus, I must agree with Bannister,
Chapman & Chapman, Colby, Darby, Knight & Sims-
Knight, Ovsiew & Hier, Weintraub, and anyone else
who criticizes diagnostic practices that assume a nonexis-
tent homogeneity to schizophrenia. As I pointed out (and
Chapman & Chapman reiterate), it is very likely that the
heterogeneity of the subjects called "schizophrenics" is at
least partly responsible for conflicting results across
studies.
Not only do the commentators and I agree that schizo-
phrenia is a heterogeneous category, but many commen-
tators also concur with my view that the relationship
between peculiar speech and schizophrenia may be
largely tautological (Colby, Mancuso, Sarbin & Heerdt).
The tautology arises because speech deviance (as in the
DSM HI American Psychiatric Association 1980) is often
one of the criteria for the schizophrenic diagnosis. It is
still possible to diagnose schizophrenia without reference
to speech because (as Andreasen, Bannister, and Colby
note) schizophrenia is a disjunctive category. Neverthe-
less, Mancuso et al. are right in arguing that independent
definitions of speech deviance and schizophrenia are
necessary if we are to avoid circular reasoning when
studying speech-disturbed schizophrenics.
Some commentators suggest that schizophrenic sub-
groups be identified (Chapman & Chapman, Knight &
Sims-Knight, Weintraub). There can be no argument
with this. One way to accomplish it is to identify separate
biological markers for the various subtypes (Darby,
Hemsley, Ovsiew & Hier). Care must be taken in this
approach, however, lest we muddy the distinctions we
already have. Darby, for example, includes autistic chil-
dren among his schizophrenic subtypes despite the evi-
dence that these disorders are quite distinct (Schwartz &
Johnson 1981). (Darby, by the way, states that most
researchers in schizophrenic cognition assume no neu-
rological problem in their subjects. I haven't taken a poll,
but I would be very surprised to find that this was true.)
Perhaps, in the future, we will have a new taxonomic
system (Colby) based on physiological and behavioral
markers that will permit us to study truly homogeneous
patient groups. Until then, however, we must decide
what to do with the hundreds of studies already in the
literature. Colby appears to opt for dumping the lot and
starting fresh. Chaika disagrees. My own view is closer to
Chaika's. Many of the experiments discussed in the target
article defined their subject populations quite clearly.
These experiments can easily be repeated; their findings
can be assessed by other investigators. Moreover, schizo-
phrenia (although not homogeneous) is not all that diffi-
cult to diagnose. Colby is right, of course, that reliability
studies could be better controlled. But the force of his
objection is diminished by noting that he himself (Colby
1981) cites the same research as evidence for the reliabili-
ty of the "paranoia" diagnosis. Schizophrenia (I will use
the singular for ease in writing, the plural character of the
disorder having already been acknowledged) is as easy to
recognize as many equally heterogeneous medical disor-
ders. It seems perfectly legitimate to evaluate the litera-
ture as it currently stands on the understanding that
future refinements in diagnosis will make possible even
finer distinctions. Indeed, it is typical in medical history
to proceed from general categories ("the fevers," for
example) to more specific illnesses that share some char-
acteristics but have their own unique features as well.
Mancuso et al. are unhappy with my medical analo-
gies. They feel that I am committed to a "disease model"
of "inappropriate discourse" and that, unlike most medi-
cal diagnoses, the label "schizophrenia" has no predictive
validity. The first objection is spurious as there is much
more to schizophrenia than inappropriate discourse. In
fact, the diagnosis can be made without reference to
speech at all (Andreasen). The conditions referred to as
schizophrenia include a range of characteristics, many of
which appear to have genetic and neurological etiologies
(Rosenthal & Kety 1968). Mancuso et al.'s second objec-
tion is equally invalid. The course of schizophrenia, the
response to certain drugs, and the incidence of similar
conditions in family members can all be predicted from
knowing that a patient has been diagnosed schizophrenic.
The schizophrenic diagnosis has as much predictive valid-
ity as many accepted medical conditions (epilepsy and
many forms of cancer, for instance).
Mancuso et al. prefer to think that diagnosing someone
as schizophrenic is a moral judgment about an indi-
vidual's behavior. This is certainly not a new idea (see
Szasz 1960), nor is it entirely incorrect. But, it's not clear
where they think their view leads. Are they arguing that
there are no physiological concomitants of schizophrenia?
If so, what do they make of the evidence summarized by
Darby? Are they arguing that these neurophysiological
problems should be ignored? Would the etiology of
general paresis ever have been identified if physicians
and researchers had refrained from making diagnostic
judgments about their patients even though many of
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these judgments could have been considered "moral," at
least at the time?
Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous diagnostic category.
Further refinements are necessary and will doubtless be
forthcoming. This doesn't mean that all of the existing
literature is worthless. If carefully examined, many of the
mistakes of the past can serve as useful lessons for the
future.
II. What is language? In order to decide whether some-
thing exists, we must first define what it is we are talking
about. In the target article, a distinction was made be-
tween language, speech, and thought. Bleuler (1950)
made similar distinctions and so have most linguists.
Having discussed these distinctions at length, I am at a
loss to explain Bannister's claim that I use the terms
"saying odd things," "schizophrenia," and "thought dis-
order" interchangeably. Indeed, it is Bannister himself
who argues that disorders of language and speech are
difficult to tell apart. Sometimes they are. But the prob-
lem is not as severe as Bannister states. For example,
stuttering and elective mutism are clearly speech disor-
ders, not language disorders.
For different reasons, Neuringer and Martin feel that
the distinctions made between language, thought, and
speech are too restrictive. Neuringer is particularly con-
cerned about the distinction between speech and
thought. He agrees that thought can proceed without
speech but asks whether speech can proceed without
thought? The answer he expects is clearly "no." But
speech does in fact appear without thought, motivation,
or control in patients suffering from Tourette's syndrome
(Shapiro, Shapiro, Brown & Sweet 1978). Clinical and
research studies of aphasia, stuttering, and Tourette's
syndrome (to name just three) show the importance of
distinguishing between language, thought, and speech.
Neuringer's unsupported assertion that speech and
thought have an "invariant correlative identity" also con-
tradicts the clinical facts. There are external factors that
can affect each individually (again, see studies of aphasia
as compared with stuttering). Furthermore, Neuringer's
feeling that thinking can only be studied through lan-
guage is just not supported (see Posner 1978).
Neuringer points out that I used the word "language"
when I should have used "speech." As he notes, this
illustrates the difficulties involved in using everyday
terms in specialized ways. But, just because these distinc-
tions are difficult doesn't mean we should ignore them.
The alternative is almost certain confusion. (For further
clarification of the distinction between thought, lan-
guage, and speech, see Boiler's helpful commentary.)
Martin's objections to my definitions of language,
thought, and speech are based on the definitions' ideal-
ization of language into a set of formal rules. He reiterates
some objections to Chomsky's work and to linguistic
formalisms in general. There is nothing new in this.
Chomsky (1975; 1980; see also BBS 3(1) 1980) has re-
sponded to these criticisms; his arguments can be con-
sulted by readers interested in learning whether the
formal approach has any life left in it. In a sense, Martin
has erected a straw man. I have no objection to studying
schizophrenic discourse or pragmatics. On the contrary,
the analysis of texts and the study of pragmatics (see
Buckingham's commentary for one approach to these
matters) are quite important to our understanding of
schizophrenia. But is it indeed arbitrarily narrow, as
Martin claims, to consider these matters related to - but
not part of- language? Martin himself agrees that prag-
matics is outside language for most linguists. On the other
hand, he would like to argue that deficits in discourse
cohesion do reflect a language deficit. To a great extent,
this is an empirical question. If a theory of language can
be developed that includes within it the ability to explain
why we sometimes violate the rules of conversational
implicature, then such matters are part of language. At
present, our theories of syntax and the meaning of sen-
tences are constructed at a level of analysis different from
the one Martin prefers. The phenomena he refers to may
be explained by their own set of rules, but they are not the
set that explains syntax, morphology, and phonology. The
deficits that occur in patients suffering from one or an-
other aphasic syndrome fall within the areas of syntax,
morphology, and phonology. As far as I know, there is no
aphasic syndrome in which the deficit appears in texts but
not in sentences.
As things stand, it is possible for someone to have full
grammatical competence and no pragmatic competence.
This appears to be the case for some schizophrenics. At
present no single theory of language can account for this
pattern. Until such a theory is forthcoming, one that deals
with syntax as well as discourse processes, it seems only
reasonable to keep the two separate.
(One final point. The commentaries and the discussion
thus far should disabuse Kertesz of the notion that I have
chosen the "safe side" and that no one denies the inde-
pendence of thought and speech.)
III. What Is meant by schizophrenic language? In the
target article I noted that schizophrenics speak co-
herently most of the time (some do so all of the time).
Inconstancy in schizophrenics' linguistic productions was
also noted by Bleuler, Chaika, Neuringer, and Zaimov.
By themselves, these inconstancies are difficult to in-
terpret. They could mean that schizophrenics have lapses
in competence as Chaika suggests or they could reflect a
performance deficit. Since the speech errors made by
schizophrenics are similar to those made by non-
schizophrenics, and since these errors occur only rarely
(and at the level of texts), it seems unlikely that they are
the result of a competence deficit like aphasia (see Rosen-
berg & Abbeduto 1982 for a longer discussion of this
point).
IV. Associationism and schizophrenic language. Associa-
tionism as a theory of language has been severely criti-
cized by many writers (see Schwartz 1978b for a review).
Nevertheless, associationism in its most primitive form -
the word association test - just will not go away. In earlier
reviews (Schwartz 1978a; 1978b), I concluded that there
was little evidence that schizophrenics give rare word
association responses. Kertesz feels that this "does not
ring true." He provides no data; nor does he try to refute
my earlier arguments. Chapman & Chapman do attempt
to provide such data; their argument deserves close
scrutiny.
According to Chapman & Chapman, schizophrenics
show a commonality deviance, not to all words but pri-
marily to "flat-slope" (also known as "high-interference"
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or "ambiguous") words, those without a single dominant
associate. Chapman & Chapman claim that this greater
deficit in commonality for "flat-slope" words was re-
ported by Lisman and Cohen (1972) and reconfirmed by
Magaro, Abrams, and Cantrell (1981), Penk and Kidd
(1977), and Penk (1978).
A close look at these studies, however, reveals a picture
very different from the one described by Chapman &
Chapman. Even a cursory look at Lisman and Cohen's
data (1972, Figure 2, p. 185) reveals that the big dif-
ferences between schizophrenics and normal individuals
do not occur with the "flat-slope" words (as Chapman &
Chapman claim) but rather with the steep-slope words.
There was a small tendency for schizophrenics to give
rarer responses than nonschizophrenics to one of the two
flat-slope lists, but this tendency was dwarfed by their
much greater tendency to give rare associates to the
steep-slope words. As Lisman and Cohen note, "all
differences between diagnostic groups appear negligible
for the flat slope words in contrast to the sharp differences
apparent with the steep slope words" (1972, p. 185).
These results are exactly opposite to the ones Chapman &
Chapman attribute to the study.
According to Chapman & Chapman, Magaro, Abrams,
and Contrell (1981) reconfirmed a finding that Lisman
and Cohen (1972) never obtained. Magaro et al. (1981)
compared paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics on
several tasks, including a word association task using
steep- and flat-slope words. Aside from noting that non-
paranoid patients gave fewer common associates to steep-
slope words and were also less likely to recall their
associates to any word than the paranoid patients, Magaro
et al. do not report response commonalities. In other
words, Magaro et al. present no evidence or data to
support Chapman & Chapman's claim that schizo-
phrenics show deviant commonality on flat-slope words.
This leaves Penk's studies. Penk and Kidd (1977) found
that schizophrenics gave fewer common responses to flat-
slope words than did "neurotics." When compared with
medical-patient controls, they gave rarer responses to all
words. Penk (1978) found an increase in common re-
sponses (to flat- but not to steep-slope words) after treat-
ment among schizophrenics but not among neurotics.
For one group of neurotics, commonality actually de-
creased with treatment! Why this should happen, and the
amazing resistance of his data to normal regression to the
mean is not explained by Penk. One cannot help but
worry about sampling error, given these results.
In summary, Chapman & Chapman's claim that
schizophrenics show greater deviance in commonality on
flat-slope words is refuted by Lisman and Cohen (1972),
and not even addressed by Magaro et al. (1981). The
pattern was found in some comparisons by Penk and his
colleagues, but some of these results are statistically
peculiar. Somehow, Chapman & Chapman see the re-
sults of these studies as supporting a response competi-
tion theory of schizophrenia.
In their commentary, Chapman & Chapman take me
to task for holding researchers to an unrealistic standard
and for making too much of negative findings. As I have
tried to show here, their standards are indeed different
from mine. Contrary to Chapman & Chapman's asser-
tion, Lisman and Cohen's conclusion that schizophrenics
have normal associative repertoires is "relevant. " For one
thing, it describes fairly their results as well as the
majority of findings in the literature.
Defining "meaning bias," Chapman and Chapman
(1965, p. 139) state that "a person has, to any one word, a
series of meaning responses . . . these several meaning
responses to a single word differ in strength." Surely
these "meaning responses" sound a lot like word associa-
tions. Nevertheless, Chapman & Chapman say they are
different, and I must take them at their word. Their
acknowledgment that words taken out of context are
treated differently from words in sentences is very wel-
come and reinforces the essential futility of trying to
understand language by studying associations to words.
Also on the topic of meaning biases, Hemsley mentions
a study by Williams, Hemsley, and Denning-Duke (1976)
which he claims found that only chronic schizophrenics
have a "strong meaning response bias." This wasn't true
in their Experiment 1. The difference between acute and
chronic schizophrenics was not significant. Moreover,
prison inmates (Rattan & Chapman 1973) and non-
schizophrenic patients (Naficy & Willerman 1980) also
show a strong meaning bias, suggesting an effect at-
tributable to institutionalization rather than schizophre-
nia.
Word association studies have been going on for about
a century. They will continue to be conducted in the
future. Thus far, they have not revealed any deficit
specific to schizophrenia (see the commentary of Asar-
now & Watkins for additional discussion of word associa-
tion studies).
V. Schizophrenics' knowledge of linguistic rules. Some
schizophrenics, Chaika suggests, produce speech similar
to that produced by some aphasics. Boiler, on the other
hand, feels that schizophrenics do not demonstrate apha-
sic features in their language. Lecours feels there are
quantitative differences between some subgroups of
schizophrenia and normal individuals. (Lecours also feels
that whether schizophrenic speech deviations are delib-
erate or whether they are manifestations of a thought or
language disorder is "irrelevant." Fortunately, few re-
searchers take this essentially atheoretical approach.)
Osview & Hier agree that no consistent patterns of
language deviance have been identified in schizophrenia.
Andreasen feels that schizophrenics are competent in
language perception but not in language production.
As noted in the target article, such disagreements are
common in the literature even though all theorists use the
same data. Ovsiew & Hier suggest that the best way to
proceed is to look for consistent patterns of speech de-
viance in schizophrenic subgroups. These speech syn-
dromes can then be linked with neurological findings.
Lecours advocates something similar, an approach he
attributes - mysteriously - to French and German neu-
rologists. I most certainly agree. This approach is not
likely to be easy. Consider the table constructed by
Ovsiew & Hier, for example. It shows marked similarity
in the speech of a patient suffering from Wernicke's
aphasia and an excerpt from the Watergate tapes. Clear-
ly, the effects of context (Weintraub) cannot be ignored.
The literature relating aphasia and schizophrenia has
been reviewed several times, most recently by Rosen-
berg and Abbeduto (1982). These reviewers also found
little evidence for dysfunctions in syntax, morphology,
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phonology, or intonation among schizophrenics. They
conclude that schizophrenics have a problem in perfor-
mance, not linguistic competence.
Martin suggests that defects in discourse cohesion
should also be considered language defects. This argu-
ment, which is also made by Rochester and Martin (1979),
is based on an alleged left hemisphere deficit in schizo-
phrenia. Since the left hemisphere is primarily responsi-
ble for language competence, and since the structure of
discourse is at least language related, discourse failure is
taken to be a failure in language competence. Not only is
this logic hard to follow, but the whole notion of left
hemisphere damage in schizophrenia is quite speculative
(see Rosenberg & Abbeduto 1982). In our own work
(Schwartz & Kirsner 1982) we have shown that many
findings attributed to hemispheric specialization in nor-
mal subjects can actually be shown to result from selec-
tive attention. There is every reason to believe that the
same holds true for schizophrenia.
VI. Hypotheses based on the content of schizophrenic
speech. It is suggested by Laffal that schizophrenic
speech, like poetry, can be understood - if one tries hard
enough (Colby agrees). Laffal also recommends that tech-
niques similar to those applied to explicating poetry be
applied to clarifying schizophrenic discourse. Why these
efforts should be necessary in the first place is not ex-
plained by Laffal's work.
VII. Pragmatic deficits in schizophrenia. Clinical investi-
gations and laboratory studies agree that schizophrenics
have pragmatic deficits. Andreasen, Buckingham,
Chaika, Colby, Mancuso et al., Martin, Rutter, and
Weintraub appear to agree with this position as stated in
the target article. I am indebted to Buckingham for
providing a useful summary of Grice's work. Morgan and
Green (1980) also provide a rule-based approach to prag-
matics similar to the one available for semantics. These
authors' work supports Martin's notion that pragmatics
itself can be considered a semiotic system.
The main issue is whether these pragmatic defects can
be considered to reflect a deficit in language competence.
Andreasen seems to think they can, and she attributes
her position to many "psycholinguists." Martin, on the
other hand, says that most linguists would put pragmatics
outside language competence. Most commentators ap-
pear to agree with Martin. Rutter sees the problem as
"social"; Buckingham hypothesizes that attentional defi-
cits are responsible for pragmatic defects; Mancuso et al.
see social interaction as the source of the problem; and
Weintraub also emphasizes the social context. Needless
to say, I side with the majority. Pragmatic defects are
important, but they are not part of language competence.
VIII. Is schizophrenic speech the result of an information-
processing deficit? Information-processing hypotheses
concerning schizophrenic cognitive deficits come and go
with disturbing frequency. Few hypotheses ever die
away completely. Zaimov, for example, still finds the Von
Domarus principle (schizophrenics are paralogicians)
useful despite the total lack of support for its validity.
Some hypotheses are so vague and circular that they
explain nothing. Neuringer, for example, favors theories
that attribute schizophrenic speech to a lack of energy or
an attempt to avoid social contact. Both notions are classic
tautologies based on schizophrenic behavior with no
independent measures of energy or motivation sugges-
ted.
I suggested that pigeonholing (a defect in selective
attention) is responsible for some of the peculiarities in
schizophrenic speech and cognition. I did not suggest
that a pigeonholing deficit was the only cognitive problem
schizophrenics have - just that it was one supported by
the literature. Some commentators questioned this con-
clusion (Chapman & Chapman, Knight & Sims-Knight,
R. G. Knight, Nuechterlein, and Oltmanns). A few found
it reasonable (Buckingham, Cromwell & Space, and
Hemsley up to a point). Some commentators ignored the
pigeonholing hypothesis and some misunderstood it
(Chaika, Kay, and Lecours).
Both filtering and pigeonholing are forms of selective
attention. The former operates by selecting on the basis of
some differentiating stimulus characteristic, the latter by
biasing the organism toward certain response categories.
Common names, for example, are more easily perceived
in noisy situations (and more easily retrieved from memo-
ry), not because they are more distinctive than rare
names but because of a pigeonholing mechanism that
biases responses toward common names. Female voices,
on the other hand, are distinguished from male voices by
filtering on the basis of vocal characteristics. The distinc-
tion between filtering and pigeonholing applies to memo-
ry as well as to perception (Schwartz 1974). In the vocabu-
lary of signal-detection theory, filtering is indexed by
changes in sensitivity (d') whereas pigeonholing is re-
flected by changes in criterion bias (p).
Oltmanns, Knight & Sims-Knight, and Hemsley con-
sider the distinction between filtering and pigeonholing
to be testable and note some of the predictions expected
to follow from my position. I must strongly disagree with
Kay, therefore, who claims that the deficit I propose is
not carefully specified and does not generate predictions.
It should also be clear that Kay is completely wrong when
he says that pigeonholing operates late in the informa-
tion-processing chain. In fact, pigeonholing is a type of
selective attention. It operates at the outset of the infor-
mation-processing chain. It should also be emphasized
that the kind of processing model that Kay describes (a
linear sequential model) has been rejected by most cogni-
tive psychologists who admit top-down and recursive
processes to be quite common in most information-pro-
cessing tasks. Finally, the bias toward certain types of
information that Kay describes as characteristic of schizo-
phrenics is quite compatible with a deficit in pigeon-
holing.
Chaika too misunderstands the pigeonholing mecha-
nism. I am not suggesting that schizophrenics cannot put
words into categories. In fact, they may have too strong a
bias to do just that.
Knight & Sims-Knight and Nuechterlein are right in
stating that my use of pigeonholing goes beyond the
situations described by Broadbent (1971). But, Broad-
bent meant the two mechanisms to be general informa-
tion-processing procedures. They would be of little in-
terest if they applied only to a certain experimental
paradigm. I think that the two mechanisms can be safely
generalized.
Consider the experiment by Knight and Sims-Knight
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(1979). Subjects were asked to judge whether sentences
had been encountered earlier. Unless we assume that all
sentences ever encountered are stored in memory, we
must assume that the subjects adopt some sort of strategy
to accomplish this artificial laboratory task. Typically, it is
assumed that an occurence "tag" is attached to "old"
sentences which can then be used to discriminate these
sentences from "new" ones. The ability to make these
comparisons involves filtering in memory and may be
measured using signal-detection statistics (Schwartz
1974). Since Knight and Sims-Knight (1979) found that
schizophrenic subjects had no difficulty discriminating
old sentences from new, there seems little evidence here
for a filtering deficit. The schizophrenics, however, had a
more cautious response criterion (or so it seems) for
responding "old" to new sentences that incorporated
some of the ideas in the old sentences. Here is an example
(as suggested by Hemsley) where, in a sense, schizo-
phrenics performed more accurately than normal people!
Chaika's explanation for Knight & Sims-Knight's (1979)
results is that the normal subjects recall meaning and
forget syntax whereas the schizophrenics forget meaning
(but apparently not syntax). This "explanation" is merely
descriptive and does not say why this should be so.
Nuechterlein indicates that some schizophrenics do
have poor sensitivity to perceptual stimuli. This is proba-
bly important but not the same (as Nuechterlein notes) as
a deficit in selective filtering. Nor is Walker's (1981)
experiment a clear case of filtering. Discriminating an "x"
from other letters can involve pigeonholing.
Asarnow & Watkins make a convincing case for study-
ing remitted schizophrenics. Their approach is likely to
separate some of the acute effects of psychosis and hospi-
talization from the specific schizophrenic deficit. Their
own research has gone a long way toward clarifying this
deficit. Some of this work is relevant to the current
discussion. In Asarnow and MacCrimmon (1978), schizo-
phrenic groups were compared with nonschizophrenic
groups on several tasks including the continuous perfor-
mance task in which subjects monitor a visual display and
press a button when a target digit appears. In their
experiment, subjects performed this task in either a quiet
condition or a distracting one (while listening to a voice
read digits over headphones). Estimating d! and P from
their graphs (Asarnow & MacCrimmon 1978, p. 602)
reveals that for the acute schizophrenic group, d' in quiet
was 2.72 (these estimates, based on graphs, can be some-
what inaccurate) and d' in the distracting condition was
2.86. That is, sensitivity improved. Performance deterio-
rated, however, because of a 30% change in p. The
pattern was similar for the normal subjects: virtually no
change in d' (the values were 4.64 and 4.20 for the quiet
and distracting conditions, respectively) but a big change
in P, from 1 to 2.56. The remitted schizophrenic group
performed quite differently. For them, P decreased by
50% from the quiet to the distracting condition. They
were the only group that behaved this way. Their behav-
ior suggests a deficit in setting a proper criterion that is
not evident in the nonschizophrenic or the acute schizo-
phrenic group.
The commentaries contain several suggestions for al-
ternative information-processing deficits in schizophre-
nia. Kay nominates the selective encoding of affective
characteristics. He discusses word list studies but pre-
sumably intends his hypothesis to apply generally. It is
not clear whether all psychiatric patients become sen-
sitized to affective cues, but it should be easy enough to
find out. Buckingham focuses on a defect in selective
attention as do Cromwell & Space. Asarnow & Watkins
look toward a production deficiency as the major problem
in schizophrenic cognition. This view has much to recom-
mend it, but care must be taken to specify precisely what
production deficiency they are talking about. When spec-
ified precisely, pigeonholing deficits may be production
deficiencies.
Asarnow & Watkins and Oltmanns suggest that the
schizophrenic deficit lies in controlled information pro-
cessing. The controlled/automatic distinction has become
a common one in recent years. I must confess to having
invoked it myself in another context (Schwartz 1981). It
has been my experience, however, that when the terms
"controlled" and "automatic" have been operationally
defined (rather than merely invoked as convenient post
hoc explanations for experimental findings), it is the
automatic processes that are the best indicators of stable
individual differences, not the controlled ones. I have
discussed this elsewhere (Schwartz 1981) and will not
repeat the argument or the data here. I will just ask the
reader to imagine learning a skill like tennis or piano
playing. At the outset, performance is controlled; most of
us must consciously concentrate on what we are doing
and we are easily distracted. As we become more profi-
cient, performance gradually becomes automated. Soon
we can play the piano while talking, drive a car while
listening to the radio, and so on. At what stage are we
likely to be able to tell the great tennis player, pianist,
driver from the mediocre: at the beginning when every-
one is learning and making lots of errors or after consider-
able practice when performance is virtually automatic? I
think Oltmanns and Asarnow & Watkins are barking up
the wrong tree. It is automatic processes that are most
likely to discriminate among groups, not controlled ones.
Cohen suggests by analogy that schizophrenics suffer
from a sort of cognitive stuttering. He lists many sim-
ilarities between schizophrenic cognition and stuttering.
To these, I should like to add that some stutterers, like
some schizophrenics, respond positively to phenothia-
zines (Andrews 1977).
IX. General issues and future directions. It is impossible
to conclude that schizophrenics are differentially worse in
pigeonholing than filtering, argues R. G. Knight, because
the two tasks have not been equated in the manner
described by Chapman and Chapman (1973). This point is
a good one, and it has relevance to areas other than
schizophrenia. But, taken to extremes, Knight's point
becomes a logical absurdity. The problem is that his
criticism is basically an empirical one. When we have no
theoretical model predicting the outcome of experi-
ments, we need to be sure that our findings are not
merely statistical artifacts. However, when we do have
well-specified theories, converging experiments using
different methods are the most convincing way to demon-
strate a hypothesis' validity. One wonders what Knight
would say about an experiment that tried to show that
one-legged runners ran slower than two-legged runners
but completed addition problems just as quickly. Would
he still insist that all conclusions were unjustified because
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the running task and the math test were not equated for
difficulty and discriminating power?
Chapman & Chapman take up a related issue when
they note that one study is not as meaningful as the total
balance of findings. Of course they are right. There are
many ways that research findings may be combined (see
Schwartz & Dalgliesh 1982 for a discussion of some
methods). From a philosophical point of view, however,
it seems only prudent to give more weight to negative
findings than to positive ones. After all, finding that
apples fall downward off trees got Newton started on a
theory of gravity. If other physicists showed that the same
holds true for other fruit (pears and peaches also fall) their
publication records would grow but it wouldn't help the
theory much. But, should one physicist discover a fruit
that falls up - now that would make a difference.
Not all relevant research has been reviewed in the
target article or in this Response. Some of the commenta-
tors have pointed out areas of research that support the
general thesis of the target article (Cromwell & Space, for
example). The field of schizophrenic research is vast; no
single article could cover it. Nor will a single defect
account for all schizophrenic symptoms. Chaika's belief
that all problems must be accounted for by any hypothesis
of schizophrenic deficit ignores the heterogeneous nature
of the diagnostic category. A better strategy, I think, is to
pursue the implications of a hypothesis as far as possible
and not to prejudge any hypothesis' explanatory power
purely on a priori grounds.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Preparation of this paper was assisted by grants from the Educa-
tional Research and Development Committee and the Aus-
tralian Research Grants Committee. I am grateful to Judy
Brown for her research assistance.
References
Abrams, R., Redfield, J. & Taylor, A. T. (1981) Cognitive dysfunction in
schizophrenia, affective disorder, and organic brain disease. British
Journal of Psychiatry 139:190-94. [JKD]
Agnew, J. & Bannister, D. (1973) Psychiatric diagnosis as a pseudo-specialist
language. Britiih Journal of Medical Psychology. 46:69-73. [DB]
American Psychiatric Association (1980) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders - DSM III. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: American
Psychiatric Association. [NCA, RLC, tarSS]
Andreasen, N. C. (1979a) Thought, language, and communication disorders. I.
Clinical assessment, definition of terms, and evaluation of their reliability.
Archives of General Psychiatry 36:1315-23. [NCA]
(1979b) Thought, language, and communication disorders. II. Diagnostic
significance. Archives of General Psychiatry 36:1325-30. [NCA]
(1982) The relationship between schizophrenic language and the aphasias.
In: Dopamine and psychosis in schizophrenia as a brain disease, ed. F.
Henn & H. Nasrallah. New York. Oxford University Press. [NCA]
Andreasen, N. C. & Grove, W. (1979) The relationship between
schizophrenic language, manic language, and aphasia. In: Hemisphere
asymmetries of function in psychopathology, ed. J. Gruzelier & P. Flor-
Henry. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland. [taSS]
Andreasen, N. C , Olsen, S. A., Dennert, J. W. & Smith, M. W. (1982)
Ventricular enlargement in schizophrenia: Relationship to positive and
negative symptoms. American Journal of Psychiatry
139:297-301. [JKD]
Andrews, G. (1977) Haloperidol and the treatment of stuttering. Journal of
Fluency Disorders 2:217-24. [rSS]
Arieti, S. (1955) Some aspects of language in schizophrenia. In: On expressive
language, ed. H. Werner. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University
Press. [KZ]
(1959) Schizophrenia: The manifest symptomatology, the psychodynamic
and formal mechanisms. In: American handbook of psychiatry, vol. 1, ed.
S. Arieti, pp. 455-507. New York: Basic Books. [KZ]
(1971) Current ideas on the problem of psychoses. In. Problem of psychosis,
ed. P. Doncet & C. Laurin, pp. 3-21. Amsterdam: Excerpta
Medica. [KZ]
Asarnow, R. F. (in press) The search for the psychobiological substrate of
schizophrenia: A perspective from studies of children at risk for
schizophrenia. In: The child at risk, ed. R. Tarter. New York: Oxford
University Press. [RFA]
Asarnow, R. F. & Asarnow, J. R. (in press) Attention/information processing
and vulnerability to schizophrenia: Implications for preventive
intervention. In. Preventive intervention in schizophrenia, ed. M.
Goldstein. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. [RFA]
Asarnow, R. F. & MacCrimmon, D. J. (1978) Residual performance deficit in
clinically remitted schizophrenics: A marker of schizophrenia? Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 87:597-608. [RFA, rSS]
(1981) Span of apprehension deficits during the post-psychotic stages of
schizophrenia. A replication and extension. Archives of General
Psychiatry 38:1006-11. [RFA]
(1982) Attention/information processing, neuropsychological functioning and
thought disorder during the acute and partial recovery phases of
schizophrenia: A longitudinal study. In prep. [RFA]
Asarnow, R. F , Steffy, R. A., MacCrimmon, D. J. & Cleghorn, J. M. (1977)
An attentional assessment of foster children at risk for schizophrenia.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 86:267-75. [RFA]
Austin, J. L. (1962) How to do things with words. New York: Oxford
University Press. [JL]
Bannister, D. (1962) The nature and measurement of schizophrenic thought
disorder. Journal of Mental Science 108:825-42. [RLC]
(1963) The genesis of schizophrenic thought disorder: A serial invalidation
hypothesis. British Journal of Psychiatry 109:680-86. [RLC]
(1968) The logical requirements of research into schizophrenia. British
Journal of Psychiatry 114.181-88. [DB]
Bannister, D., Adams-Webber, J. R., Penn, W. I. & Radley, A. R. (1975)
Reversing the process of thought disorder: A serial validation experiment.
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 14:169-80. [DB]
Basso, A., De Renzi, E., Faglioni, P., Scotti, G. & Spinnler, H. (1973)
Neuropsychological evidence for the existence of cerebral areas critical to
the performance of intelligence tasks. Brain 96:715-28. [FB]
Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J. E. & Erbaugh, J. K.
(1962) Reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. II. A study of consistency of
clinical judgments and ratings. American Journal of Psychiatry
119:351-57. [taSS]
Benson, D. F. (1975) Disorders of verbal expression. In: Psychiatric aspects of
neurologic disease, ed. D. F. Benson & D. Blumer. New York: Grune &
Stratton. [FB]
Bernstein, B. (1960) Language and social class. British Journal of Sociology
11:271-76. [WW]
Binet, A. (1903) L'itude experimentale de ^intelligence. Paris:
Schleicher. [FB]
Bleuler, E. (1911) Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien.
Leipzig & Vienna: Deuticke. [KZ]
(1950) Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias. New York:
International Universities Press. 1st ed., 1911. [RFA, DB, BDC, tarSS]
Bobon, J. (1952) Introduction historique d l'itude des niologismes et des
glossolalies en psychopathologie. Liege: Vaillant-Carmanne. [ARL]
Boland, T. B. & Chapman, L. J. (1971) Conflicting predictions from Broen's
and Chapman's theories of schizophrenic thought disorder. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 78:52-58. [taSS]
Braff, D. L. & Saccuzzo, D. P. (1981) Information processing dysfunction in
paranoid schizophrenia: A two-factor deficit. American Journal of
Psychiatry 138:1051-56. [KHN]
Broadbent, D. E. (1958) Perception and communication. Oxford: Pergamon
Press. [RAK, taSS]
(1971) Decision and stress. New York: Academic Press. [LC, RAK, RGK,
KHN, TFO, DRR, tarSS]
(1977) The hidden preattentive processes. American Psychologist
32:109-18. [RAK]
(1981) Selective and control processes. Cognition 10:53-58. [RAK]
Broen, W. E., Jr. (1968) Schizophrenia: Research and theory. New York:
Academic Press. [DRH, JL]
Broen, W. E., Jr. & Storms, L. H. (1966) Lawful disorganization: The process
underlying a schizophrenic syndrome. Psychological Review
73:265-79. [SRK]
620 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
(1967) A theory of response interference in schizophrenia. In: Progress in
experimental personality research, vol. 4, ed. B. A. Maher. New York:
Academic Press. [taSS]
Browning, R. M. & Stover, D. O. (1971) Behaviour modification in child
treatment. New York: Aldine. [taSS]
Buchshaiim, M. S. & Haier, R. J. (1978) Biological homogeneity, symptom
heterogeneity, and the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin
4:473-75. [FO]
Buchsbamn, M. S. & Reider, R. O. (1979) Biologic heterogeneity and
ps>chiatric research. Archives of General Psychiatry 36:1163-69. [FO]
Buckingham, H. W. (1979) Linguistic aspects of lexical retrieval disturbances
in the posterior fluent aphasias. In: Studies in ncurolinguistics, vol. 4.,
ed. H. Whitaker & H. A. Whitaker. New York. Academic
Press. [HWB]
Buckingham, H. W. & Kertesz, A. (1976) Neologistic jargon aphasia.
Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger. [HWB]
Buss, A. H. & Lang, P. J. (1965) Psychological deficit in schizophrenia: I.
Affect, reinforcement, and concept attainment. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 70:2-24. [SRK]
Callaway, E. & Naghdi, S. (1982) An information processing model for
schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 39:339-47. [KHN, TFO]
Cameron, N. (1938) Reasoning, regression and communication in
schizophrenics. Psychological Monographs 50, no. 1, whole no.
221. [CN]
(1944) Experimental analysis of schizophrenic thinking. In: Language and
thought in schizophrenia, ed. J. S. Kasanin. New York:
Norton. [CN, taSS]
Campbell, M., Rosenbloom, S., Perry, R., George, A. E., Kricheff, I. I.,
Andersen, L., Small, A. & Jennings, S. J. (1982) Computerized axial
tomography in young autistic children. American Journal of Psychiatry
139:510-12. [JKD]
Carpenter, M. D. (1976) Sensitivity to syntactic structure, good vs poor pre-
morbid schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85:41-50.
[NCA, taSS]
Cegalis, J. A. & Tegtmeyer, P. F. (1980) Visual selectivity in schizophrenia.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 168:229-35. [DRH]
Cenac, M. (1925) Dc certains langagcs crfts par les aliints: contribution &
I'dtude des glossolalies. Paris: Jouve. [ARL]
Chafe, W. (1980) The pear stories. Advances in discourse processes vol. 3.
Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing. [EC]
Chaika, E. O. (1974) A linguist looks at "schizophrenic" language. Brain and
Language 1:257-76. [EC, AK, taSS]
(1977) Schizophrenic speech, slips of the tongue, and jargonaphasia: A reply
to Fromkin and to Lecours and Vanier-Clement. Brain and Language
4:464-75. [EC, taSS]
(1981) How shall a discourse be understood? Discourse Processes
4:71-88. [EC]
(1982a) Language: The social mirror. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House
Publishers. [EC]
(1982b) Thought disorder or speech disorder in schizophrenia?
Schizophrenia Bulletin, forthcoming. [EC]
(1982c) A unified explanation for the diverse structural deviations reported
for adult schizophrenics with disrupted speech. Journal of Communica-
tion Disorders, 15:167-89. [EC]
Chapman, L. J. (1958) Intrusion of associative responses into schizophrenic
conceptual performance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
56:374-79. [SRK]
Chapman, L. J. & Chapman, J. P. (1965) Interpretation of words in
schizophrenia. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1:135-46. [tarSS]
(1973) Disordered thought in schizophrenia. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall. [LC, SRK, RAK, tarSS]
(1978) The measurement of differential deficit. Journal of Psychiatric
Research 14:303-11. [SRK]
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P. & Daut, R. L. (1976) Schizophrenic inability
to disattend from strong aspects of meaning. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 85:35-40. [JL]
Chapman, L. ] . , Chapman, J. P. & Miller, C. A. (1964) A theory of verbal
behavior in schizophrenia. In: Progress in experimental personality
research, vol. 1, ed. B. A. Maher. New York: Academic Press. [JL,
taSS]
Chomsky, N. (1964) Degrees of grammaticalness. In: The structure of
language, ed. J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall. [JL]
(1965) Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [JL]
(1972) Language and the mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich. [taSS]
(1975) Reflections on language. New York: Pantheon. [rSS]
(1980) Rules and representations. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. [rSS]
Clark, H. & Clark, E. V. (1977) Psychology and language: An introduction to
psycholinguistics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [HWB]
Clark, H. & Haviland, S. (1977) Comprehension and the given-new contract.
In: Discourse production and comprehension, ed. R. O. Freedle.
Norwood, N.J : Ablex Publishing. [HWB]
Cohen, B. D. (1978) Referent communication disturbances in schizophrenia.
In: Language and cognition in schizophrenia, ed. S. Schwartz. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [EC, taSS]
Cohen, B. D. & Camhi, J. (1967) Schizophrenic performance in a word-
communication task. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 72:240-46. |BDC,
JL, taSS]
Cohen, B. D., Naehmani, G. & Rosenberg, S. (1974) Referent communication
disturbances in acute schizophrenia. Journal ofAbnonnal Psychology
83:1-13. [BDC, KHN, taSS]
Cohen, R. A. (1975) Manic-depressive illness. In: Comprehensive textbook of
psychiatry II, ed. A. M. Freedman, J. I. Kaplan & B. J. Sadock.
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins. [taSS]
Colbourn, W. A. & Lishman, W. A. (1979) Lateralization of function and
psychotic illness: A left hemisphere deficit? In: Hemisphere asymmetries
of function in psychopathology, ed. J. Gruzelier & P. Flor-Henry.
Amsterdam. Elsevier/North Holland. [RGK]
Colby, K. M. (1981) Modeling a paranoid mind. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 4.515-60. [rSS]
Colby, K. M. & McGuire, M T. (1981) Signs and symptoms: Zeroing in on a
better classification of the neuroses. The Sciences 21:21-23. (KMC]
Colby, K. M. & Spar, J. E. (in press) The fundamental crisis in psychiatry:
Unreliability of diagnosis. Indianapolis: Charles C. Thomas. [KMC]
Connolly, J. F., Gruzelier, J. H., Kleinman, K. M. & Hirsch, S. R. (1979)
Lateralised abnormalities in hemisphere-specific tachistoscopic tasks in
psychiatric patients and controls. In: Hemisphere asymmetries of function
in psychopathology, ed. J. GruzeLer & P. Flor-Henry. Amsterdam:
Elsevier/North Holland. [RGK]
Cornblatt, B. & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (in press) Early attentional
predictors of adolescent behavioral disturbances in children at risk for
schizophrenia. In: Children at risk for schizophrenia, ed. J. Anthony, L.
Wynne, N. Watt & J. Rolff. New York: Cambridge University
Press. [RFA]
Critchley, M. (1964) The neurology of psychotic speech. British Journal of
Psychiatry 110:353-64. [FB]
(1970) Thinking and speaking: Verbal symbols in thought. In: Aphasiology,
pp. 159-74. London: Arnold. [FB]
Darby, J. (1976) Neuropathologic aspects of psychosis in children. Journal of
Autistn and Childhood Schizophrenia 6.339-51. [JKD]
Davidson, G. S. & Neale, J. M. (1974) The effect of signal-noise similarity on
visual information processing of schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 83:683-86. [taSS]
Deckner, C. W. & Blanton, R. L. (1969) Effect of context and strength of
association on schizophrenic verbal behaviour. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 74:348-51. [taSS]
de Silva, W. P. & Hemsley, D. R. (1977) The influence of context on
language perception in schizophrenia. British Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology: 16:337-45. [DRH, taSS]
Dewolfe, A. S. & Fedirka, P. J. (1978) Interference in word associations in
schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical Psychology 34:302-5. [LC]
Dingemans, P., Space, L. G. & Cromwell, R. L. (1982) Repertory grid,
consistency, and schizophrenia. [RLC]
DiSimoni, F. G., Darley, F. & Aronson, A. (1977) Patterns of dysfunction in
schizophrenic patients on an aphasia test battery. Journal of Speech and
Hearing Disorders 42:498-513. [FB]
Dokecki, P. B., Polidoro, L. G. & Cromwell, R. L. (1965) Commonality and
stability of word association responses on good and poor premorbid
schizophrenics. Journal ofAbnonnal Psychology 70:312-16. [JKD]
Eaton, E. M. (1979) Hemisphere-related visual information processing in
acute schizophrenia before and after neuroleptic treatment. In:
Hemisphere asymmetries of function in psychopathology, ed. J. Gruzelier
& P. Flor-Henry. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North Holland. [RGK]
Eisenson, J. (1958) A perseveration theory of stuttering. In: Stuttering: A
symposium, ed. J. Eisenson. New York: Harper. [BDC]
Emmerich, D. S. & Levine, F. M. (1970) Differences in auditory sensitivity
of chronic schizophrenic patients and normal controls determined by use
of a forced-choice procedure. Journal of Diseases of the Nervous System
31:552-57. [KHN]
Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. & Cornblatt, B. (1978) Attentional measures in a
study of children at high risk for schizophrenia. In: The nature of
schizophrenia: New approaches to research and treatment, ed. L.
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5 621
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
Wynne, R. Cromwell & S. Matthysse. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. [RFA]
Faber R. & Reichstein M. B. (1981) Language dysfunction in schizophrenia.
British Journal of Psychiatry 139.519-22 [FO]
Federn, P. (1952) Ego psychology and the psychoses. New York. Basic
Books [CN]
Feighner, J. P., Robins, E., Cuze, S. B., Woodruff, R. A., Winokur, G &
Munoz, R. (1972) Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research.
Archives of General Psychiatry 26:52-63. [taSS]
Fenton, W. S., Mosher, L. R. & Matthews, S. M. (1981) Diagnosis of
schizophrenia. A critical review of current diagnostic systems
Schizophrenia Bulletin 7.452-76. [taSS]
Flekk0y, J. (1975) Associative changes in hospitalized schizophrenics during a
16 year period. Neuropsychobiology 147-58. [RFA]
Flekk0y, K., Astrup, C. & Hartmann, T. (1969) Word associations in
schizophrenics: A ten year follow-up. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica
45:209-16. [RFA]
Flor-Henry, P. (1969) Psychosis and temporal lobe epilepsy: A controlled
investigation. Epilepsia 10:363-95. [RGK]
Flournoy, T. (1900) Les lndes d la planete Mars. Paris- Alcan. [ARL]
Forrest, D. V. (1976) Nonsense and sense in schizophrenic language.
Schizophrenia Bulletin 2.286-301. [taSS]
Fowler, R (1969) On the interpretation of "nonsense strings." Journal of
Linguistics 5:75-83. [JL]
Frame, C. L. & Oltmanns, T. F. (1982) Distraction and verbal information
processing deficit in noninstitutionalized schizophrenics. In prep. [TFO]
Frankel, A. S & Buchwald, A. M. (1969) Verbal conditioning of common
associations in long-term schizophrenics: A failure. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 74:372-74. [taSS]
Friedrich, D., Emery, K., & Fuller, G (1974) Performance of paranoid
schizophrenics on a dichotic listening task. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 42:583-87. [taSS]
Fromkin, V. A. (1975) A linguist looks at "A linguist looks at 'schizophrenic
language." Brain and Language 2:498-503. [FB, EC, AK, ARL, taSS]
Fuller, G. D. & Kates, S. L. (1969) Word association repertoires of
schizophrenics and normals. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 33:497-500. [LC, taSS]
Furth, H. G. (1961) The influence of language on the development of concept
formation in deaf children. In: Language and thinking, ed. P. Adams.
Baltimore: Penguin. [taSS]
Gattaz, W. F., Beckmann, H. & Mendlewicz, J. (1981) HLA antigens and
schizophrenia: A pool of two studies. Psychiatric Research
5:123-28. [JKD]
Gerson, S. N., Benson, D. F. & Frazier, S. H. (1977) Diagnosis:
Schizophrenia versus posterior aphasia. American Journal of Psychiatry
134:966-69. [taSS]
Gerver, D. (1967) Linguistic rules and the perception and recall of speech by
schizophrenic patients. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology
6:204-11. [taSS]
Gleason, H. A., Jr. (1968) Contrastive analysis and discourse structure.
Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics 17, pp. 75—95.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Rpt. (1973) Readings in
stratificational linguistics, ed. A. Makkai & D. Lockwood, pp. 258-76.
University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press. [JRM]
Gold, G. (1974) The White House transcripts. New York: Bantam
Books. [taSS]
Golden, C. J., Graber, B., Coffman, J., Berg, R. A., Newlin, D. B. & Bloch,
S. (1981) Structural brain deficits in schizophrenia. Archives of General
Psychiatry 38:1014-17. [JKD]
Goldman-Eisler, F. (1958) Speech production and the probability of words in
context. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
10:96-106. [BDC]
Goldstein, K. (1944) Methodological approach to the study of schizophrenia
and thought disorder. In: Language and thought in schizophrenia, ed. J.
S. Kasanin. New York: Norton. [SRK, taSS]
Gottschalk, L. A. & Gleser, G. C. (1964) Distinguishing characteristics of the
verbal communications of schizophrenic patients. In. Disorders of
communication, ed. D. McRioch & E. A. Weinsten. Baltimore: Williams
and Wilkins. [taSS]
(1969) The measurement of psychological states through the content analysis
of verbal behavior. Berkeley: University of California Press. [taSS]
Gregory, M. J. & Carroll S. (1978) Language and situation: Language
varieties and their social contexts. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul. [JRM]
Grice, H. P. (1975) Logic and conversation. In: Syntax and semantics. Vol. 3:
Speech acts, ed. P. Cole & J. L. Morgan. New York: Seminar
Press. [HWB]
Grove, W. M., Andreasen, N. C , McDonald-Scott, P., Keller, M. B. &
Shapiro, R. W. (1981) Reliability studies of psychiatric diagnosis: Theory
and practice. Archives of General Psychiatry 38.408-12. [JCM]
Gruzelier, J. (1979) Synthesis and critical review of the evidence for
hemisphere asymmetries of function in psychopathology. In: Hemisphere
asymmetries of function in psychopathology, ed. J. Gruzelier & P. Flor-
Henry. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North Holland. [RGK]
Gruzelier, J. & Venables, P. (1974) Bimodal and lateral asymmetry of skin
conductance orienting activity in schizophrenics: Replication and
evidence of lateral asymmetry in patients with depression and disorders
of personality. Biological Psychiatry 8:55-73. [RGK]
(1975) Evidence of high and low levels of physiological arousal in
schizophrenics. Psychophysiology 12.66-73. [DRH]
Gur, R. E. (1978) Left hemisphere dysfunction and left hemisphere over-
activation in schizophrenia. Journal of Abnorvial Psychology
87:226-38. [RGK]
Halliday, M. A. K. (1973) Explorations in the functions of language.
Explorations in Language Study. London: Edward Arnold. [JRM]
(1978) Language as a social semiotic: The social interpretation of language
and meaning. London: Edward Arnold. [JRM]
Halliday, M. A. K. & Hasan, R. (1976) Cohesion in English. English
Language Series 9. London. Longman. [JRM]
Hankamer, J. & Sag, I. A. (1976) Deep and surface anaphora. Linguistic
Inquiry 7:391-428. [HWB]
Hartmann, E. (1975) Dreams and other hallucinations: An approach to the
underlying mechanism. In. Hallucinations: Behavior, experience and
theory, ed. R. K. Siegel & L. J. West. New York. John Wiley &
Sons. [DRH]
Harvey, P., Winters, K., Weintraub, S. & Neale, J. M. (1981) Distractibility
in children vulnerable to psychopathology. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 90:298-304. [KHN]
Haviland, S. & Clark, H. (1974) What's new? Acquiring new information as a
process in comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior 13:512-21. [HWB]
H£caen, H. & Dubois, J. La naissance de la neurupschologie du langage.
Pans. Flammarion. [ARL]
Hellige, J. B. (1975). Hemispheric processing differences revealed by
differential conditioning and reaction time performance. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 104:309-326. [RGK]
Helzer, J. E., Robins, L. N., Taibleson, M., Woodruff, R. A., Reich, T. &
Wish, E. D. (1977) Reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. Archives of
General Psychiatry 34:129-41. [JCM]
Hemsley, D. R. (1975) A two-stage model of attention in schizophrenic
research. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology
14.81-89. [LC, taSS]
Hemsley, D. R. & Richardson, P. H. (1980) Shadowing by context in
schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
168:141-45. [LC, RAK, RGK, TFO, taSS]
Herbert, R. & Waltensperger, K. (1981) Schizophrasia A case study of a
paranoid schizophrenic's language. Applied Psycholinguistics
1:81-93. [EC]
Herman, P. G. & Hessel, S. J. (1975) Accuracy and its relationship to
experience in the interpretation of chest radiographs. Investigative
Radiology 10-62-67. [taSS]
Hirsch, S. R. & Leff, J. P. (1975) Abnormalities in parents of schizophrenics.
London: Oxford University Press. [taSS]
Hoffman, R. E., Kirstein, L., Stopek, S. & Cicchetti, D. V. (1982)
Apprehending schizophrenic discourse: A structural analysis of the
listener's task. Brain and Language 15:207-33. [HWB]
Hollingshead, A. B. & Redlich, F. C. (1958) Social class as a mental illness: A
community study. New York: John Wiley & Sons. [taSS]
Holzman, P. (1978) Cognitive impairment and cognitive stability: Towards a
theory of thought disorder. In: Cognitive defects in the development of
mental illness, ed. G. Serban. New York: Brunner/Mazel. [EC]
Hormann, H. (1971) Psycholinguistics. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. (taSS]
Horton, D. L., Marlowe, D. & Crowne, D. P. (1963) The effect of
instructional set and need for social approval on community of word-
association responses. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
66:67-72. [taSS)
Hymes, D. (1971) Competence and performance in linguistic theory. In:
Language acquisition. Models and methods, ed. R. Huxley & E. Ingram,
pp. 3-28. New York: Academic Press. [JRM]
Jansson, B. (1968) The prognostic significance of various types of hallucinations
in young people. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 44:401-9. [RAK]
Jenkins, J. J. (1974) Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it.
American Psychologist 29:785-95. [JCM]
Jenkins, J. J. & Russell, W. A. (1952) Associative clustering during recall.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47:818-21. [taSS]
Jeste, D. V., Kleinman, J. E., Potkin, S. G., et al. (1982) Ex uno multi:
622 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
Subtyping the schizophrenic syndrome. Biological Psychiatry
17:199-222. [FO]
Johnson, R. C , Weiss, R. L. & Zelhart, P. F. (1964) Similarities and
differences between normal and psychotic subjects in response to verbal
stimuli. Journal of Abnormal anil Social Psychology 58.221-26. [taSS]
Kasanin, J. S. (1944) Language and thought in schizophrenia. New York-
Norton. [taSS]
Katz, J. J. (196-1) Semi-sentences. In: The structure of language, ed. J. A.
Fodor & J. J. Katz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. [JL]
Kay, S. R. (1982) Conceptual disorder in schizophrenia as a function of
encoding orientation. Journal of Ncrvotts and Mental Disease
170:154-63. [SRK]
Kay, S. R. & Singh, M. M. (1975) A developmental approach to delineate
components of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia. British Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology 14:387-99. [SRK]
(1979) Cognitive abnormality in schizophrenia: A dual-process model
Biological Psychiatry 14-155-76. [SRK]
Kay, S. R., Singh, M. M. & Smith, J. M. (1975) Colour form representation
test. A developmental method for the study of cognition in schizophrenia.
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 14:401-11. [SRK]
Keeney, T., Cannizzo, S. & Flavell, J. (1967) Spontaneous and induced verbal
rehearsal in a recall task. Child Development 38:953-66. [RFA]
Kelly, G. A. (1955) The psychology of personal constructs. 2 vols. New York:
Norton. [DB, RLC]
Kelter, S., Cohen, R., Engel, D., List, C. & Strohner, H (1977) Verbal
coding and visual memory in aphasia. Neuropsychologia 15:51-60. [FB]
Kempson, R. (1975) Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics.
Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 15. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. [JRM]
Kent, C. H. & Rosanoff, A. J. (1910) A study of association in insanity.
American Journal of Insanity 67:37-96. (taSS]
Kertesz, A. (1981) The anatomy of jargon. In: Jargon aphasia, ed. J. Brown,
pp. 63-112. New York: Academic Press. [AK]
Kiinura, D. (1973). The asymmetry of the human brain. Scientific American,
228:70-78. [RGK]
Klatzky, R. L. (1975) Human memory: Structures and processes. San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co. [SRK]
Knight, R. A., Roff, J., Barmett, J. & Moss, J. (1979) The concurrent and
predictive validity of thought disorder and affectivity: A 22 year follow-up
of acute schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
88:1-12. [RAKJ
Knight, R. A., Sherer, M & Shapiro, J. (1977) Iconic imagery in overinclusive
and nonovcrinclusive schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
86:242-55. [RAK]
Knight, R. A. & Sims-Knight, J. E. (1979) Integration of linguistic ideas in
schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 88:191-202. [NCA,
EC, RAK, tarSS]
(1980) Integration of visual patterns in schizophrenics. Journal ofAbnornial
Psychology 89:623-34. [RAK]
Knight, R. G. & Russell, P N. (1978) Global capacity reduction and
schizophrenia. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology
17:275-80. [TFO]
Kogan, N. & Wallach, M A. (1964) Risk-taking- A study in cognition and
personality. Now York: Holt, Rinchart & Winston. [DRR]
Koh, S. D. (1978) Remembering of verbal materials by schizophrenic young
adults. In: Language and cognition in schizophrenia, ed. S. Schwartz.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [RFA, JKD, taSS]
Koh, S. D. or Kayton, L. (1974) Memorization of "unrelated" word strings by
young nonpsychotic schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
83:14-22. [SRK]
Koh, S. D., Kayton, L. & Berry R. (1973) Mnemonic organization in young
nonpsychotic schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
81:229-310. [RAK, taSS]
Koh, S. D., Kayton, L. & Schwarz, C. (1974) The structure of word storage
in the permanent memory of nonpsychotic schizophrenics. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 42:879-87. [RAK, taSS]
Kraepelin, E. (1896) Psychiatric, ein Lehrbuch fur Studierende und Arzte. 5th
ed. Leipzig: Barth. [ARL]
(1913) Psychiatric. Achte Auflage, vol. 3, pt. 2. Leipzig: Barth. [KZ]
Kreitman, N., Sainsbury, P., Morrissey, J., Towers, J. & Serivner, J. (1961)
Tlie reliability of psychiatric assessment: An analysis. Journal of Mental
Science 107:887-908. [taSS]
Labov, W. (1972a) Language in the inner city. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press. [JRM]
(1972b) Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press. [JRM]
Labov, W. & Fanshel, D. (1977) Therapeutic discourse: Psychotherapy as
conversation. New York: Academic Press. [EC]
Laffal, J (1965) Pathological and nortnal language. New York:
Atherton. [taSS]
(1979) A source document in schizophrenia. Hope Valley, R.I.: Gallery
Press. [JL, taSS]
Lang, P. J. & Boss, A. H. (1965) Psychological deficit in schizophrenia: II.
Interference and activation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
70:77-106. [SRK]
Larsen, S. F & Fromholt, P (1976) Mnemonic organization and free recall in
schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 86.61-65. [SRK, taSS]
Lashley, J. S. (1951) The problem of serial order in behaviour. In: Cerebral
mechanisms in behaviour, ed. L. A. Jeffress. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. [taSS]
Lebrun, Y. & Hoops, R (1974) Intelligence and aphasia. Amsterdam: Swets
& Zeitlinger. [FB]
Lecours, A. R. (1982) Simulation of speech production without a computer.
In. Neural models of language processes, ed. M. Arbib, J. Marshall & D.
Caplan, pp. 345-70. New York: Academic Press. [ARL]
Lecours, A. R., Navet, M. & Ross-Chouinard, A. (1981) Langage et pensee
du sehizophase Confrontations psychiatriques 19:109-44. [ARL]
Lecours, A. R. & Vanier-Clement, M (1976) Schizophasia and jargonaphasia:
A comparative description with comments on Chaika's and Fromkin's
respective looks at "schizophrenic" language. Brain and Language
3-516-65. [AK, ARL, taSS]
Lenneberg, E. H. (1967) Biological foundations of language. New York: John
Wiley & Sons. [taSS]
Levin, S. R. (1971) The analysis of compression m poetry. Foundations of
Language 7:38-55. [JL]
Levme, F. M. & Whitney, N. (1970) Absolute auditory threshold and
threshold of unpleasantness of chronic schizophrenic patients and
normals Journal of Abnormal Psychology 75:74-77. [KHN]
Levitz, L. S. & Ullmann, L. P (1969) Manipulation of indications of
disturbed thinking in normal subjects. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 33:633-41. [taSS]
LeVi-Valensi, J., Migault, P. & Lacan, J. (1931) Ecrits inspires: schizographie.
Annales me'dico-psychologiqucs 89:1—26. [ARL]
Levy-Bruhl, L. (1927) L'&me primitive. 2d ed. Paris: Alcan. [KZ]
Lewis, N. C. (1944) Preface to "language and thought in schizophrenia." In:
Language and thought in schizophrenia, ed. J. S Kasanin. New York:
Norton. [taSS]
Lisman, S A. & Cohen, B. D. (1972) Self-editing deficits in schizophrenia: A
word-association analogue. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
79 181-88. [LC, tarSS]
Lorenz, M. (1957) Expressive form in schizophrenic language. Archives of
Neurology and Psychiatry 78:643-55. [JL]
(1961) Problems posed by schizophrenic language. Archives of General
Psychiatry 4:603-10. [JL]
Luchms, D. J., Monhisa, J. M., Weinberger, D. R & Wyatt, R. J. (1981)
Cerebral asymmetry and cerebellar atrophy in schizophrenia: A
controlled postmortem study. American Journal of Psychiatry
138:1501-3. [JKD]
Luria, A. R. (1961) The role of speech in the regulation of normal and
abnormal behavior. New York Liveright Publishing Corp. [RFA]
McGhie, A. & Chapman, J (1961) Disorders of attention and perception in
early schizophrenia. British journal of Medical Psychology
34:103-16. [KHN]
Mclntosh, R. P. (1967) An index of diversity and the relation of certain
concepts to diversity. Ecology 48.392-404. [FO]
MacMahon, B., Morrison, A. S. & Ackerman, L. V. (1973) Histological
characteristics of breast cancer in Boston and Tokyo. International
Journal of Cancer 11:338. [taSS]
Magaro, P. A. (1980) Cognition in schizophrenia and paranoia: The
integration of cognitive processes. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. [JCM]
(1981) The paranoid and the schizophrenic: The case for distinct cognitive
style Schizophrenia Bulletin 7:632-61. [RAK]
Magaro, P. A., Abrams, L. & Cantrell, P. (1981) The Maine scale of paranoid
and nonparanoid schizophrenia: Reliability and validity Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 49.438-47. [LC, rSS]
Maher, B. (1966) Principles of psychopathology: An experimental approach.
New York. McGraw-Hill. [TFO, taSS]
(1972) The language of schizophrenia: A review and interpretation. British
Journal of Psychiatry 120:3-17. [BDC, JL, KHN, TFO, taSS]
Maher, B. A., Manschreck, T. C. & Rucklos, M. E. (1980) Contextual
constraint and the recall of verbal material in schizophrenia: The effect of
thought disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry 137:69-73. [TFO]
Mandler, G. & Watson, D. L. (1966) Anxiety and the interruption of
behavior. In: Anxiety and behavior, ed. C. D. Spielberger. New York:
Academic Press. [RFA]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5 623
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Re/erences/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
Manschreck, T. C , Maher, B. A., Rucklos, M. E. & White, M. T. (1979)
The predictability of thought disordered speech in schizophrenic patients
British Journal of Psychiatry 134:595-601. [taSS]
Maratsos, M. P. (1976) The use of definite and indefinite reference in young
children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [taSS]
Margo, A., Hemsley, D. R. & Slade, P. D. (1981) The effects of varying
auditory input on schizophrenic hallucinations. British Journal of
Psychiatry 139:122-27. [DRH]
Marie, P. (1906) La troisieme circonvolution frontale gauche ne joue aucun
rdle special dans la function du langage. Semaine MSdicale, May 23, rpt.
P. Marie (1926) Travaux et memoires, 1:3-30, Paris: Masson. For
translation, see M. F. Cole & M. Cole (1971) Pierre Marie's papers on
speech disorders. New York: Hanier. [FB]
Marvinney, D. A., Rosenberg, E. & Knight, R. A. (1982) The identification of
schizophrenics: Differential selection by five research diagnostic systems.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of EPA, Baltimore. [RAK]
Mednick, S. A. (1958) A learning theory approach to research in
schizophrenia. Psychological Bulletin 55:316-27. [JL, taSS]
Mefferd, R. B., Jr. (1978) Schizophrenic "thought disturbance" reconsidered.
In Phenomenology and treatment of schizophrenia, ed. W. E. Fann, I.
Karacan, A. D. Pokorny & R. Williams. New York: Spectrum. [taSS]
Meichenbaum, D. (1973) Cognitive factors in behavior modification:
Modifying what clients say to themselves. In. Annual review of behavior
therapy. Theory and practice. New York: Brunner/Mazel. [taSS]
Meichenbaum, D. & Cameron, R. (1973) Training schizophrenics to talk to
themselves: A means of developing attentional controls. Behavior
Therapy 4.515-34. [RFA]
Meiselman, K. C. (1978) Inducing "schizophrenic" associations in normal
subjects. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 87:291-93. [taSS]
Meltzer, H. Y. (1979) Biology of schizophrenia subtypes: A review and
proposal for method of study. Schizophrenia Bulletin 5 460-79. [FO]
Moran, L. J., Mefferd, R. B., Jr. & Kimble, J P., Jr. (1964) Idiodynamic sets
in word association. Psychological Monographs 78, 2, whole no
579. [LC, SRK, taSS]
Morgan, J. L. & Green, G. M. (1980) Pragmatics and reading comprehension.
In: Theoretical issues in reading comprehension, ed. R. J. Spiro, B. C
Bruce & W. F. Brewer. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. [rSS]
Mosher, L. R. (1978) Can diagnosis be nonpejorative? In: The nature of
schizophrenia: New approaches to research and treatment, ed. L. C.
Wynne, R. L. Cromwell & S. Matthysse. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. [taSS]
Nachmani, G. & Cohen, B. D. (1969) Recall and recognition free learning in
schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 74.511-16. [SRK, taSS]
Naficy, A. & Willerman, L. (1980) Excessive yielding to normal response
biases is not a distinctive sign of schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 89:697-703. [tarSS]
Namyslowska, I. (1975) Thought disorders in schizophrenia before and after
pharmacological treatment. Comprehensive Psychiatry 16-37-42. [taSS]
Navet, M., Lavallfie-Huynh, G. & Lecours, A. R. (1982) La schizographie ou
I'ecriture indocile. Etude frangaise 18:61-91. [ARL]
Neale, J. M. & Cromwell, R. L. (1972) Attention and schizophrenia In.
Annual review of the schizophrenic syndrome, vol. 2, ed. R. Cancro.
New York: Brunner/Mazel. [SRK]
Neale, J. M. & Oltmanns, T. F. (1980) Schizophrenia. New York. John Wiley
& Sons. [RFA, KHN, TFO, taSS]
Nebes, R. D. (1975) The nature of internal speech in a patient with aphemia.
Brain and Language 2:489-97. [FB]
Neuringer, C , Fiske, P. J. & Goldstein, G. (1969) Schizophrenic adherence
to strong meaning associations. Perceptual and Motor Skills
29:394. [taSS]
Neuringer, C , Fiske, P. J., Schmidt, M. W. & Goldstein, G. (1972)
Adherence to strong verbal meaning definitions in schizophrenics.
Journal of Genetic Psychology 121:315-23. [taSS]
Neuringer, C , Kaplan, H. A. & Goldstein, G. (1974) Schizophrenic avoidance
of strong meaning associations to emotional words. Journal ofCenetic
Psychology 124:123-29. [taSS]
Nuechterlein, K. H. (1982a) Signal detection in vigilance tasks and behavioral
attributes among offspring of schizophrenic mothers and among
hyperactive children. Journal of Abnormal Psychology [KHN]
(1982b) Sustained attention among children vulnerable to adult
schizophrenia and among hyperactive children. In: Children at risk for
schizophrenia: A longitudinal perspective, ed. N. Watt, E. J. Anthony,
L. C. Wynne & J. Rolf. New York: Cambridge University Press. [RFA,
KHN]
O'Brian, J. P. & Weingartner, H. (1970) Associative structure in chronic
schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 22:136-42. [RFA]
Olson, D. R. (1970) Language and thought: Aspects of a cognitive theory of
semantics. Psychological Review 77:257-81. [JGM]
Oltmanns, T. F. (1978) Selective attention in schizophrenic and manic
psychoses: The effect of distraction on information processing. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 87:212-25. [LC, KHN, TFO]
(in press) The effect of distraction on sensitivity to syntactic structure in
schizophrenic and affective disorders. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology. [TFO]
Oltmanns, T. F. & Neale, J. M. (1975) Schizophrenic performance when
distractors are present: Attentional deficit or differential task difficulty?
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 84:205-9. [LC, RGK, KHN]
(1978) Distractibility in relation to other aspects of schizophrenic disorder.
In: Language and cognition in schizophrenia, ed. S. Schwartz. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [TFO]
Ombredane, A. (1951) L'Aphasie et I'elaboration de la pensfe explicitc. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France. [FB]
Ostwald, P & Zawarin, V (1980) Language and schizophrenia in the USSR.
In: Applied psycholinguistics and mental health, ed. R. W. Richer. New
York- Plenum Press. [taSS]
Ostwald, P. F. (1978) Language and communication problems with
schizophrenic patients — a review, commentary and synthesis. In:
Phenomenology and treatment of schizophrenia, ed. W. E. Fann, I.
Karacan, A. D. Pokorny & R. L. Williams. New York: Spectrum. [taSS]
(1981) Speech and schizophrenia. In: Speech evaluation in psychiatry, ed. J.
Darby. New York: Grune & Stratton. [taSS]
Overall, J. E. & Hollister, L. E. (1979) Comparative evaluation of research
diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry
36:1198-1205. [RAK, taSS]
Overall, J. E. & Woodward, J. A. (1975) Conceptual validity of a
phenomenological classification of psychiatric patients. Journal of
Psychiatric Research 12:215-30. [taSS]
Palermo, D S. & Jenkins, J. J. (1965) Sex differences in word associations.
Journal of General Psychiatry 72:77-84. [taSS]
Pavy, D. (1968) Verbal behaviour in schizophrenia: A review of recent
studies. Psychological Bulletin 70:164-78. [taSS]
Payne, R. W. (1966) The measurement and significance of overinclusive
thinking and retardation in schizophrenic patients. In: Psychopathology of
schizophrenia, ed. P. H. Hoch & J. Zubin. New York: Grune &
Stratton. [SRK, taSS]
Payne, R. W. & Friedlander, D. (1962) A short battery of simple tests for
measuring overinclusive thinking. Journal of Mental Science
108:362-67. [taSS]
Payne, R. W. & Hirst, H. L. (1957) Overinclusive thinking in a depressive
and a control group. Journal of Consulting Psychology 21:186-88. [taSS]
Payne, R. W., Hochberg, A. C. & Hawks, D. V. (1970) Dichotic stimulation
as a method of assessing disorder of attention in overinclusive
schizophrenic patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
76:185-93. [taSS]
Penk, W. E. (1978) Effects of ambiguous and unambiguous stimulus word
differences on popular responses of schizophrenics. Journal of Clinical
Psychology 34:838-43. [LC, rSS]
Pogue-Geile, M. F. & Oltmanns, T. F. (1980) Sentence perception and
distractibility in schizophrenic, manic, and depressed patients. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 89:115-24. [LC, RGK, TFO, taSS]
Posner, M. I. (1978) Chronomctric explorations of mind. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [KHN, tarSS]
Posner, M. I. & Hanson, V. I. (1980) Analyzing spoken and written language.
In: Perception and production of fluent speech, cd. R. Cole. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [JCM]
Rappaport, M., Hopkins, H. K. & Hall, K. (1972) Auditory signal detection in
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics. Archives of General Psychiatry
27:747-52. [KHN]
Rattan, R. B. & Chapman, L. J. (1973) Associative intrusions in schizophrenic
verbal behaviour. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 82:169-73. [tarSS]
Reed, J. L. (1970) Schizophrenic thought disorder: A review and hypothesis.
Comprehensive Psychiatry 11:403-32. [taSS]
Ries, H. A. & Johnson, M. H. (1967) Commonality of word associations in
good and poor premorbid schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 72:487-88. [taSS]
Rochester, S. R. (1978) Are language disorders in acute schizophrenia actually
information processing problems? In: The nature of schizophrenia: New
approaches to research and treatment, ed. L. C. Wynne, R. C.
Cromwell & S. Matthysse. New York: John Wiley & Sons. [DB, KHN,
TFO, taSS]
Rochester, S. R., Harris, J. & Seeman, M. V. (1973) Sentence processing in
schizophrenic listeners. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
82:350-56. (NCA, taSS]
624 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
Rochester, S. R. & Martin, J. R. (1977) The art of referring: The speaker's use
of noun phrases to instruct the listener. In: Discourse production and
comprchesion, ed. R. O. Freedle. Norwood, N.J.. Ablex
Publishing. [HWB]
(1979) Crazy talk: A study of the discourse of schizophrenic speakers. New
York: Plenum Press. [NCA, JRM, TFO, DRR, tarSS]
Rochester, S. R., Martin, J. R. & Thurston, S. (1977) Thought-process
disorder in schizophrenia: The listener's task. Brain and Language
4:95-114. [HWB, KHN, DRR]
Rommetvcit, R. (1974) On message structure. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. [JCM]
Rosenberg, S. & Abbeduto, L. (1982) Adult schizophrenic language. In:
Handbook of applied psycholinguistics, ed. S. Rosenberg. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [rSS]
Rosenthal, D. & Kety, S. (1968) The transmission of schizophrenia. Elmsford,
N.Y.: Pergamon Press. [rSS]
Rosenzweig, M. R. (1964) Word associations of French workmen:
Comparisons with associations of French students and American workmen
and students. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior
3:57-69. [taSS]
Riimke, H. C. & Nijam, S. J. (1958) Aphasia and delusion. Folia Psychiatrica,
Ncurologica ct Ncurochirurgica Ncerlandica 61:623-29. [FB]
Russell, P. N. & Beekhuis, M. E. (1976) Organization in memory, a
comparison of psychotics and normals. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
85:527-34. [taSS]
Russell, W. A. & Meseck, O. R. (1959) Der Einfluss der Assoziation auf das
Erinnern von Worten in der deutsehen, franzosisehen und englischen
Sprache. Zeitschrift fur Expcrimcntcllc und Angewandte Psychologic
6:191-211. [taSS]
Rutschmann, J., Cornblatt, B. & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (1977) Sustained
attention in children at risk for schizophrenia: Report on a continuous
performance test. Archives of General Psijchiatry 34:571-75.
[KHN]
Rutter, D. R. (1979) The reconstruction of schizophrenic speech. British
Journal of Psychiatry 134:356-59. [taSS]
(1981) The reconstruction of schizophrenic speech. Bulletin of the British
Psychological Society 34:25. [DRR]
(1982) Language in schizophrenia: The structure of conversations. Bulletin
of the British Psychological Society 35:30. [DRR]
Rutter, D. R., Draffan, J. & Davies, J. (1977) Thought disorder and the
predictability of schizophrenic speech. British Journal of Psychiatry
131.67-68. [taSS]
Rutter, D. R., Wishner, J & Callaghan, B. A. (1975) The prediction and
predictability of speech in schizophrenic patients. British Journal of
Psychiatry 126:571-76. [taSS]
Rutter, D. R., Wishner, J., Kopytynska, L. & Button, M. (1978) The
predictability of speech in schizophrenic patients. British Journal of
Psychiatry 132:228-32. [taSS]
Saccuzzo, D. P. & Braff, D. L. (1981) Early information processing deficit in
schizophrenia: New findings using schizophrenic subgroups and manic
control subjects. Archives of Ceneral Psychiatry 38:175-79. [KHN]
Salzinger, K. (1973) Schizophrenia: Behavioral aspects. New York: John Wiley
& Sons. [SRK]
Salzinger, K. & Pisoni, S. (1958) Reinforcement of affect responses of
schizophrenics during the clinical interview. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 57:84-90. [taSS)
(1961) Some parameters of the conditioning of verbal affect responses in
schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
63:511-16. [taSS]
Salzinger, K., Portnoy, S. & Feldman, R. S. (1964) Verbal behavior of
schizophrenic and normal subjects. Annals of the Neiv York Academy of
Sciences 105:845-60. [taSS]
(1966) Verbal behavior in schizophrenics and some comments toward a
theory of schizophrenia. In. Psyehopathology of schizophrenia, ed. P. H.
Hoch & J. Zubin. New York: Grime & Stratton. [taSS]
(1978) Communicahility deficit in schizophrenics resulting from a more
general deficit. In: Language and cognition in schizophrenia, ed. S.
Schwartz. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [EC, DRR,
taSS]
(1979) The predictability of speech in schizophrenic patients (letter to the
editor). British Journal of Psychiatry 135.286-87. [taSS]
Salzinger, K., Portnoy, S., Pisoni, D. B. & Feldman, R. S. (1970) The
immediacy hypothesis and response-produced stimuli in schizophrenic
speech. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 76:258-64. [taSS]
Sandifer, M. C , Petlos, C. & Quade, D. (1964) A study of psychiatric
diagnosis. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 139:350-56. [taSS]
Sarbin, T. R. (1977) Conte.xtualism: A world view for psychology. In:
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Personal construct psychology, ed.
A W. Landfield, pp. 1-41. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press. [JCM]
Sarbin, T. R. & Mancuso, J. C. (1980) Schizophrenia: Medical diagnosis or
moral verdict? Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press. [JCM]
Saussure, F. de (1915) Cours de linguistique g6nirale. Paris: Payot. [FB,
taSS]
(1959) Course in general linguistics (1915). New York: Philosophical
Library. [JL]
Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, C. & Sacks, H. (1977) The preference for self-
correction in the organization of repair in conversation. Language
53.361-82. [EC]
Schlesinger, I. M., Forte, M., Fried, B. & Melkman, R. (1965) Stuttering,
information load and response strength. Journal of Speech and Hearing
Disorders 30.32-36. [BDC]
Schwartz, S. (1974) Arousal and recall: Effects of noise on two retrieval
strategies. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102:896-98. [rSS]
(1978a) Do schizophrenics give rare word associations? Schizophrenia
Bulletin 4:248-50. [SRK, tarSS]
(1978b) Language and cognition in schizophrenia. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates. [JKD, RAK, tarSS]
(1978c) Schizophrenic language and cognition: A review and synthesis. In:
Language and cognition in schizophrenia, ed. S. Schwartz. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [JKD]
(1981) Verbal ability, attention and automaticity. In: Intelligence and
learning, ed. M. Friedman, J. P. Das, & N. O'Connor, New York:
Plenum Press. [rSS]
Schwartz, S. & Dalgliesh, L. (1982) Statistical inference in personality
research Journal of Besearch in Personality, in press. [rSS]
Schwartz, S. & Johnson, J. H. (1981) Psyehopathology of childhood.
Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press. [rSS]
Schwartz, S. & Kirsner, K. (1982) Laterality effects in visual information-
processing. Hemispheric specialisation or the orienting of attention?
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 34A:61-77. [rSS]
Sechehaye, M. A. (1951) Symbolic realisation. New York: International
Universities Press. [DB]
Senf, R., Huston, P. E. & Cohen, B. D. (1955) Thinking deficit in
schizophrenia and changes with amytal. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 50:383-87. [SRK]
Shakow, D. (1979) Adaptation in schizophrenia: The theory of segmcntal sets.
New York: Wiley-Interscience. [SRK]
Shapiro, A K , Shapiro, E. S , Brown, R. D. & Sweet, R. D. (1978) Cities de
la Tourette syndrome. New York: Raven Press. [rSS]
Sheehan, S. (1981) A reporter at large (Creedmore, pt. 1). New Yorker, 25
May. [taSS]
Shiffrin, R. M. & Schneider, W. (1977) Controlled and automatic human
information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and
a general theory. Psychological Review 84:127-90. [KHN]
Siegel, A., Harrow, H., Reilly, F. E. & Tucker, G. J. (1976) Loose
associations and disordered speech patterns in chronic schizophrenia.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 162:105-12. [RFA]
Silverberg-Shalev, R., Gordon, H. W., Bentin, S. & Aranson, A. (1981)
Selective language deterioration in chronic schizophrenia. Journal of
Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 44:547-51. [FO]
Singer, M. T. & Wynne, L. C. (1966) Communication styles in parents of
normals, neurotics and schizophrenics. Psychiatric Research Reports
20:25-38. [taSS]
Slobin, D. (1979) Psycholinguistics. 2d ed. Oakland, N.J.: Scott, Foresman
and Co. [EC]
Smith, E. E. (1970) Associative and editing processes in schizophrenic
communication. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 76:182-86. [taSS]
Sommer, R, Dewar, R. & Osmond, H. (1960) Is there a schizophrenic
language? Archives of General Psychiatry 3:665-73. [taSS]
Space, L. G., Nideffer, R. F., Cromwell, R. L. & Dwyer, P. (1982) Choice
reaction time in good and poor premorbid schizophrenics. In prep.
[RLC]
Spence, J. T. & Lair, C. V. (1965) Associative interference in the paired
associate learning of remitted and nonremitted schizophrenics. Journal of
Abnonnal Psychology 70:119-22. [RFA]
Spence, J. T. & Spence, K. W. (1966) The motivational components of
manifest anxiety: Drive and drive stimuli. In: Anxiety and behavior, ed.
C. D. Spielberger. New York: Academic Press. [RFA]
Sperry, R. (1968) Hemisphere disconnection and unity in conscious awareness.
American Psychologist 23:723-33. [taSS]
Spitzer, R. L., Endicott, J. & Robins, E. (1978) Research diagnostic criteria:
Rationale and reliability. Archives of General Psychiatry 35:773-82. [JCM.
taSS]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5 625
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
References/Schwartz: Is there a schizophrenic language?
Spitzer, R. L. & Fleiss, J. L. (1974) A reanalysis of the reliability of psychiatric
diagnosis. British Journal of Psychology 125:341-47. [JCM, taSS]
Spitzer, R. L., Forman, J. B. W. & Nee, J. (1979) DSM-llI field trials: Initial
interrater diagnostic ability. American Journal of Psychiatry
136.815-17. [KMC, taSS]
Spitzer, R. L , Williams, J. B. W. & Skodol, A. E (1980) DSM-III. The
major achievements and an overview. American Journal of Psychiatry
137:151-64. [JCM]
Steingart, I. & Freedman, N. (1976) The organization of body-focused kinesic
behavior and language construction in schizophrenic and depressed
states. In. Psychoanalysis and contemporary science, vol 4, ed. D. P.
Spence. New York. International Universities Press [WW]
Stilson, D. W. & Kopell, B. S. (1964) The recognition of visual signals in the
presence of visual noise by psychiatric patients. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease 139:209-21. [KHN]
Stilson, D. W., Kopell, B. S., Vandenbergh, R. & Downs, M. P. (1966)
Perceptual recognition in the presence of noise by psychiatric patients.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 142:235-47. [KHN]
Straube, E. R. (1979) On the meaning of electrodermal nonresponding in
schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
167:601-11. [DRH]
Straube, E., Barth, U. & Konig, B. (1979) Do schizophrenics use linguistic
rules in speech recall? British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology
18-407-15. [TFO]
Strauss, J. S & Carpenter, W. T. (1972) The prediction of outcome in
schizophrenia: 1. Characteristics of outcome. Archives of General
Psychiatry 27:739-46. [RAK]
Sullivan, H. S. (1944) The language of schizophrenia. In. Language and
thought in schizophrenia, ed. J. S. Kasanin. New York: Norton. [taSS]
(1953) The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York. Norton. [CN]
Szasz, T. S. (1960) The myth of mental illness. American Psychologist,
15:113-18. [rSS]
Thomas, E. J. & Mueller, B. (1969) Appendectomy: Diagnostic criteria and
hospital performance. Hospital Practice 4:72. [taSS]
Thorndike, L. L. & Lorge, I. (1944) The teacher's word book of 30,000
words. New York: Columbia University Press. [FO]
Traupmann, K. L. (1975) Effects of categorization and imagery on recognition
and recall by process and reactive schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 84:307-14. [SRK]
Traupmann, K. L., Berzofsky, M. & Kesselman, M. (1976) Encoding of
taxonomic word categories by schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 85:350-55. [taSS]
Truscott, T. P. (1970) Contextual constraint and schizophrenic language.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 35.189-94. [taSS]
Tschudi, F. & Rommetveit, R. (1982) Sociality, intersubjectivity, and social
processes: The sociality corollary. In: The construing person, ed. J. C.
Mancuso & J. R. Adams-Webber, pp. 235-61. New York: Praeger.
Ullmann, L. P., Krasner, C. & Edinger, R. L. (1964) Verbal conditioning of
common associations in long-term schizophrenic patients. Behavior
Research and Therapy 2:15-18. [taSS]
Underwood, G. (1978) Concepts in information processing theory. In:
Strategies of information processing, ed. G. Underwood. London:
Academic Press. [DRH]
Van Dijk, T. A. (1972) Some aspects of text grammars. The Hague:
Mouton. [JRM]
(1980) Macrostructures: An interdisciplinary study of global structures in
discourse, interaction, and cognition. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. [EC, JCM]
Von Domarus, E. (1944) The specific laws of logic in schizophrenia. In:
Language and thought in schizophrenia, ed. J. S. Kasanin. New York.
Norton. [taSS, KZ1
Vonnegut, M. (1976) The Eden express New York: Bantam Books. [EC]
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962) Thought and language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press [RFA, FB, WW]
Walker, E (1981) Attentional and neuromotor functions of schizophrenics,
schizoaffectives, and patients with other affective disorders. Archives of
General Psychiatry 38:1355-58. [KHN, rSS]
Weintraub, W. (1981) Verbal behavior; Adaptation and psychopathology.
New York. Springer. [WW]
West, R. (1958) An agnostic's speculations about stuttering. In: Stuttering. A
symposium, ed. J. Eisenson. New York: Harper. [BDC]
Wickens, D. D. (1972) Characteristics of word encoding. In: Coding processes
in human memory, ed. A. W. Melton & E. Martin. Washington, D.C.:
Winston & Sons. [SRK]
Williams, E. B. (1964) Deductive reasoning in schizophrenia. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 69.47-61. [taSS]
Williams, R. M., Hcmsley, D. R. & Denning-Duke, C. (1976) Language
behavior in acute and chronic schizophrenics. British Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology 15:73-83. [DRH, rSS]
Wing, J. K. (1978) The social context of schizophrenia. American Journal of
Psychiatry 135.1333-38. [taSS]
Wishner, J. & Wahl, O. (1974) Dichotic listening in schizophrenia. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 42:538-46. [RAK, taSS]
Wohlberg, G. & Kornetsky, C. (1973) Sustained attention in remitted
schizophrenics. Archives of Ceneral Psychiatry 28.533-37. [RFA]
Woods, W. L. (1938) Language study in schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous
and Mental Disease 87:290-316. [BDC]
Wreschner, A. (1907) Die Reproduktion und Assoziation von Vorstellungen.
Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologie 3.1-599. [taSS]
Yusin, A., Nihira, K & Mortashed, C. (1974) Major and minor criteria in
schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry 131:688-92. [taSS]
Zaimov, K. (1973) Paralogical thinking. Nevrologia, psihiatria i nevrohirurgia
(Sofia) 12:267-72 (in Bulgarian). [KZ]
(1981a) Affective paraadaptive reactions of the personality. Sofia, Medicina i
Fizkultura (in Bulgarian). [KZ]
(1981b) Associative process in semantic jargon and in schizophrenic
language. In: Jargonaphasia, ed. J. W. Brown, pp. 151-68. New York:
Academic Press. [KZ]
Zaimov, K., Geranliev, B., Beltchev, D. & Zaimova, S. (1960) Some
observations on the process of thinking of chronic schizophrenic patients
in the course of occupational therapy. Words of the High Medical
Institute of Sofia 39.115-32 (in Bulgarian). [KZ]
Zubin, J. & Spring, B. (1977) Vulnerability - A new view of schizophrenia.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 86:103-26. [TFO]
626 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1982) 5
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00013698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:46:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
